interposed between the passing of an act and the time of its coming into operation, so as to give the subjects of the realm an opportunity of becoming acquainted with its provisions (x). The rule, it will be observed, is laid down with an exception of the case where the period of commencement is otherwise fixed by the statute itself; for by force of an express provision, or even by necessary construction from the nature of the enactment, the operation of a statute may be either postponed on the one hand, or have a retrospective relation on the other, so as to affect rights which had vested before it received the royal assent, or transactions which had before then taken place (y).

2. Statutes are to be construed not according to their mere letter, but the intent and object with which they were made (z). It occasionally happens therefore that the judges who expound them are obliged, in favour of the intention, to depart in some measure from the words. And this may be either by holding that a case within the words, is not within the meaning; or that a case not within the words, is within the meaning. Thus where a statute provides that all who shall commit a certain act shall be deemed felons, yet a madman who does the act shall not be deemed a felon; for that would be contrary to the presumable intention (a). And so, on the other hand, where an act of parliament gave the owners of inheritances a remedy by action against such tenants holding for life or years as should commit waste (i. e. spoil and destruction); the action was held maintainable against a tenant holding only for one year or less, for so the lawmakers presumably designed (b). In all instances where

(x) This is the principle of the modern French law; vide Code Civil, tit. Prelim.

(y) Upon the subject of construing a statute retrospectively, see Burn v. Carvalho, 1 Ad. & El. 338; Hitchcock v. Way, 6 Ad. & El. 943; Moon

v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22.

(z) Bac. Ab. Statute (1)5; Stradling. Morgan, Plow. 205; Rex v. Everdon, 9 East, 101.

(a) Eyston v. Studd, Plow. 465. (b) Ibid. 467.

the strict letter of the law is thus corrected by reference to its intention, the construction is said to be by equity (c), a phrase not peculiar to the law of England, but used by foreign jurists in the same sense (d). Thus, in the first example, the case would be said to be out of the equity of the act; in the second to be within its equity (e). It is to be observed, however, that this principle of equitable construction is not to be carried beyond certain bounds, and a judge is not at liberty, in favour of a supposed intention, to disregard the express letter of the statute, where, for anything that appears, the wording may correspond with the actual design of the legislature—the maxim in cases of this description being that a verbis legis non recedendum est (f). It is also important to remark, that the rule in question has been applied more freely to the antient statutes than it now is to those of more modern date, which are interpreted somewhat more strictly, and with closer adherence to the letter (g). For the style of framing acts of parliament has itself undergone a material change- those of a more antient era being comparatively short and general in their character, while the later acts are expanded into minute detail, and intended to reach every specific case; and, therefore, in adopting a construction not in strict conformity with the language of the legislature, there is more danger, than there once was, of going beyond, or falling short of, its real intention.

3. Another maxim (and one that may often serve for our guidance in the application of the last,) is, that, in the

(c) Eyston v. Studd, Plow. 465, 467; Co. Litt. 24 b; 1 Bl. Com. 62. The term is of very early occurrence in our law; vide Bract. lib. 1, c. 4, p. 3 a; lib. 2, c. 7, p. 23 b.

(d) Grotius de quitate, s. 3; Puffendorf, Elem. Jur. Un. lib. 1, ss. 22, 23.

(e) 3 Bl. Com. 431. The latter expression is of more familiar occurrence, however, than the former.

(f) Edrich's case, 5 Rep. 118 b.;

and see Jones v. Smart, 1 T. R. 53 ; and R. v. Inhabitants of Great Bentley, 10 Barn. & Cress. 520.

(g) Per Coleridge, J., Rex v. Gardner, 6 Ad. & El. 118; and see Brandling v. Barrington, 6 Barn. & Cress. 475; Rex v. Inhabitants of Barham, 8 Barn. & Cress. 104; Notley v. Buck, ib. 164; Adam v. Inhabitants of Bristol, 2 Ad. & El, 395, 399.

c. 10.

interpretation of statutes in general, the following points are to be considered, -the old law, the mischief, and the remedy; that is, how the common law stood at the making of the act, what the mischief was for which the common law did not provide, and what remedy the parliament hath provided to cure this mischief (h). And here an example may again be found in the restraining statute of 13 Eliz. By the common law the master and fellows of a college, and such other corporations, might let as long leases as they thought proper; the mischief was that they let long and unreasonable leases, to the impoverishment of their successors; the remedy applied by the statute was by making void all leases made by them for longer terms than three lives, or twenty-one years. Now in the construction of this statute it is held, that leases, though for a longer term, made by the masters and fellows of a college or a dean and chapter, are not void during the continuance of the master or the dean; for the act was made for the benefit and protection of the successor (i), and the mischief is therefore sufficiently suppressed by vacating them after the determination of the interest of the grantors; but the leases, during the continuance of the grantors, not being within the mischief, are not within the remedy (k).

4. It is also an established rule, that remedial statutes are to be more liberally, and penal more strictly, construed (1). The statute of Elizabeth just mentioned may again serve as an example; for soon after it was made, the master and fellows of Magdalen College granted certain premises to the queen, her heirs and successors, on condition that she should convey the same to a certain person named and it was contended that this conveyance was not restrained by the act; for that by the general rule of law the sovereign is not bound by a statute unless speci

(h) Heydon's case, 3 Rep. 7; 1 Bl. Com. 87; 2 Inst. 110.

(i) Co. Litt. 45, n. (4), by Harg. ; Bac. Ab. Leases (H); Magdalen

College case, 11 Rep. 73 a.

(k) 1 Bl. Com. 87.
(1) Ibid. 88.

cases true.

ally mentioned; which the court admitted to be in many But as this was a remedial act, and made to to suppress wrong, it was adjudged that it should bind the queen (m). As to the stricter manner in which a penal act must be interpreted, we may resort to an illustration of Lord Bacon's, that if for a certain offence it be enacted that a man shall lose his right hand, and some offender hath had his right hand before cut off in the wars; he shall not lose his left hand, but the crime shall rather pass without the punishment which the law assigned, than the letter of the law shall be extended (n). This distinction applies, it will be observed, not only to remedial and penal statutes properly so called, but also to those of a mixed kind, which contain both remedial and penal provisions (o); -the former of which will be construed with more indulgence than the latter. To exemplify this we may refer to a decision which took place on the 9 Anne, c. 14, against gaming. That statute provided, that if any person shall lose at any time or sitting ten pounds, and shall pay it to the winner, he may recover it back by action within three months; and if the loser does not sue within that time, any other person may sue for it and treble the value besides. An action being brought to recover back a sum which had been won and paid, the question was, whether the money was to be considered as won at any one sitting, so as to fall within the prohibition of the act, there having been an interruption to the play during dinner. And the court held the affirmative, because the action was not brought by a common informer for the penalty, but by the loser to regain his money; and so far as his reimbursement was concerned, the statute was of a remedial character (p).

(m) Magdalen College case, 11 Rep. 72.

(n) Bac. Maxims, 12.

(0) Platt v. Sheriffs of London, Plowd. 36.

(p) Bones v. Booth, W. Bla. 1236.

It may be observed, that the penalties of 9 Ann. c. 14, have been recently repealed by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 15, and the law with regard to gaming differently regulated; vide post, bk. vI. c. XII.

5. In the construction of a statute all other such statutes ought to be taken into consideration as have been made in pari materia (q). Thus by the 7 Geo. II. c. 15, it was enacted, that ship-owners, carrying goods are not to be responsible for losses to such goods, incurred (without their privity) by the misconduct of the master and mariners, to any greater extent than the value of the ship, with all her appurtenances, and the freight. By 26 Geo. III. c. 86, they were exempted from liability for loss incurred by robbery of any persons whatsoever, farther than the value of the ship, with all her appurtenances, and the freight. By 53 Geo. III. c. 159, s. 1, they were not to be answerable for losses arising from any act done without their fault or privity, beyond the value of the ship and freight. Upon the last act a question arose, whether the owner of a vessel was answerable for the value of certain fishing stores belonging to the ship, and lost by an accidental collision at sea: and the court held him answerable; and remarked, that in subsequent sections of the same act, and also in the two preceding acts, which were in pari materia, the words used were ship and all her appurtenances; so that the section in question was to be understood as if the words with all her appurtenances were used therein, supposing that those words would make any difference in the sense (r). This rule, it will be observed, applies whether the prior statutes are referred to in the statute on which the question arises, or not. They are considered, indeed, as all forming one continued enactment (s). 6. [A statute which treats of things or persons of an

(9) Bac. Abr. Statute (1), 2, 3; Jones v. Smart, 1 T. R. 53; King, qui tam v. Smith, 4 T. R. 419; Duck v. Addington, 4 T. R. 447; Gale v. Laurie, 5 Barn. & Cress. 156.

(r) Gale v. Laurie, 5 Barn. & Cress. 156. It may be remarked, that the substance of the provisions in favour of shipowners (as to which

see 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 88), having been incorporated in the 9th part of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, the three acts mentioned in the text are repealed by the Merchant Shipping Repeal Act, 1854, s. 14.

(s) Earl of Aylesbury v. Pattison, 1 Doug. 30.