has not changed her laws, and her manner of acting, but we were not sufficiently acquainted with them. Our mistake should make us more cautious, and quicken our researches, that we may not act upon prereiterated experiments we shall be more sumptions where we can avoid it. By

successful.

powers; on the contrary, it is known, cess. If we do not succeed, nature has on all hands, that there is a connexion, not deceived us, we have suffered ourselves an intimate, inseparable connexion, to be deceived by appearances. Nature between the one and the other. Bread would no longer be bread, should it cease to be nutritious to the race of beings who have been nourished by it; or their natures must be totally changed, not to be nourished by it any longer. But the laws by which these secret powers of nutrition, that inward nature by which they are so wonderfully adapted to the human constitution, may never be known. Thus has our sophist, with more dexterity than ingenuous argumentation will permit, inferred that our ignorance of the arcana of nature destroys our knowledge of existing properties." But Mr. Hume appears to mean by the word connection not conjunction merely, but that which conjoins, that which makes the conjunction necessary, that in short which could not be known without a knowledge of that inward nature in bodies, to which the two events owe the relation of cause

and effect. This distinction, we must however acknowledge, is made not very consistently by a writer, who has laboured to shew that there is nothing without us or within us that seems capable of suggesting the notion of power

or necessary connexion. Because we'

are ignorant, not that there are properties, for this Mr. H. appears to allow, at the same time that he main tains we have no idea of power at all; but because we are ignorant what makes them to be properties, or why certain events have uniformly hitherto followed certain other events, he ventures to maintain," that there is a step," a medium of proof, wanted in our inference from the past to the future; since to assert and re-assert the acknowledged conjunction of events, is not to produce the medium of our reasoning. To these refinements of scepticism, our author has given a sound practical reply:

"Why should past experience be extended to future times, and other objects, which, for aught we know, may be only in appearance? My first answer is, by the question, Why should we not continue our confidence in one who, for aught we know, may continue our friend? who is not prone to deceive, and from whom we have received so many benefits? My second answer is, If these similar appearances should be, in every point, the same, we are sure of suc

suffered, during our ignorance, will augThe disappointments we have ment our knowledge; and they may finally conduct us, through this ignorance, into a more extensive acquaintance with facts, and the laws by which the different parts of nature are governed. As our knowledge increases will our failures decrease, until the past shall become an infallible rule for the future."-Pp. 291, 292.

animadversions on Mr. Hume's metaWe shall conclude our review of the physics, by laying before our readers Dr. Cogan's reply to his objection to miracles. According to Mr. H. though a revelation, and therefore a miracle may be possible (for he does not appear impossible that such an event should to deny this possibility), yet it is wholly

be made credible to me.

"A miracle

he says) is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable the proof against a miracle, from the experience has established these laws, very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." Our author replies: "As every man has an equal right to propose his definition, I beg which all believers in miracles will leave to substitute the following, to give a ready assent, and which unbelievers cannot confute, until they shall them. Whoever admits of the existence have annihilated all the powers above of a miracle, admits that some phænoof the course of nature, hus suddenly and menon, contrary to our usual experience unexpectedly taken place, and been made obvious to the senses of individuals, by the immediate agency of an intelligent power, superior to man. I shall leave it to vellous and miraculous-between the others to distinguish between the mardeceptions of impostors, or the extrávagances of superstitions eredulity, and real miracles. Our subject is confined to the possibility of a miracle, which is so dogmatically denied by this doubting philosopher. If the above definition be admitted, (and by what arguments, will it be opposed?) the possibility of a

miracle cannot be denied, until we shall have experienced that no superior agent exists; or that he is destitute of the requisite power; or that in every state of the moral world a miracle is totally useless; or that the intrinsic nature of a miracle renders it unworthy of a Deity to perform one." But, as we apprehead, the thing to be proved was, not that a miracle is possible, for a genuine sceptical philosopher could have no opinion on such a subject; but that it is not from the nature of the fact incapable of being proved as other facts are proved, by unquestionable testimony: the following reply therefore seems to meet the objection more fairly:

"It (experience) never has been, nor can be, applied to our belief in the truth

of a narrative. Experience is confined to our own personal knowledge of facts derived from the sense of seeing, hearing, feeling, &c."-Pp. 320, 321.

"When an individual has experienced a fact, he is fully convinced of its truth. Another person, or multitudes of others, not having experienced the same, is no evidence against the fact alleged. Their negatives cannot destroy his positive. They do not maintain that they have experienced the contrary; they confess that they have had no experience of a similar nature. Will the inhabitants of a salubrious climate.

claim a right to deny the possible existence of an epidemic disease, because they have had uninterrupted health? It is, therefore, as ridiculous to talk of a preponderancy of experience, in such cases, as it is seriously to expect that the emptiness and levity of one scale, should counterbalance all the weights of another."-Pp. 321,

322.

. Again :

"I must suspect that the strong mind of Mr. Hume knew, that, in the manner of his statement, he was gravely asserting an absurdity. You might as well place contrary demonstrations in opposition to each other, in a geometrical problem, as entire proofs against entire proofs in moral reasoning!"-P. 325.

Men, who presume to question what the multitude of the unlearned, and learned believe, or profess to believe, will never want enemies and enemies so personal, as to carry their attack beyond the author to the man. Prejudice, pride, interest, superstition and honest principle all will be in arms against them. For this reason inquisitive and philosophic men ought to

regard it as a duty which they owe to truth and humanity, if they cannot mitigate the clamour, at least not to increase it by their voice. At the same time it is not necessary to applaud because bigotry condemns, or to give to Mr. Hume more than his due because others may have given less. We are persuaded that no man is less likely to join in popular invective than our anthor, and that he exercises his own unbiassed judgment when he refuses to Mr. Hume the praise of honest intention: and it must indeed be confessed that for an enquirer after truth, gifted too pre-eminently for that enquiry, Mr. Hume was singularly unfortunate in the issue of it. The fact seems to be, that it was become the habit of his mind to detect and magnify whatever subtilty could object, without contemplating steadily the arguments of truth. Our author's censure goes a little farther than this:

of Mr. Hume more than the writer of these "No man (he says) admires the talents remarks; and no man more sincerely laments his abuse of them. His conduct

and his motives appear to be inexplicable. His capacity to reason justly is indubitable; his disposition to perplex is equally indubitable.

It is highly probable that he began in jest, simply with an intention to perplex that class of dogmatists, who were perpetually boasting of their demonstrations, upon subjects where they did not always enjoy a preponderancy of evidence. No part of his other writings indicate such contrarieties, as are manifest in every part vain boastings, open contradictions, and of this celebrated Essay; at a detection of which he would probably have smiled; and he must have felt a surprise equal to his triumph, when his artifices remained undiscovered. Mr. Hume was too wise a man not to know that, under his system, no philosopher can breathe a moment."Pp. 330, 331.

"Our great admiration of Mr. Hume's intellectual powers, induces us to lament, that they were so ill employed; that his ambition to acquire literary fame, should be founded on the subversion of the best principles that can actuate mankind. Nor ought the insidious and treacherous manner in which this attempt has been frequently made, to escape the severest reprehension."

-P. 333.

In the last Enquiry, which respects Moral Obligation, the author has found its sources in principles which are inseparable from our nature, universally

and powerfully operative, and perpetual as the desire of well-being-in the mutual action, and control of self-love and social affection. His doctrine is alike removed from the mystical and occult on the one hand, and the cold maxims of a selfish expediency on the other. The enlightened moralist and benevolent Christian here speak the same language, and point to the same path of wisdom, uniting authority with counsel, and proving together that man is under a moral government, and that the great moral Ruler has in the Christian revelation expounded and enforced the same law of morality, which was always inscribed in his

nature.

From our review of the present volume, which, though somewhat extended, is too brief for the survey, it will be seen that the range of enquiry is very extensive, and the subjects of great and universal interest; and with out lavishing commendation we may venture to say, that few even of the thinking class can peruse the Ethical Questions carefully, without gaining something new as well as useful, both for speculation and for practice.

THE

ART. II. Dr. Laurence's Remarks
upon Griesbach's Classification, &c.
[Continued from p. 172.]
HIS author speaks of Griesbach
(16) as "correcting the received
text upon the decisions of his own
judgment." But, if Bengel and Sem-
ler are acknowledged to have been
his predecessors "in the same path,"
we have here an observation contra-
dicting another of Dr. L.'s statements.
It is an observation which, in it's
effect, whatever be it's design, can-
not injure Griesbach's memory. No-
thing can be less arbitrary, nothing,
in this department of literature, less
precarious, than the Professor's cor-
rection of the text of the New Testa-
ment. Far from relying on the
decisions of his own judgment," he
has never lost sight of "the critical
principles" of former authors of high
reputation and his merit consists in
his diligent and skilful application of
those principles, in the patience of his
labours, and, especially, in that habit
of discerning the age, and estimating
the relative value, of manuscripts
which is only to be acquired by

experience combined with sagacity: and knowledge. A few years previously to the appearance of Griesbach's edition, in 1775, our learned countryman and printer Bowyer had published the Greek Testament, and admitted into it's text those readings which Wetstein had merely marked. as being preferable to what were generally received. Consequently, no candid and intelligent person will, either openly or covertly, accuse' Griesbach of an attachment to adventurous critics, or of lightly departing, and encouraging others to depart, from "the beaten track of preconceived opinion."

After stating that Griesbach "confines himself solely to the triple division of an Alexandrine, a Western, and a Byzantine, text," (20) Dr. Laurence asks,

"May we not hence conclude that,

feeling the task of accurately fixing the true number of classes greater than he expected, he satisfied himself with what he deemed an approximation to the truth, and was contented to finish, as he began, with only three? But does this approximation afford a sufficiently solid basis for a durable superstructure? Can it furnish any thing like complete satisfaction?”

"con

From these questions we clude" that the Remarker is but imperfectly acquainted with the nature and the principles, the history and the state, of Biblical Criticism. Reasonable satisfaction is what true scholars will look for from it's researches and decisions; since it doesnot present to the mind that complete evidence which characterises mathematical demonstrations. The highest certainty of which it admits, is moral certainty: nor can greater be attained in regard to most of the subjects on: which men are called to exercise: their judgments. It was never imagined by Griesbach or his admirers that nothing is left to be done by succeeding editors. Michaelis considered the age of manhood" of the criticism of the text of the New Testament as beginning with Mill's edition. Since that period, it has

* See, in Symbol. Critic. Vol. I. p. 121,: his own description of the qualifications of an able Editor of the New Testament.

Nov. Test. Griesb. 1796. Pref.
Introd. to the N. T. Vol..II. p. 454.