Public Choice and Constitutional EconomicsJames D. Gwartney, Richard E. Wagner JAI Press, 1988 - 422 Seiten Five of the papers were originally developed at a symposium on government, the economy, and the constitution sponsored by the Policy Sciences Program of Florida State University in March 1986 and subsequently published in the Cato journal, fall 1987. Includes bibliographies and indexes. |
Inhalt
PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE CONDUCT | 3 |
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER | 26 |
THE CONSTITUTION OF ECONOMIC POLICY | 98 |
Urheberrecht | |
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