[With regard to emblements or the profits of lands sowed by tenant for years, there is this difference between him and tenant for life: that where the term of tenant for years depends upon a certainty, as if he holds from Midsummer for ten years, and in the last year he sows a crop of corn, and it is not ripe and cut before Midsummer, the end of his term, the landlord shall have it,] in the absence of any special contract or custom to the contrary; [for the tenant knew the expiration of his term, and therefore it was his own folly to sow what he never could reap the profits of (t). But where the lease for years depends upon an uncertainty, as upon the death of the lessor, being himself only tenant for life, or being a husband seised in right of his wife (u), or if the term of years be determinable upon a life or lives:] in all these cases, the estate for years not being certainly to expire at a time foreknown, but merely by the act of God, -the tenant for years, or his executors, shall have the emblements in the same manner that a tenant for life, or his executors, shall be entitled thereto (x). Not so, if it determine by the act of the party himself; as if the tenant does anything that amounts to a forfeiture in which case the emblements shall go to the lessor, and not to the lessee, who hath determined his estate by his own default (y). The operation of the common law right to emblements, however, is now much more limited than it once was, having ceased (as we have seen), by the effect of 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25, to apply to such tenants as hold farms or lands at a rack rent under a landlord entitled for life or any other uncertain interest, and whose lease or tenancy determines by the death of their landlord, or by the cesser of his estate; and a pro

:

(t) Litt. s. 68.

(u) A lease for years by a tenant for life, or a husband seised in right of his wife, is not in all cases subject to uncertainty. For by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 32, such persons may now, under such circumstances as

therein mentioned, make effectual leases for any term not exceeding twenty-one years. Vide sup. pp. 258,259,263, 285.

(x) Co. Litt. 56 a; vide sup. p.

264.

(y) Co. Litt. 55 b.

tection of a different kind, being now provided for tenants so circumstanced (z).

II. The second species of estates not freehold, are estates at will (a). An estate at will is where lands and tenements are let by one man to another to have and to hold at the will of the lessor, and the tenant by force of this lease obtains possession (b). It may be constituted by written or verbal agreement without further ceremony, if followed by entry; and may in some cases arise by mere construction of law. [Such tenant hath no certain indefeasible estate; nothing that can be assigned by him to any other; because the lessor may determine his will, and put him out whenever he pleases. But every estate at will is at the will of both parties, landlord and tenant: so that either of them may determine his will, and quit his connexions with the other, at his own pleasure (c). Yet this must be understood with some restriction. For, if the tenant at will sows his land, and the landlord, before the corn is ripe or before it is reaped, puts him out, yet the tenant shall have the emblements, and free ingress, egress, and regress to cut and carry away the profits (d). And this for the same reason upon which all the cases of emblements turn, viz. the point of uncertainty; since the tenant could not possibly know when his landlord would determine his will, and therefore could make no provision against it; and having sown the land, which is for the good of the public, upon a reasonable presumption, the law will not suffer him to be a loser by it. But it is otherwise, and upon reason equally good, where the tenant himself determines the will; for in this case the landlord shall have the profits of the land (e).]

The liability of a tenant at will, in regard to waste of the voluntary kind, is similar to that of tenant for years (ƒ);

but he is understood to be not liable for waste merely permissive (f).

[What act does, or does not, amount to a determination of the will on either side, has formerly been matter of great debate in our courts. But it is now settled, that-besides the express determination of the lessor's will, by declaring that the lessee shall hold no longer, which must either be made upon the land (g), or notice must be given to the lessee (h)-the exertion of any act of ownership by the lessor,] without the lessee's consent, puts an end to or determines the estate at will; as, for example, [entering upon the premises and cutting timber (i), or taking a distress for rent and impounding it thereon (k), or making a feoffment, or lease for years of the lands to commence immediately ().] And the same consequence will follow [any act of desertion by the lessee, as assigning his estate to another, which is an act inconsistent with such a tenure (m);] or his committing waste (n). Also, [which is instar omnium, the death or outlawry of either lessor or lessee (o).]

The law is, however, careful [that no sudden determination of the will by one party, shall tend to the manifest and unforeseen prejudice of the other. This appears in the case of emblements before mentioned; and, by a parity of reason, the lessee, after the determination of the lessor's will, shall have reasonable ingress and egress to fetch away his goods and utensils (p). And, if rent be payable quarterly or half-yearly, and the lessee determines the will, the rent shall be paid to the end of the current quarter or half-year (7). And, upon the same principle, courts of law

(f) See Harnett v. Maitland, 16 Mee. & W. 257.

(g) Co. Litt. 55 b.

(h) Hinchman v. Iles, 1 Ventr. 248.

(i) Co. Litt. 55 b. So by carrying away stone, Turner v. Doe d. Bennett, 9 M. & W. 643.

(k) Co. Litt. 57 b.

(1) 1 Roll. Abr. 860; Disdale v. Iles, 2 Lev. 88.

(m) Co. Litt. 57 a.

(n) Ibid.; 1 Watk. Copyh. 511. (0) Oland's case, 5 Rep. 116 b; Co. Litt. 57 b, 62 b.

(p) Litt. s. 69.

(q) Leighton v. Theed, 2 Salk. 414; Kighly v. Bulkly, 1 Sid. 339.

[have of late years leaned as much as possible against construing demises, where no certain term is mentioned, to be tenancies at will (r); but have rather held them to be tenancies from year to year so long as both parties please,] and will not suffer either party to determine the tenancy, without reasonable notice to the other; which reasonable notice is now fixed, by general usage, at half a year at the least, ending with the current year of the tenancy (s); though where the tenancy commenced at one of the usual quarterly feast days, the half-year may be computed from one feast day to another, whether there be 182 days between them or not (t).

This tenancy "from year to year," or "by the year," has in modern times almost entirely superseded the old tenancy at will, and prevails so much that it may be proper to enlarge a little more upon its character. It belongs properly to the first species of estate which has been noticed in this chapter, viz. the estate for years; though, from the degree of uncertainty to which its duration is subject, it partakes also in some measure of the nature of an estate at will. It may be created not only by the express agreement of the parties, verbal or written (u), but also by construction of law. Thus, if a man demise land to another at a yearly rent, no length of time being expressed, the law will construe this as a demise from year to year (x). So the law will always imply a tenancy

(r) But a demise, wherein the intention of the parties is evidently to create a tenancy by will, is still so construed by the courts. (See Doe v. Cox, 11 Q. B. 122.)

(s) See Timmins v. Rawlinson, 3 Burr. 1603; Right v. Darby, 1 T. R. 159; Doe v. Smith, 5 Ad. & El. 351; Doe v. Stanion, 1 Mee. & Wels. 695. Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 147) remarks that this kind of lease was in use as long ago as the reign of Henry the eighth, when half a year's notice seems to have been required to de

termine it.

(t) Doe v. Watkins, 7 East, 551; Roe v. Doe, 6 Bing. 574.

(u) But unless made by deed, the rent reserved must be two-thirds of the improved value of the thing demised. (29 Car. 2, c. 29, s. 3; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3.)

(x) See Doe v. Donavan, 1 Taunt. 555; Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128; Shirley v. Newman, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 266; Doe v. Hazell, ib. 94; Wilkinson v. Hall, 3 Bing. N. C. 508.

from year to year where land is occupied at an annual rent, and there is no evidence that the occupier's estate is of a different description (y). And the case has been adjudged to be the same, if a man is let into possession under a verbal demise for a term of more than three years which, as already observed, must now be by deed (z);-for though such a demise will not be effectual for the term intended, yet it has been held that the lessee must be considered as holding from year to year (a).

With respect to the duration of the interest, it is to be observed, that, as the half-year's notice to determine the estate (or notice to quit as it is called) must always be for quitting at the end of some particular year of the tenancy (b), a lease "from year to year" will necessarily confer an estate for one year certain, at the outset (c); and if in that, or any succeeding year of the tenancy, more than half a year elapse without a notice to quit being given by either of the parties, another year certain is thereby constantly added to that which is in progress. Upon the same principle, if the lease be "for a year, and so from year to year," it will enure as a demise for two years certain, at the outset; for at the expiration of the first, there is a continuation of the tenancy, which cannot be determined by a notice to quit at an earlier period than the expiration of the second year (d). But in other respects the law of duration is the same as in the case first supposed. It is further to be remarked, that the estate from year to year, when once constituted, does not determine (like an

(y) See Doe d. Lord v. Crago, 6

C. B. 90.

(z) Vide sup. p. 293.

(a) See Doe v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471; Clayton v. Blakey, 8 T. R. 3; Lee v. Smith, 9 Exch. 662; Stratton v. Pettit, 16 C. B. 432.

(b) As to the manner of proving a notice to quit, see Doe v. Somerton, 7 Q. B. 58; Stapylton v. Clough.

2 Ell. & Bl. 933. As to the sufficiency of a notice to quit, as given in particular cases, see Doe d. Lyster v. Goldwin, 2 Q. B. 143; Doe d. Bailey v. Foster, 3 C. B. 215.

(c) See Doe d. Hogg v. Taylor, 1 Jur. 960; Doe d. Cornwall v. Matthews, 11 C. B. 675.

(d) Denn v. Cartwright, 4 East, 32.