General exceptions to for the ancient rule, that private property on land is subject to seizure and confiscation. They are undoubtedly correct with respect to the general abstract right, as deduced from the law of nature and ancient practice; but while the general right continues, modern usage, and the opinions of modern text-writers of the highest authority, have limited this right by establishing the rule of general exemption. The private property of a sovereign is considered in the same light as that of any other individual.' § 13. But it must also be remembered that there are many exceptions to this rule, or rather, that the rule itself is not, by rule of ex- any means, absolute or universal. The general theory of emption war is, as heretofore stated, that all private property may be taken by the conqueror, and such was the ancient practice. But the modern usage is, not to touch private property on land, without making compensation, except in certain specified These exceptions may be stated under three general heads: Ist, confiscations or seizures by way of penalty for military offences; 2nd, forced contributions for the support of the invading armies, or as an indemnity for the expenses of maintaining order, and affording protection to the conquered inhabitants; and 3rd, property taken on the field of battle, or in storming a fortress or town. Penalty for offences cases. § 14. In the first place, we may seize upon private property, by way of penalty for the illegal acts of individuals, or of the community to which they belong. Thus, if an individual be guilty of conduct in violation of the laws of war, we may scize and confiscate the private property of the offender. So also, if the offence attach itself to a particular community or town, all the individuals of that community or town are liable to punishment, and we may either seize upon 1 Puffendorf, De Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. viii. ch. vi. § 20; Heffter, Droit International, § 133; Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, § 282; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. vii. ch. i. The Franco-Austrian campaign, 1859, affords an example of the manner in which war may be carried on without causing ruin to the surrounding country. Preserve,' said Napoleon III., when addressing his troops, 'that strict discipline which is the honour of the army. Here-forget it not-there are no other enemies than those who fight against you in battle;' and well was that order obeyed. On the other hand, during the American Civil War, General Sherman on his memorable march to the sea, through the Gulf States in 1864, seized private property as booty, and devastated the whole country through which he passed, but this act doubtlessly accelerated peace in a very material degree. their property, or levy upon them a retaliatory contribution, by way of penalty. Where, however, we can discover and secure the individuals so offending, it is more just to inflict the punishment upon them only; but it is a general law of war, that communities are accountable for the acts of their individual members. This makes it the interest of all to discover the guilty persons, and to deliver them up to justice. But if these individuals are not given up, or cannot be discovered, it is usual to impose a contribution upon the civil authorities of the place where the offence is committed, and these authorities raise the amount of the contribution by a tax levied upon their constituents.' contri § 15. In the second place we have a right to make the Military enemy's country contribute to the expenses of the war. butions Troops, in the enemy's country, may be subsisted either by regular magazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorised pillage. It is not always politic, or even possible, to provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army during the active operations of a campaign. Where this cannot be done, the general is obliged either to resort to military requisitions, or to entrust their subsistence to the troops themselves. The inevitable consequences of the latter system are universal pillage, and a total relaxation of discipline; the loss of private property, and the violation of individual rights, are usually followed by the massacre of straggling parties, and the ordinary peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and implacable enemies. The system is, therefore, regarded as both impolitic and unjust, and is coming into general disuse among the most civilised nations-at least for the support of the main army. In case of small detachments, where great rapidity of motion is requisite, it sometimes becomes necessary for the troops to 1 In 1870 the Germans levied contributions in money on many towns of France, the principle adopted by them, apparently, being that towns offering resistance, or throwing obstacles in the way of the invaders, were heavily fined, while peaceful towns were held exempt. Thus Dieppe was fined 2,000l. for a few shots fired from a French steamer at some Prussians. Nevertheless, some towns which had offered resistance, but which had been severely bombarded, such as Strasburg and Péronne, were spared (Edwards, Germans in France). There is no doubt but that the Germans were justified in levying a fine on Dieppe, but the principle of punishing an invaded town for its resistance (if the conclusion of the above writer be correct) is inconsistent with the rules of civilisation. Of hostile populations Capture on the battlefield procure their subsistence wherever they can. In such a case, the seizure of private property becomes a necessary consequence of the military operations, and is, therefore, unavoidable. Other cases, of similar character, might be mentioned. But even in most of these special and extreme cases, provisions might be made for subsequently compensating the owners for the loss of their property.1 § 16. In the invasion of the Spanish peninsula, Napoleon had to choose between methodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army, or purchased of the inhabitants, and regularly paid for, and irregular warfare, supplying his troops by forced requisitions and pillage. The former plan was adopted for some of the main armies, moving on prescribed lines, and the latter for the more active masses. Soult and Suchet, in favourable parts of the country, succeeded for a considerable length of time in procuring regular supplies for their armies, but most of the French generals obtained subsistence for their troops mainly by pillage. Napoleon, at St. Helena, attributed most of his disasters to the animosities thus created among the Spanish people. The Duke of Wellington, on the other hand, was adverse to requisitions, both when he was in the Peninsula and when he was in France, although they could not always be avoided. After the battle of Waterloo his army received their provisions and forage by requisition on the country, but in every case upon regular receipts by the commissioners attached to his troops; this was done not with the view of paying for what had been received, but in order to avoid abuse and plunder, and to restrict the requisition to food and forage only—both strict necessaries.2 § 17. Upon the invasion of Mexico by the armies of the United States, in 1846, the commanding generals were, at first, instructed to abstain from appropriating private property to the public use without purchase at a fair price; but subsequently instructions of a severer character were issued. It was said by the American Secretary of War (Mr. Marcy) that an invading army had the unquestionable right to draw its supplies from the enemy without paying for them, and to Jomini, Tableau Analytique, ch. ii. sec. 1, art xiii.; Halleck, Elem Mil. Art and Science, ch. iv. pp. 90, 91; Scott, General Orders, No. 358, November 25, 1847; ibid. No. 395, December 31, 1847. 1 2 Napoleon, Memoirs of St. Helena. Wellington's Dispatches, 1815. require contributions for its support, and to make the enemy destruc § 18. The evils resulting from irregular requisitions and Useless foraging for the ordinary supplies of an army are so very tion of great, and so generally admitted, that it has become a recog- enemy's property 1 Buonaparte tried to save France from fresh taxes by making large requisitions on the enemy. In 1806, after the battle of Jena, he caused Prussia to pay upwards of a hundred million francs. After Suchet's conquest of Valencia in 1812 that country was forced to pay fifty thousand francs, together with an additional two hundred million francs for the use of the army. nised maxim of war, that the commanding officer who permits indiscriminate pillage, and allows the taking of private property without a strict accountability, whether he be engaged in offensive or defensive operations, fails in his duty to his own Government, and violates the usages of modern warfare. It is sometimes alleged, in excuse for such conduct, that the general is unable to restrain his troops; but in the eyes of the law, there is no excuse; for he who cannot preserve order in his army, has no right to command it. In collecting military contributions, trustworthy troops should always be sent with the foragers, to prevent them from engaging in irregular and unauthorised pillage; and the party should always be accompanied by officers of the staff and administrative corps to see to the proper execution of the orders, and to report any irregularities on the part of the troops. In case any corps should engage in unauthorised pillage, due restitution should be made to the inhabitants, and the expenses of such restitution deducted from the pay and allowances of the corps by which such excess is committed. A few examples of such summary justice soon restores discipline to the army, and pacifies the inhabitants of the country or territory so occupied. But modify and restrict it as you will, the system of subsisting armies on the private property of an enemy's subjects, without compensation, is very objectionable, and almost inevitably leads to cruel and disastrous results. There is, therefore, very seldom a sufficient excuse for resorting to it. If, however, the general be left without the means of support, or if the nature of his operations prevent his carrying subsistence in the train of his army, or purchasing it in the country passed over, his conduct becomes the result of necessity, and the responsibility of his acts rests upon the Government of his State, which has failed to make proper provisions for the support of his troops, or which has required of him services which cannot be performed without injury and oppression to the inhabitants of the hostile country.1 1 Manning, Law of Nations, p. 136; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. ix. §165; Moser, Beiträge, &c., b. iii. § 256; Isambert, Annales Pol. et Dip. Int., p. 115; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. i. p. 92; Mr. Marcy's Letter to Gen. Taylor, Sept. 22, 1846; To Gen. Scott, April 3, 1847; Cong. Doc., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1, p. 563; Scott to Marcy, May 20, 1847; Cong. Doc., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., H. R., Ex. Doc., |