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they voluntarily enter the State and become its citizens by the ordinary modes of naturalisation. The former government, by the act of cession or confirmation of conquest, has relinquished all its claim to the allegiance of the inhabitants of the transferred territory, whether natives, naturalised citizens, or domiciled aliens. The old State, by the transfer of the territory, relinquishes its claim to the allegiance of its inhabitants, and the new State, by their tacit consent, receives them as its subjects. The neutral State can no more complain of the conqueror, for receiving as citizens its subjects who were naturalised by the conquered State, than it had to complain of the latter for naturalising them. Naturalisation by conquest and incorporation can no more be complained of than naturalisation by any other mode, so long as it is voluntary on the part of the person naturalised. And the transfer of allegiance, by the rule of domicile, or animo manendi, in the conquered territory, is certainly voluntary on the part of those who so remain.1

§ 10. The inconveniences to those who do not transfer by treaty their allegiance, arising from making the law of domicile the or munici rule of evidence by which to determine the consent of the pal law conquered, may be avoided by treaty stipulations, or by the municipal laws of the conqueror. Provisions are sometimes made in treaties for special modes by which the inhabitants of ceded territory shall exercise their right of election otherwise than by domicile, such as judicial declarations and public registrations of intentions. Thus, in the eighth article of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, between the United States and the Republic of Mexico, in 1848, it was provided that Mexican citizens established in the ceded territory might retain the character of Mexicans by declaring their intentions to that effect, within one year from the date of the exchange of ratifications; but without such declaration within such time, they were to be considered as having elected to become citizens of the United States. But no provisions of this kind were made in the treaties by which Louisiana and Florida were acquired; it, therefore, became necessary, in deciding questions of citizenship, in the absence of any special modes,

1 Dubois case, 1 Martin R., 285; United States v. Laverty et al., Martin R., 747; Pothier, Traité des Personnes, tit. ii. § 1.

to resort to the general rule of international law, which makes domicile the evidence of assent or refusal, on the part of the inhabitants, to transfer their allegiance to the new sovereignty. In the treaties of 1814 and 1815, by which certain portions of territory acquired since 1791 by France were re-ceded to the allies, it was stipulated that the inhabitants of such territory who wished to remain in France might become Frenchmen by declaring their intention within a specified time. But this stipulation was objected to by French publicists as being harsh and illiberal, because it assumed that the national character of the inhabitants was forcibly changed by the transfer of the territory, leaving them no option to retain by domicile in French territory their character of Frenchmen.'

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§ 11. It may be laid down as a general rule, that the in- Right to habitants of a conquered territory who remain in it, become ship under citizens of the new State; for justice would seem to require new sovereignty that the rights of citizenship should be given them in return for their allegiance. But this general rule of justice must yield to the conditions upon which the conquered are incorporated into the new State, and to the peculiar character of the institutions and municipal laws of the conqueror. It could not reasonably be expected that the conquering State would modify or change its laws and political institutions by the mere act of incorporating into it the inhabitants of a conquered territory. The inhabitants so incorporated, therefore, may, or may not, acquire all the rights of citizens of the new government, according to its constitution and laws. It may, and sometimes does, happen, that a certain class of the citizens of the conquered territory are, by the laws of the new State, precluded from ever acquiring the full political rights of citizenship. This is the necessary and unavoidable result of the different systems of law which prevail in different States. Thus, certain persons who were citizens of Mexico, in California and new Mexico, on the transfer of those territories to the United States, by the treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, never have and never can become citizens of the United States. Such citizenship is repugnant to the Federal Constitution and Federal organisation. Nevertheless, they may be citizens of California or New Mexico, according to 1 U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. viii. pp. 202, 256.

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the local constitutions and laws which those countries have already adopted, or which they may hereafter adopt.'

§ 12. As has already been remarked, the laws of different countries with respect to the relations between the conqueror and the inhabitants of an acquired conquered territory, are very different. The rules of English law on this subject are, that a country conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of the king in the right of his crown, . . . . . that the conquered inhabitants once received under the king's protection, become subjects, and are to be universally considered in that light, not as enemies or aliens.' Although they owe the allegiance of subjects, and are entitled to the protection of subjects, it does not follow that they are entitled to all the political rights of an Englishman in England. They have the rights of British subjects in the conquered territory, but not necessarily the political rights of British subjects in other parts of the empire. It is said that 'an Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the plantations, has no privilege distinct from the natives.' But an Englishman in Minorca has not the political rights of an Englishman in England. The inhabitants of a conquered territory are therefore British subjects, with the local rights of British subjects, but not with all the rights of Englishmen in the realm.2

§ 13. The Supreme Court of the United States seems to decisions have based its decisions upon the same general principles. The sixth article of the treaty by which Spain ceded the Floridas to the United States, is as follows: The inhabitants of the territories which his Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States, by this treaty, shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, as soon as may be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to all the privileges, rights, and immunities of citizens of the United States.' In delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court on this clause, Chief Justice Marshall remarks: 'This treaty is the law of the land, and admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States. It is unnecessary to enquire, whether 1 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard R., 393; Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dallas R., 153.

2 Wildman, Int. Law, vol. i. p. 162; the Calvin's case, Coke R., pt. vii.; Callet v. Lord kard z. Guldy, 4 Mod. R., 225.

Flotina,' 1 Dod. R., 450 ;
Keith, 2 East., 260; Blan-

that is not their condition, independent of treaty stipulation. They do not, however, participate in political power; they do not share in the government, till Florida shall become a State.' The word citizen is here used in its more extended sense, as understood in the law of nations, including men, women, and children, and not in the more restricted meaning attached to it in municipal law; that is, a person who, under the Constitution. and laws of the United States, has a right to vote for representatives in Congress and other public officers, who is qualified to fill offices under the Federal Government, and who may sue. and be sued as a citizen of the United States. There can be little or no doubt that the inhabitants of Florida, as intimated by Chief Justice Marshall, were entitled, without the treaty stipulation, to the 'privileges, rights, and immunities' of citizens, in this more extended sense of the term; but their right to be incorporated in the Union, and participate in political power, was derived from the treaty, and not a necessary consequence, under the law of nations, of the transfer of their country and of their allegiance. Their political power under the Federal Constitution and the laws of the United States, resulted from the admission of Florida into the Union as a State, and the political rights of citizenship of the United States thereby acquired were determined and limited, with respect to age, sex, colour, and condition, by our institutions. and laws. It must also be remarked that a man may become a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of any particular State, or may become a citizen of a particular State without being a citizen of the United States.'

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§14. The laws of a conquered country,' says Lord Mans- Laws of field, continue in force until they are altered by the conqueror; the absurd exceptions as to pagans, mentioned in territory Calvin's case, shows the universality and antiquity of the maxim. For that distinction could not exist before the Christian era, and in all probability arose from the mad enthusiasm of the crusades.' This may be said of the municipal laws of the conquered country, but not of its political laws, or the relations of the inhabitants with the government. The rule is stated by Chief Jus.ice Marshall, as follows: On the transfer of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the

1U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. viii. pp. 256, 257; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. R., 644.

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inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory;-the law, which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals remains in force until altered by the newly created power of the State.' This is now a well-settled rule of the law of nations, and is universally admitted. Its provisions are clear and simple, and easily understood; but it is not so easy to distinguish between what are political and what are municipal laws, and to determine when and how far the constitution and laws of the conqueror change or replace those of the conquered. And in case the government of the new State is a constitutional government, of limited and divided powers, questions necessarily arise respecting the authority, which, in the absence of legislative action, can be exercised in the conquered territory after the cessation of war, and the conclusion of a treaty of peace. The determination of these questions depends upon the institutions and laws of the new sovereign, which, though conformable to the general rule of the law of nations, affect the construction and application of that rule to particular cases.1

Conquered § 15. It seems to be a well-settled principle of English law, territory that a country conquered by British arms becomes a dominion British of the king, in right of his Crown, and therefore necessarily subject to the legislature, the Parliament of Great Britain; that the king, without the concurrence of Parliament, may change a part or the whole of the political form of the government of a conquered dominion, and alter the old, or introduce new laws into the conquered country; but that all this must be done subordinate to his own authority in Parliament, that is, subordinate to legislation; and that he cannot make any change contrary to fundamental principles; that he cannot, for instance, exempt the inhabitants of the conquered territory from the power of Parliament, or the laws of trade, or

1 Rex v. Vaughan, 4 Burr R., 2500; Calvin's case, Coke R., pt. vii. ; Am. Atty.-Gen. v. Stewart, 2 Meriv. R., 154; Sprague v. Stone, Doug. R., 38; Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 Vesey R., 482; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, I Cowp. R., 165; Smith v. Brown, 2 Salk. R., 666; Evelyn v. Forster, 8 Vesey R., 481; Clark, Colonial Law, p. 4; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. xvi. p. 158; Burge, Commentaries, vol. i. pp. 31, 32; Morley, Digest of Indian Cases, pp. 169, 170.

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