To conclude then, what shall we denominate the artificial system, or organ of truth, as it has been called, of which we have been treating? Shall we style it the art of reasoning? So honourable an appellation it by no means merits, since, as hath been shewn, it is ill adapted to scientific matters, and for that reason never employed by the mathematician; and is utterly incapable of assisting us in our researches into nature. Shall we then pronounce it the science of logomachy, or in plain English, the art of fighting with words, and about words? And in this wordy warfare, shall we say that the rules of syllogizing are the tactics? This would certainly hit the matter more nearly; but I know not how it happens, that to call any thing logomachy or altercation, would be considered as giving bad names; and when a good use may be made of an invention, it seems unreasonable to fix an odious name upon it, which ought only to discriminate the abuse. I shall therefore only title it, the scholastic art of disputation *. It is the schoolmen's science of defence.

* It answers to that branch of logic which Lord Verulam styles Doctrina de elenchis hermeniæ; concerning which he affirms," Dedimus ei nomen ex usp, quia verus ejus usus est planè redargutio, et cautio circa usum ver"borum. Quinimo partem illam de prædicamentis, si rectè instituatur, "circa cautiones de non confundendis aut transponendis definitionum et "divisionum terminis, præcipuum usum sortiri existimamus, et huc etiam * referri malumus." De Aug. Sci. In v. e. 4.

When all erudition consisted more in an acquaintance with words, and an address in using them, than in the knowledge of things, dexterity in this exercitation conferred as much lustre on the scholar, as agility in the tilts and tournaments added glory to the knight. In proportion as the attention of mankind has been drawn off to the study of Nature, the honours of this contentious art have faded, and it is now almost forgotten. There is no reason to wish its revival, as eloquence seems to have been very little benefited by it, and philosophy still less.

Nay, there is but too good reason to affirm, that there are two evils at least which it has gendered. These are, first, an itch of disputing on every subject, however uncontrovertible; the other, a sort of philosophic pride, which will not permit us to think that we believe any thing, even a self-evident principle, without a previous reason or argument. In order to gratify this passion, we invariably recur to words, and are at immense pains to lose ourselves in clouds of our own raising. We imagine we are advancing and making wonderful progress, while the mist of words in which we have involved our intellects, hinders us from discerning that we are moving in a circle all the time *.

How ridiculous are the efforts which some very learned and judicious men have made, in order to evince that whatever begins to exist must have One argues, "There must have been a cause to determine the

a cause.

"time and place," as though it were more evident that the accidents could not be determined without a cause, than that the existence of the thing could not be so determined. Another insists very curiously, that if a thing had no cause, it must have been the cause of itself; a third, with equal consistency, that nothing must have been the cause. Thus, by always assuming the absolute necessity of a cause, they demonstrate the absolute necessity of a cause. For a full illustration of the futility of such pretended reasonings, see the Treatise of Human Nature, B. I. Part iii. Sect. 3. I do not think they have succeeded better who have attempted to assign a reason for the faith we have in this principle, that the future will resemble the past. A late author imagines, that he solves the difficulty at once, by saying, that "what is now time past, was once future; and that though no man has had "experience of what is future, every man has had experience of what was "future." Would it then be more perspicuous to state the question thus, "How come we to believe that what is future, not what was future, will re"semble the past ?" Of the first he says expressly, that no man has had experience, though almost in the same breath he tells us, not very consistently, "The answer is sufficient, have we not always found it to be so ?" an answer which appears to me not more illogical than ungrammatical. But admitting with him, that to consider time as past or future (though no distinction can be more precise) is only puzzling the question; let us enquire whether a reason can be assigned, for judging that the unknown time will resemble the known. Suppose' our whole time divided into equal portions. Call these portions A, B, C, D, E, F, G. experienced, the remaining four are not. one another, but how must I argue with was like A, therefore D will be like C; or, if you think it strengthens the argument, shall I say, C resembled A and B, therefore D will resemble A, B, and C. would gladly know what sort of reasoning, scientifical or moral, this could be denominated; or what is the medium by which the conclusion is made out? Suppose, further, I get acquainted with D, formerly unknown, and find that it actually resembles A, B, and C, how can this furnish me with any knowledge of E, F, and G, things totally distinct? The resemblance I have discovered in D to A, B, and C, can never be extended to any thing that is not D, nor any part of D, namely to E, F, and G; unless you assume this as the medium, that the unknown will resemble the known; or, which is equivalent, that the future will resemble the past. So far is this principle, therefore, from being deduced from particular experience, that it is fundamental to all particular deductions from experience, in which we could not advance a single step without it. We are often misled in cases of this nature, by a vague and popular use of words, not attend

Of these the three first have been The three first I found to resemble regard to the rest? Shall I say, B

ing to the nicer differences in their import in different situations. If one were to ask me, "Have you then no reason to believe that the future will "resemble the past ?" I should certainly answer, "I have the greatest reason to believe it." And if the question had been concerning a geometrical axiom, I should have returned the same answer. By reason we often mean, not an argument, or medium of proving, but a ground in human nature on which a particular judgment is founded. Nay further, as no progress in reasoning can be made where there is no foundation, (and first principles are here the sole foundation) I should readily admit, that the man who does not believe such propositions, if it were possible to find such a man, is perfectly irrational, and consequently not to be argued with.

CHAP, VII.

Of the consideration which the speaker ought to have of the Hearers, as Men in general.

RHETORIC, as was observed already, not only considers the subject, but also the hearers and the speaker*. The hearers must be considered in a twofold view, as men in general, and as such men in particular.

As men in general, it must be allowed there are certain principles in our nature, which, when properly addressed and managed, give no inconsiderable aid to reason in promoting belief. Nor is it just to conclude from this concession, as some have hastily done, that oratory may be defined, "The art of deception." The use of such helps will be found, on a stricter examination, to be in most cases quite legitimate, and even necessary, if we would give reason herself that influence which is certainly her due. In order to evince the truth considered by itself, conclusive arguments alone are requisite; but in order to convince me by these arguments, it is moreover requisite that they be understood, that they be attended to, that they be remembered by me; and in order to persuade me by them, to any