romantic and healthful region and discussed the importance of speedily connecting it with Manila by a railway, which could be accomplished by a line 55 miles in length, from Dagupan to Baguio, the former being the northern terminus of the Manila and Dagupan Railway, now in operation. The preliminary survey, at that time being made, has been completed by Capt. Charles W. Mead, a competent civil engineer, and now city engineer of Manila. He advised us that it would be necessary to build a highway along the proposed route of the railway, in order to enable a final instrumental survey to be made, and that this highway would also be useful, if not indispensable, when the railway was put in course of construction. Accordingly the requisite appropriation for building the highway was made and the work put in charge of Captain Mead. He has been much delayed by the difficulty of procuring the labor requisite for its early completion and several months will yet elapse before it is finished. It is being constructed in the most substantial manner and will be useful both whilst the railway is being built and thereafter.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

At the date of the last preceding report of the commission, a certain number of courts of justices of the peace had been established in the capitals of some of the provinces, the courts of first instance had been established in the provinces of Manila, Pangasinan, Cagayan, Isabela, Cavite, Iloilo, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Ilocos Norte, Bataan, Cebu, Bohol, La Union and Benguet, and a supreme court for the islands had been organized. Most of these courts had been organized by military orders prior to September 1, 1900, on which date the commission first had legislative authority. The judges and justices of all these courts, except the supreme court, were Filipinos. In the supreme court the minority were Americans. These courts had not been established as a regular system for the administration of justice, but as provisional and temporary expedients to meet the exigencies arising in provinces where civil courts could be of utility. They were unsatisfactory and a reorganization of the whole system was regarded as indispensable as soon as such action could properly be taken. These courts had not all been instituted at one time, but had gradually been brought into being as rapidly as conditions warranted. Meanwhile, pending the reorganization of the courts and the enactment of improved methods of procedure, several laws were enacted by the commission, to meet pressing needs.

On the 21st day of December, 1900, act No. 63 was passed, providing that in the construction of acts enacted by the commission, the English text should govern; but that in obvious cases of ambiguity, omission or mistake the Spanish text might be consulted to explain the English text.

On the 10th day of August, 1900, the Hon. Antonio Majorreis del Rosario, judge of the court of first instance of the district of Binondo, in the city of Manila, was suspended from the further performance of the duties of his office by order of the military governor, Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, for alleged malfeasance in office. In October, 1900, Judge Majorreis made a written application to the commission, wherein he prayed that the cause of his suspension might be inquired into by it and that he might be reinstated in office or be permanently removed, as justice might require. In response to that application, the commission set apart the 17th day of December for the purpose of hearing the charges against Judge Majorreis and his defense, and upon that day and subsequent days the facts which led to his suspension from office were fully heard on due notice to all parties. On the 5th day of January, 1901, the commission announced its decision, that the suspension ordered by the military governor on the 10th day of August, 1900, ought to be made permanent and that the judge should be removed from his office and so ordered. It was found as a fact that in the executive action of Regidor v. Hartman, Judge Majorreis had rendered a final judgment for $30,000 in favor of the plaintiff and had issued execution against the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank when that bank was not a party to the action, had never been cited to appear and protect its rights and the judge was authentically informed that the bank denied having in its possession any funds or property belonging to Hartman subject to execution, and when its efforts to be heard in vindication of its rights were entirely disregarded and defeated by the judge.

The fundamental principle, not only of the universal sense of justice and right, but also of every civilized system of jurisprudence, that no one should be condemned unheard, and that judgment should not be rendered and execution should not issue in any case against anyone until he had had his day in court, had been completely violated by Judge Majorreis, and that violation had occurred in an action where great pecuniary interest was at stake and where redress was impossible if the execution ordered by him had been enforced. So complete a violation of fundamental principles as to shock the moral sense indicated such a shortage of moral discrimination and such a disregard of the plain difference between justice and injustice that it was considered that his continuance in office would be highly detrimental to the good name of the courts and to the due administration of justice. The decision in this case is found in the "Public laws and resolutions passed by the United States Philippine Commission" during the quarter ending February 28, 1901, on page 1 of the public resolutions therein printed.

On the same date, the decision of the commission in the San Jose College case was rendered. The history of that case is stated in

another portion of this report, and the decision is embraced in the volume last above referred to.

On the 22d day of January, 1901, act No. 75 was passed, providing an easy remedy against judgments obtained by fraud, accident or mistake, which enables the supreme court on petition, upon just terms, to grant relief against judgments that have been obtained by fraud, accident or mistake, and to grant appeal where the right to appeal had been lost by reason of either of the grounds above stated. This act is in accordance with the procedure that obtains in many of the States of the United States and was rendered necessary as emergency legislation to afford redress against iniquitous judgments obtained by fraud which were about to be enforced and against which the existing Spanish law furnished no adequate relief.

On January 24, 1901, act No. 76, conferring admiralty jurisdiction upon provost courts, was enacted. There were no courts existing in the islands at that time which clearly had jurisdiction over maritime contracts, torts, injuries or offenses, and the existing civil courts were so dilatory in their dispatch of business that it was deemed essential to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon provost courts, where speedy justice could be rendered in relation to admiralty controversies, criminal and civil, so that vessels might not unduly be delayed in the waters of these islands, awaiting the determination of a maritime controversy. The right of review of the proceedings of the provost courts, acting in admiralty was by the act conferred upon the military governor in cases where the proceedings were had in the court located in Manila, and upon the commanding general of the department in which the court was located if the proceedings were had in a court located at another port in the Philippine Islands. The commanding general or military governor, as the case might be, was thus given substantially the same power over admiralty proceedings conducted in the provost courts that he had over other proceedings conducted by those courts.

Under the Spanish procedure, a system of challenging of judges, magistrates and justices of the peace existed, which was found to result in an absolute paralysis of all the machinery of justice in certain cases. Aside from the ordinary grounds of disqualification of judges which exist in the United States, the Spanish law allowed a peremptory challenge of the competency of judicial officers on the ground of undue friendship or hostility to either party or his counsel. Upon these or other grounds, it was practicable for the party to challenge the competency of a judge or magistrate at nearly every stage of the proceedings, when the party wished to secure delay or imagined that the judge or magistrate was liable to decide against him. Upon the filing of the challenge as to the competency of the judge or magistrate, the question of competency was referred to another judge or magistrate to

determine, and the original proceedings awaited the termination of this side issue. But the competency of the judge or magistrate sitting to determine the competency of the first judge or magistrate, could be challenged upon the same ground, and the fitness of the second judge or magistrate to sit in the trial of the question of the competency of the first one was referred to a third, and so on, ad infinitum. Criminal prosecutions were pending in the city of Manila, in which every available judge and justice had been challenged, so that the alleged criminal was able to hold the public entirely at bay and prevent all proceedings to secure his conviction. To meet this difficulty, act No. 81 was enacted on January 28, 1901, repealing all those portions of the Spanish civil and criminal codes of procedure authorizing the challenge of judges, magistrates, justices of the peace, assessors and auxiliaries to tribunals, and providing that the ordinary disqualifications of pecuniary interest, relationship to either party within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or having been counsel in an action, should exist, and that the judge or magistrate should determine upon the question of his own competency immediately, as is done in the United States, and proceed with the action or retire from it, according to his determination upon that question, and that no appeal or stay of action should be allowed from or by reason of his decision in favor of his own competency until after the final judgment in his court. This act furnished an immediate relief in many cases and allowed the clogged machinery once more to get in motion.

REORGANIZATION OF COURTS.

On the 11th day of June, 1901, the commission enacted act No. 136, providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine Islands, which act took effect on the 16th day of June. The preparation of this act, as well as of the code of civil procedure hereinafter referred to, was intrusted to Commissioner Ide soon after the arrival of the commission in the islands, and the first draft of the act was prepared by him during the year succeeding his assignment for that purpose. After the completion of the first draft of the two acts, they were revised by President Taft and Commissioner Wright, the other two members of the commission having a legal education. When the work of revision by the commissioners had been concluded, the proposed acts were printed in the Spanish and English languages and distributed to the bar and all others of the public who were interested, and public discussion thereof was invited. The public sessions of the commission for the discussion of these important enactments extended over a period of nearly two months. It thus became practicable for the commission to receive most important aid and information in the perfection of the laws and their adaptation to local conditions.

Act No. 136, providing for the organization of courts, establishes a