obligation to government, by oaths, &c. ceaseth, and Christian religion is part of the law itself, therefore injuries to God are as punishable as to the King or any common person." The next case which occurred was that of Curl, in which the power of the temporal courts was disputed, and the ground of their interference expressly declared. This case is reported in 2 Strange, 789, 1 Geo. II. before Raymond, Chief Justice. "It was an information against defendant, for printing and publishing a lewd and obscene book; the defendant moved in arrest of judgment, contending that, however he might be punished for this in the spiritual court, as an offence contra bonos mores, yet it would not be a libel for which he was punishable in the temporal courts. The Attorney General contended, that it was an offence at common law, as it tended to corrupt the morals of the King's subjects, and is against the peace of the King. Peace, he observed, includes good order and government, and may be broken several ways without actual force. 1. If it be an act against the constitution or civil government. 2. If it be against religion; and, 3d, if against morality. It is a libel if it reflects upon religion, that great basis of civil government, and may be both a spiritual and temporal offence. The cases we have noticed before, and particularly Taylor's case, are quoted in support of this principle, and also two cases (the particulars of which are not reported) of punishment, for buffooning or writing libels about the Trinity, in which this principle, it is observed, was not made a doubt of, and in which, as Lord Raymond in the next case, of the King against Woolston, observed, it had been settled, that to write against Christianity, in general, was an offence.' The Chief Justice is then reported to have said, in deciding the question, "If it reflects on religion, virtue, or morality, if it tends to disturb the civil order of society, I think it is a temporal offence." And Probyn, Just. "inclined this to be punishable at common law, as an offence against the peace, in tending to weaken the bonds of civil society, virtue and morality." The next case is the famous one of Rex v. Woolston, likewise before Raymond, 2 Strange 834. The defendant had been convicted on four informations for blasphemous discourses, denying the miracles of our Saviour; and the court there declared they would not suffer it to be debated, whether to write against Christianity in general was not an offence at common law punishable in the temporal courts, it having been so settled in the cases above-mentioned. "They desired, however, it might be taken notice of that they laid their stress on the word general, and did not intend to include disputes among learned men upon particular controverted points." The same case is reported in Fitzgibbons, 64, and there it appears the question was debated at considerable length, whether this was an offence in the temporal courts, and also, whether the prosecution ought not to have been under the statute 9 and 10 Wm. III. c. S2. Raymond is there reported to have said, "Christianity in general is parcel of the common law of England, and therefore to be protected by it. Now, whatever strikes at the very root of Christianity tends manifestly to a dissolution of the civil government, and so was the opinion of my Lord Hale in Taylor's case." would have it taken notice of, that we do not meddle with any difference of opinion, and that we interpose only where the very root of Christianity itself is struck at, as it plainly is by this allegorical scheme, the New Testament and the whole relation of the life and miracles of Christ being denied." "As to 9 and 10 Wm. III., it is true, where a statute introduces a new offence and inflicts a new punishment, it must be followed; but where it only inflicts a new punishment for an offence at common law, it remains an offence as it was before. Forgery, notwithstanding 5 Eliz., remains punishable as it was before." In the King v. Annett, Blackst. Rep. 395, the same doctrine was held in a prosecution "for writing 'The Free Inquirer,' in which it was contended, that Moses was an impostor," &c. And the last case I shall mention is, that of the King v. Williams, for publishing Paine's Age of Reason, in which Ashhurst, in giving the judg ment of the court, said, "It was fit to shew our abhorrence of such wicked doctrines, which were not only an offence against God, but against all law and government, from the direct zendency to dissolve all the bonds and obligations of civil society. upon this ground that the Christian It was religion constituted part of the law of England. But if the name of our Redeemer was suffered to be traduced and his holy religion treated with contempt, the solemnity of au oath, on which the due administration of justice depended, would be destroyed, and the law be stripped of one of its principal sanctions--the dread of future punishment." We have gone through the cases on this head of the common law, and I think it would be a waste of time to say, what must be quite clear, that the simple impuguing of the doctrine of the Trinity does not in the least touch upon the principle upon which these cases have been decided, and upon which alone courts of justice can interfere, viz. that the Christian religion in general is to be protected by the State, as one of its main supports, without entering at all upon questions which do not affect its influence as a bond of moral obligation and civil society. The statute 19 Geo. III. would never have contented itself with requiring the simple declaration of belief that the Scriptures contain the revealed will of God, if that belief had not been thought to be as much as ought to be required for the purposes of civil government. It seems, however, that we are perfectly justified in observing with Mr. Holt, that the manner of the attack must be essential in determining what cases are properly within the cognizance of our courts; and indeed, the difficulty of saying that a sober argument upon the evidences of the Christian religion was punishable if it leaned against the belief in the truth of that dispensation, seems to have been felt, and to have given rise to the legislative enactment which it was thought expedient to make by the 9 and 10 Wm. III. c. 32, whereby penalties are inflicted on all persons who, having been educated in, or made profession of Christianity, for it extends to no other persons but apostates, shall deny the divine authority of the Scriptures, &c.; which enactment puts a total stop to all argument of that kind, in whatever manner conducted, in the VOL. XII. 4 A case of persons who had been profes- The manner seems, in many cases, The only point remaining seems to does, only by implication, apply that epithet, or any other epithet of offence cognizable at common law, to the impugning of the doctrine of the Trinity. It recites, that many persons had of late maintained many blasphemous and impious opinions, contrary to the doctrines and principles of the Christian religion, greatly tend ing to the dishonour of God, &c.; and for the more effectually suppressing such detestable crimes, the impugning the doctrine of the Trinity, the maintaining that there are more Gods than one, and the denying of the divine authority of the Scriptures by Christians, are prohibited under certain penalties. But in the second place, if it is clear that this offence is pronounced blasphemy by the act, it would only lead to an inquiry, what is blasphemy at common law, and whether all blasphemies are cognizable by it. Now it seems quite clear that heresy and blasphemy are nearly synonimous terms in the ecclesiastical courts, though it is admitted on all hands that heresies are not cognizable at common law. Without attempting to define the legal import of the word blasphemy, which is comparatively new in the common law courts, and does not appear to have in itself any very precise or determinate signification, it is sufficient to observe, that it is perfectly evident from all the authorities on the subject, that only such blasphemies come within the principle laid down for the jurisdiction of the temporal courts as affect the power and moral attributes of God, by denying his being and providence, or the revelation of his will to man, so as to impair our reverence of him, and weaken the bond of moral obligation. If then the legislature has only done here as it has done before, in repeated instances, viz. inflicted a temporal punishment for the more effectually suppressing" a heresy or blasphemy in the spiritual courts, such enactment would furnish no argument in favour of the prior jurisdiction of the temporal court over the offence; but the necessity of such an enactment would, on the contrary, be rather an argument the other way, as it would not have been required if the temporal courts could punish without it. If again it should be contended that this statute must be considered as a declaration of the legislature that these opinions are hostile to the Christian religion in general, and therefore, within the scope of temporal jurisdiction, it is to be observed, that to put this construction upon such an act after its repeal, would be contrary to the principles by which our law has viewed other penal laws on religious subjects, which, when prohibiting opinions which it was thought at the time expedient to suppress, have never been nice in applying epithets which no one has even thought declaratory of the law on the subject when the enactment is repealed, to which the denomination of the offence meant to be suppressed is merely ancillary. It surely can never be seriously contended that the old penal laws, which are to be found on our statute book, declaring all sorts of opinions in their turns impious, heretical, blasphemous, felonious, &c., are declarations of their criminality in those respects, after the penalties have been long ago swept away. It is quite clear (though in the case of many of these statutes the legislature has not gone so far, as it has in our case, to repeal but merely to suspend the penalty) yet that the acts of toleration are considered as making the worship, which had been prohibited by the old statutes, innocent and lawful. Who that reads Lord Mansfield's and Mr. Justice Foster's speeches on Evans's case, or appeals to common sense, can for a moment conceive that when Unitarians are protected by the toleration acts in their worship, when the ecclesiastical courts are prohibited from prosecuting and the penal enactments against them is repealed, such enactment is to be considered as authorizing the temporal courts to prosecute us for what we are expressly protected in exercising, and in inflicting on us a punishment heavier than the express enactment imposed? The Liverpool prosecution against Mr. Wright we see is abandoned; and when so much zeal was manifested in the first proceeding, it is not likely that after the parties had so committed themselves they would have desisted if they had not been advised that an indictment would not lie. It only remains to add a few words on the last, and indeed, the only case in which this question has been started in a court of justice, and this we may certainly consider the unkindest act of all, inasmuch as it is raised against us by brother Dissenters. One would have thought it was enough for the Orthodox Dissenters to reflect, that their body had once so far forfeited their claim to the title of advocates of religious liberty, as to be instrumental in excluding their Antitrinitarian brethren from the pale of toleration; and it cannot but be strange to see part of their body (after the legislature has opened the door to us) the first to contend that the indulgence is a dead letter, and to contest the grand principle on which their own liberties and privileges mainly rest, viz. that when the punishment imposed by the law has ceased, the crime ceased with it. part, of all adoption or use on that occasion, of the notion, that impugning the doctrine of the Trinity is an offence at common law; and that it was with surprise and indignation he then, for the first time, heard of the prosecution which proceeded on that notion. The argument which he used, as counsel in that case, was rested, it is said, by him on the ground that (although the maintenance of these opinions be tolerated, and no longer punishable), yet there still remains enough offence to prevent the Court of Chancery from protecting their institutions by administering their trusts. This argument, it will be observed, is one that would have prevented the Court of Chancery from administering any Dissenting trust, and applies to us only in common with all Dissenters. The common law offence being given up, the whole argument, as it affects Unitarians, distinct from the general body, is given up; and we shall not be afraid to contend that Lord Mansfield and the several Judges who have disallowed it, were justified in so doing, particularly as we should then have to maintain our proposition in common with our brethren, who have so kindly brought us into the dilemma. E. T. Of the ground on which Mr. Shadwell argued that Unitarianism was indictable at common law, every one can now fully judge. The reader will learn from Justice Ashhurst, the ground on which the Christian religion forms part of the law of England, and he will observe, that if by the Christianity which Hall and Raymond speak of protecting, we are to understand the Church of England, or any thing but the simple belief in the revelation through Christ, of the will of God to man, and the divine authority of the GLEANINGS; OR, SELECTIONS AND Scriptures, we are merely reviving the old law of heresy, and making it of temporal, not spiritual jurisdiction; all which has been most carefully guarded against by the great Judges from whose words was taken the garbled proposition upon which the ar.gument was built. The Statute 19 Geo. III. is of itself decisive evidence, that the simple belief in the revelation of the will of God, and the divine authority of the Scriptures, is all that the law requires, or considers essential for temporal purposes. With regard to the principal conductor of the cause to which I am now alluding, whose name we all justly venerate, and are, therefore, sorry to see so engaged, I can only hint here (though I think it due to him and ourselves to go so far), that he and the reporter of that case are, in some measure, at issue as to the argument used by him on that occasion; but I am happy to add, that it arises from the disavowal, on his REFLECTIONS MADE IN A COURSE No. CCCXII. You are then a downright Sceptic. But, Sceptic, as you are, you own it probable there is a God, certain that the Christian religion is useful, possible it may be true, certain that if it be, the Minute Philosophers (by whom he means Free-Thinkers) are in a bad way. This being the case, how can it be questioned what course a wise man should take? Whether the principles of Christians or Infidels are truest may be made a question, but which are safest can be none. Certainly, if you doubt of all opinions you must doubt of your own; and then, for ought you know, the Christian may be true. The more doubt, the more room there is for faith, a Sceptic of all men having the least right to demand evidence. But, whatever uncertainty there may be in other points, thus much is certain: either there is or there is not a God: there is or there is not a revelation: man either is or is not an agent: the soul is or is not immortal. If the negatives are not sure, the affirmatives are possible. If the negatives are improbable, the affirmatives are probable. In proportion as any of your ingenious men finds himself unable to prove any one of these negatives, he hath grounds to suspect he may be mistaken. A Minute Philosopher, therefore, that would act a consistent part, should have the diffidence, the modesty and the timidity, as well as the doubts of a Sceptic; not pretend to an ocean of light, and then lead us to an abyss of darkness. If I have any notion of ridicule, this is most ridiculous. But your ridiculing what, for ought you know, may be true, I can make no sense of. It is neither acting as a wise man with regard to your own interest, nor as a good man with regard to that of your country. No. CCCXIII. Moral Maxim of Confucius. Reason (says Bishop Berkeley) is the same, and rightly applied will lead to the same conclusions, in all times and places. Socrates, two thousand years ago, seems to have reasoned himself into the same notion of a God which is entertained by the philosophers of our days. And the remark of Confucius, That a man should guard in his youth against lust, in manhood against faction, and in old age against covetousness, is as current morality in Europe as in China. No. CCCXIV. Recantation. Hearne, the antiquarian, having edited a work of Dodwell's, which, in the judgment of the heads of houses of the university of Oxford, contained many heretical positions, they suppressed the book, and urged the editor to retract, which he absolutely refused. In relating the circumstances to a friend, he adds as follows: "Indeed if I had been prevailed with to have written any thing to signify my sorrow, it should have been only in some such form as this: "I, Thomas Hearne, A. M. of the University of Oxford, having ever since my matriculation, followed my studies with as much application as I have been capable of, and having published several books for the honour and credit of learning, and for the reputation of the aforesaid university, am very sorry that by my declining to say any thing but what I knew to be true, and particularly in the last book I published, intituled, Henrici Dodwelli de Parma Equestri Woodwardiana Dissertatio, &c. Ishould incur the displeasure of the heads of houses; and as a token of my sorrow for their being offended at truth, I subscribe my name to this paper, and permit them to make what use of it they please. THO. HEARNE.” Although the University did all in their power to suppress the book, it appears that a considerable part of the impression was circulated. No. CCCXV. A Diplomatic Difficulty. 46 In 1600, Queen Elizabeth's Commissioners met at Bayonne those of France, Spain, and the Archduke, to treat of a general Peace. 'Having now shewed their credential letters, on both sides, the Spaniards excepted in those of the Queen's against the epithet of most illustrious in the Archduke's title, who being descended, as they said, of sacred Emperors, and being son-in-law and brother to two Kings of Spain, the husband and head of the most serene Infanta Isabella, eldest daughter of Spain, was honoured by all princes with the title of most serene. When the English shewed that an archduke was not to be equalled to a king in title, and that no other title than most illustrious was given in antient treaties to the Archduke Philip, father to Charles the Fifth; the Spaniards answered, that it was no marvel if the title of most illustrious were given in that age to the Archduke Philip, seeing no other was given in the same treaty to King Henry the Eighth." The English Commissioners were wise enough to concede the important point, "the title of most serene being duly inserted in the Queen's commission, as often as the Archduke's name was mentioned." Camden's Hist. Q. Eliz. 3d Ed. p. 587. |