Prices of Grain. Meteorological Diary.—Bill of Mörtality. AVERAGE PRICES of CORN, from March 7, to March 12, 17746 Wheat Rye Bar. Oats Beans 5 93 3 42 13 3 COUNTIES INLAND. 'COUNTIES upon the COAS♪. Northampton 7 s Rutland 12 72 Derby 6 ၅၁ 03 112 Monmouth Devon 6 30 03 5 ·6 54 43 61 11 Stafford Shropshire Hereford 102 4 9 Hampshire Worcester 9,0 C3 12 Suffex S 70 93 2 7 102 34 4 A Meteorological DIARY of the Weather for APRIL, 1773. many flying clouds, fome ftrong fhowers of hail a very wet morning, fine afternoon froft in the night, bright morning, wet afternoon fmart froft in the night, a very fine bright day chiefly cloudy, but fair fome flying clouds, but a fine day an exceffive bright fine day cloudy, with a few drops of Bill of Mortality from Feb. 22, 1774, to March 26, 1774. Α FTER Baron Eyre had finifhed, Mr. Justice Nares delivered his opinion on the fubject. He began by obferving, that the hiftorical nature of the cafe had been fo learnedly and fully agitated in the hearing of the houfe, that he should wave entering into it, and fhould rather reft his opinion on general conclufions, deduced from principles which arofe from fair argument. He ftated to the house why he thought a common-law right in literary property did exift, and why the ftatute of Queen Anne did not take it away. He obferved, that he was of Mr. Dunning's fentiments, that, as it was admitted on all hands that an au thor had a beneficial interest in his own manufcript before publication, it was a moft extraordinary circumftance that he fhould lofe that beneficial intereft the very first moment he attempted to exercise it. Mr. Juftice Nares put feveral cales to fupport his argument; and the ftatute, he faid, did not take away the common-law remedy, although it gave an additional one, as in the case of an action for maliciously fuing out a commiffion of bankruptcy, although the ftatutes of bankruptcy have provided an additional penalty for that offence by the bond given to the Chancellor. After having spoken near an hour, he concluded with anfwering the questions in a manner directly oppofite to that of Mr. Baron Eyre. Judge Afburst then rofe, and accord ed in the fame opinion with Mr. Juf 1774. tice Nares, after tracing the nature of literary property, and producing many cogent reafons to prove that fuch a claim was warranted by the principles of natural juftice and folid reafon, Making an author's intellectual ideas common, was, he observed, giving the purchaser an opportunity of using those ideas, and profiting by them, while they inftructed and entertained him; but he could not conceive that the vender, for the price of five fhillings, fold the purchaser a right to multiply copies, and fo get five hundred pounds. Literary property was to be defined and defcribed as well as other matters, and matters which were tangible. Every thing was property that was capable of being known or defined, capable of a feparate enjoyment, and of value to the owner. Literary property fell within the terms of this definition, Ac cording to the appellants, if a man lends his manufcript to his friend, and his friend prints it, or if he lofes it, and the finder prints it, yet an action would lie (as Mr. Juftice Yeates had admitted), which thewed that there was a property beyond the materials, the paper and print. That a man, by publishing his book, gave the public nothing more than the use of it. A man may give the public a highway through his field, and if there was a mine under that highway, it was neverthelefs his property. It has been said, that when the bird was once out of the hand, it was become common, and the property of whoever caught it. This was not wholly true, for there was a cafe upon the law books, where a hawk with bells about its neck had flown away; a perfon detained it, and an action was brought at common law against the person who did detain it. A book with an author's name to it, was the hawk with the bells about its neck, and an action might be brought against whoever pirated it. Since Arguments for and against Literary Property. Since the ftatute of monopolies, no question could exit about niechanical inventions. Manufactures were at a very low ebb till Queen Elizabeth's time. In the reign of James the Firft, the ftatute of monopolies was paffed; fince that act no inventor could maintain an action without a patent. 'Tis the policy of kingdoms, and pr. fervation of trade, to exclyde them. The appellants were contending for the right of printing; but the right of exerciling a trade with another man's materials, could not be allowed either by reason or natural juftice. A miller might grind corn, a carpenter might build a houfe; but the first was not warranted in grinding any corn but his own, nor the carpenter in building a house with another man's wood. The cafes of Evre and Walker, and Tonfon and Walker, happened fince the ftatute. With regard to the queftion, its being capable of perpetuity, few subjects were fo. Even land, the most tangible fpecies of property, might be washed away by the tea, and therefore might be rendered incapable of being He' thought, perjetually enjoyed. however, that the refpondents were entitled to as full an enjoyment, as the nature of the cafe could allow. As foon as Judge Ashu ft had concluded. be informed the house that Judge Blackflone was ill with the gout, but had fent his written opinion, which he read to the house. Judge Blackflone in general terms, aufwered the five questions, and was of the fame opinion with his bretheren, Mr. Justice Nares and Mr. Juftice Adhurst, Mr. Justice Willes, after having fhewn of what species of property the author's copy ight partook,-that it was ettate perfonal, that it was affignable, and that every man conceived what it meant, declared it as his opinion, that an author had an indifputable power and dominion over his manuscript; that that power was not alienated when the manufcript was printed and publifhed; that the author had an exclufive right of multiplying copies according to the common law, which was founded on reafon and truth. This claim of right begin with printing, and for this especial reafon, becaute copies could not be easily multiplied but by the prefs," and, therefore, that from which no profit could be got, was hardly a proparty. In the couife of the arguments this claim had been called by the odious name of a monopoly. This was a popular argument; but argumenta ad populum were not always well founded; and, upon proper investigation, this appeared to be more fpecious than real. After a variety of learned obfervations and feveral inftances cited to prove that copy-right did exift independent of patents, privileges, ftarchamber decrees, or the ftatute of Queen Anne; particularly the cafe of Tillotson's fermons, for the copy right of which the Archbishop's family received twenty-five hundred pounds after the expiration of the licenfing act, and previous to the a& of Queen Anne; Judge Willes gave his opinion upon the firft, fecond, and fourth questions, that at common law an author had the fole right of firft printing and publish ing the fame for fale, and might bring. an action against any person who print ed, published, and fold the fame without confent; and likewife that, after publication, an author or his affigns had an exclusive right in perpetuity of multiplying copies. He then proceeded upon the ftatute of Queen Anne, which he declared did not take away that right. It was, he obferved, an act very inaccurately penned, but nevertheless it conveyed to his mind no idea of the legifatuie's entertaining an opinion, that, at the time of paffing it, there was no common-law right. The word vefling appearing in the title had given rife to fuch an idea, but the preamble contradicted it in the fullest manner. The words of it were, "Whereas certain printers and book fellers have taken the liberty of printing and reprinting," &c. &c. The phrafeology of this fentence plainly proved, that a known tight previous to that ftatute exifted; the legiflature would not have termed the exercise of what was common to all, taking a liberty: had they not understood that a right in perpetuity exifted at common law, the words of the preamble to the bill would probably have been, "Whereas certain printers and book fellers claim a right of printing," &c. and the intention of the word printing thewed, that the idea prevailed that an author's property went farther than the first. publication. The univerfity of the faving clause, Judge Willes fid, convinced him that the right of common law, which he had fuppofed to have exifted antecedent to that act, was left untouched by it; that Arguments for and against Literary Property. that it was not a particular falvo for the univerfiries, and the holders of copy-right by patent, but that it was general, mentioning the words "all perfons." Having by a multitude of forcible arguments maintained the doctrine of a perpetuity, he answered the third and fifth questions by giving it as his opinion, that an action at common law was not any ways impeached, restrained, or taken away, by the ftatute of Queen Anne, nor was the author piecluded by fuch ftatute from any remedy, except on the foundation of the faid ftatute, and the terms and conditions prefcribed thereby. common Mr. Juftice Afton next gave his anfwer, beginning with reading a learned Judge's fentiments in favour of literary property, as reported by Sir James Burrow; he agreed with the three Judges who had spoke before him, that it was a property, and that it be. longed to an author independent of any ftatutary fecurity. It was not neceffary, he obferved, for any man to advert either to the Grecians or Romans to difcover the principles of the com. mon law of England. Every country had fome certain general rules which governed its law; that our law had its foundation in private juf tice, moral fitnefs, and public convenience; the natural rights of every fubject were protected by it, and there did not exilt an argument which would amount to conviction that an author had not a natural right to the produce of his mental labours. If this ight originally exifted, what but an act of his own could take it away? By publication he only exercifed his over it in one fenfe; when one book power was fold, it never could be thought that the purchater had poffeffed himfelf of that property which the author held before he published his work. A real abandonment on the part of the first owner must have taken place, before his original right became com mon. In all abandonments, Judge Yeates had defined, that two circumftances. were neceffary; an actual relinquishing the poffeffion, and an intention to relinquilh it; in the prefent cafe neither Could be proved. Many manufcripts had not been committed to the prefs till years after they were written; the poffeffion, of them for a century did, not invalidate the claim of the author or his affigns, With regard to me ་ 101 chanical inftruments, becaufe the act against monopolies had rendered it necellary for the inventors of them to feek fecurity under a parent, it could be no argument why in literary property there should be no common-law right. He thought it would be more liberal to conclude, that, previous to the monopoly ftatute, there exifted a common law right, equally to an inventor of a machine and author of a book. After a variety of arguments drawn from the nature of the the construction which would rationally property, and be put upon the act of publication, Judge Alton gave his opinion in favour of the first, fecond, and fourth questions. With regard to the ftatute of Queen Anne, he observed, that it was no more than a temporary fecurity, given by the legiflature to the author, enabling him to recover penalties, and bring a matter of complaint against any perfon who printed upon him to a more certain iffue than by an action at common law. It was an act paffed for the encouragement of learned men, and being fo termed in its title, it was a fufficient proof that it was no bar to the common-law right which exifted previous to its being enacted. He read the preamble, and contended, that it was evident from the wording of it, that it meant to give an additional fecurity to a right which they who pass manner of paffing it fpoke in favour ed the act knew exifted. Eefides, the ginal bill as prefented to the committee of this idea. He had feen the oriappointed to brag it in, and it then had a long flourishing preamble, which the committee ftruck out. Those who were fanguine for the petitioners, begged a perpetuity by ftatute. The enemies ftatutary fecurity. The bill gave parto them at first refused to grant any ticular trouble in paffing; there were feveral conferences between the two houles upon it; and the very day it paffed, it was fo backward, that the Queen did not come to the house till faving claufe was clearly a falvo to the three in the afternoon. Befides, the common-law right. The idea was as forcibly expreffed, as words could exprefs it. After citing the injunctions granted by the court of Chancery, and ufing a multitude of circumftances in favour of literary property, he gave his anfwer to the third and fifth questions, declaring it his opinion, that an action at |