CHAPTER VII. Jefferson chosen Governor of Virginia-John Page his Competitor-Gloomy Condition of Affairs-Particularly so in the South-Weakness of the three Southern States-Statistical and Natural Causes therefor-The British Plan-War transferred to the SouthWar changes in its Spirit-British Commissioners to Bribe Americans-Their Strange Manifesto-Condition of Virginia-Her Natural Exposure to the Enemy-No Fortifications-Her Militia without Arms-A Nursery of Men and Provisions-How freely she supplied these to the Cause-But wholly destitute of defensive Strength-Washington Responsible for her Military Policy-Never was State so exposed to Invasion-General Matthews's Invasion before Jefferson's Accession-Colonel Lawson's Account of itDangers in the West--Hamilton, British Governor of Detroit-His Atrocities to American Prisoners-His projected Campaign of 1779-Colonel Clarke had taken Kaskaskias-His Winter March against Hamilton-Incredible Hardships-Takes St. Vincenne and captures Hamilton-Randolph compares Clarke to Hannibal-Hamilton placed in Irons-General Phillips interferes Jefferson consults Washington-Washington's Reply-Retaliations menaced on both Sides-Was Retaliation by Americans expedient?-Machinations in and out of Congress-Virginia ratifies French Treaties-Spain declares War-Jefferson takes Possession of Western Country-Anecdote of Colonel Clarke-Territorial Claims of Virginia opposed in Congress-State Rights-Count d'Estaing arrives on the Coast-French and Americans attack Savannah-Webster and other British Officers-Clinton takes Charleston-Losses of Virginia-Losses at Monk's Corners-British Advance-Tarleton cuts Buford to Pieces-Description of Tarleton and his Legion-Lee's Statements respecting British Cruelties-A theory on the Subject Campaign suspended-De Kalb sent South-Energetic Provisions of Virginia-A Fatal Lack-Efforts of the Virginia Ladies Governor Jefferson's ActivityLetter to Washington-Impressment as a Substitute for Money-Jefferson's Unsectional Spirit-His Letters to Washington, Gates and Stevens-He adheres to Washington-Battle of Camden-Shameful Conduct of Virginia Militia-Sumpter surprised by Tarleton-Cornwallis kept inactive by Illness of his Troops-Gloomy Prospects of the South-Jefferson's Letters to Washington, Stevens, and Gates-Virginia Militia desert -Governor's Proceedings thereon-His further Letters Gates requests no more Men sent-Jefferson's Reply-Operations in Western Virginia-Project against DetroitGovernor consults Washington-Gives Clarke an Option-Clarke scourges the Hostile Tribes-Border Heroism-Project against Detroit renewed-The Governor asks Aid of General Washington-Survey of the Mouth of the James Governor applies to have the French Fleet Winter in the Chesapeake An Error of Girardin-Proceedings of Virginia Legislature-Cornwallis advances on North Carolina-Clinton's infamous Proclamation-Fully carried out by Cornwallis-Cornwallis's intercepted Letter-His Conduct considered-Consequences of it-Battle of King's Mountain-Tories hung -Gates's Remarks thereon-Just Retaliation-Its Effect Good-Effect of the Battle of King's Mountain-Gates superseded by Greene. On the first day of June, 1779, Mr. Jefferson was chosen Governor of Virginia. He was the second Republican incum 288 CHAP. VII.] JEFFERSON GOVERNOR. 239 bent of that office, taking the place of Patrick Henry, who, having served three years, was disqualified by the Constitution for a reëlection for the space of the next three years. Mr. Jefferson's early friend, John Page, was his competitor on this occasion. He had served at the head of the Privy Council, and in that capacity had acted as Lieutenant Governor. He was a gentleman of ability, an active patriot, and belonged to a family of great influence in the State. The competition between him and Jefferson was involuntary on the part of both; and was followed by explanations between them evincing a high sense of delicacy and mutual respect. Mr. Jefferson was thirty-six years old when he entered upon ) the chief magistracy of Virginia. The period, in the opinion of General Washington,' was more gloomy in the affairs of the whole country than any by which it had been preceded. The last campaign had been productive of few important results on either side. But the French alliance, without yet introducing into the country anything like a counterpoise to the British strength, had infused a fatal security into the public mind. Enlistments were far more difficult to be procured. Men were not so willing to leave their all, when it was no longer urged by necessity and despair. The State legislatures reflected the public feeling, and their efforts were proportionably languid. For the South, a new and gloomier era was opening. Hitherto, the active operations of the war, and consequently its direct and desolating ravages, had been principally confined to the North. But the unexpected degree of resistance made by the Colonies, or States, as a whole, and the now open adhesion of France, compelled the British Government to change its policy. That government had become convinced that the prospect of reconquering the entire country was all but desperate. The fertile Southern provinces had fewer natural or artificial defences than the Northern, and they were far more thinly populated. Georgia contained but about twenty-seven thousand white inhabitants, South Carolina about ninety-three thousand, and North Carolina about one hundred and eighty-three thousand. The three together did not contain, by nearly fifty thousand, the number of whites in Massachusetts alone, while 1 See his Correspondence of the year. U. S. Census of 1850, folio edition, p. xxxi. We have followed its estimate for 240 GLOOMY SOUTHERN PROSPECTS. [CHAP. VII. their territory was more than double that of New England entire.' The scattered agricultural population of the South could not be easily concentrated for military purposes; the low level country where most of its population then resided, was unfavorable for defence by irregular troops, and was particularly accessible to a foe by means of its rivers; while the remote and isolated position of these States, with respect to most of the stronger parts of the Confederacy, cut them off from the chance of speedy succor except by sea. But notwithstanding the strong fleets sent from France, the British had generally, thus far, maintained an incontestable superiority in the North American waters. They could strike a sudden and serious blow, from New York, at any point south of Cape Charles-in fact, south of Cape May-before an efficient resistance could be matured out of the provincial militia, necessarily intent most of the time on their occupations as husbandmen, and long before reinforcements of regulars could arrive from those northern points, where the presence of the main force of the enemy and the consequent policy of the American commander-in-chief, kept them principally concentrated. The British plan-adopted some time in 1778, and just entered upon before the close of the campaign that year-was, therefore, to seize and utterly subjugate Georgia and the Carolinas, restoring them by one decisive effort to the Crown, and returning the people to their allegiance by reëstablishing royal governments. This point gained, the career of reconquest north was to be governed by circumstances. The control of the Chesapeake, the natural outlet of such an immense region of country, was a prize worth a determined struggle. In any event, then, Virginia was to become, ultimately, the debatable ground, for the three Southern States were certain not to be given up without a protracted and bloody struggle to save them by their northern sisters. Virginia, particularly, lying next them, would fiercely put forth her last and most desperate efforts for their protection. The war was to change as much in its character as in its the f 1775, in regard to the three preceding States. In the same, the whole population of Massachusetts is given at 352,000. 1 Georgia, South and North Carolina contain, according to the best authority, 131,500 square miles; New England, entire, 58,280, of which Maine (then but little inhabited) comprises 35,000. CHAP. VII.] WAR CHANGED IN CHARACTER. 241 atre. Hitherto, some moderation had been observed by the invaders, because they did not regard conciliation as utterly hopeless. Parliament sent three Commissioners (Carlisle, Eden, and Johnstone), to offer terms to the Colonies, in the spring of 1778. They reached Philadelphia, then in the hands of the English, in June. Congress refused to negotiate on any other basis than that of a recognition of American independence and the withdrawal of the British forces. The Commissioners thereupon made an effort-perhaps the real one for which they were sent -to divide and disaffect the Americans, and to seduce over their officers and prominent men, by direct bribes and by munificent promises of influence, titles, and estates in the country when it should be brought back to its allegiance. This attempt produced very little effect, and Congress finally forbade all further communication with these emissaries. The latter, therefore, on the 3d of October, issued a manifesto, which they sent to Congress, the State legislatures, and scattered as widely as possible among the people, containing this remarkable avowal of the future spirit in which the war would be carried on: "The policy, as well as benevolence of Great Britain, have thus far checked the extremes of war, where they tended to distress a people still considered as our fellow subjects, and to desolate a country shortly to become a source of mutual advantage: but when that country professes the unnatural design, not only of estranging herself from us, but of mortgaging herself to our enemies, the whole contest is changed; and the question is, how far Great Britain may, by every means in her power, destroy or render useless a connection contrived for her ruin, and for the aggrandizement of France. Under such circumstances, the laws of self-preservation must direct the conduct of Great Britain; and if the British Colonies are to become an accession to France, will direct her to render that accession of as little avail to her as possible." If these extraordinary declarations were intended for the purpose of intimidation, none the less was it also intended they should be literally and fearfully executed! Let us now pause a moment to glance at the condition of Virginia, and her preparedness for the part which she would be soon called upon to play. The Chesapeake gave her, practically, as extended a line of sea-board to be defended, as any other State -while a superior naval power could, with a few ships at the mouth of that great estuary, blockade her entire coast, except in the unimportant matter of transit between the ports within the bay. Her numerous navigable rivers gave an enemy easy VOL. 1.-16 242 EXPOSED SITUATION OF VIRGINIA. [CHAP. VIL. and rapid access to all her principal towns, and to nearly all her portable or destructible resources beyond those of mere agriculture. Her great artery of population, trade, and wealth, was the James. A forty-gun ship could ascend this as far as Jamestown, and by lightening herself, to Harrison's bar. Vessels of two hundred and fifty tons could proceed to Warwick, and those of one hundred and twenty-five tons to within a mile of Richmond. The State had but four armed vessels, mounting, in all, sixty-two guns, and two or three armed boats, of little consequence, and this flotilla was not manned well enough to make it fit for serious service. It would have required more means than the United States had at their disposal, to put the Virginia waters in a state of efficient defence; and there was not yet a fortification on them, probably, sufficient to beat off, and certainly not to stop one or two frigates. The militia of the State consisted, nominally, of the able bodied male freemen between sixteen and fifty years old-comprising about fifty thousand able bodied persons, being less than one for each square mile of territory within the limits of the present State.' These were required by law to provide themselves with the arms used in regular service-but this had been but very imperfectly done before the Revolution; and the serviceable arms which the opening of the Revolution had found in the country, had been to a most serious extent withdrawn to supply the troops sent out of the State. At the present time (1779), the lower portion of the State was nearly disarmed; the middle portion was almost as destitute, except of guns provided to destroy game, and therefore of little value for military ser vice. West of the Blue Ridge, the hardy borderers were better armed, and they bore the deadly rifle. No part of the militia was thoroughly disciplined and not/ a man in a hundred of them had ever seen the face of an armed enemy. It was mostly composed of husbandmen, who owned real estate, and whose presence was all-important at home, in the summer, to plant, cultivate, and secure their crops. Being thinly scattered over an immense extent of country, they could neither be collected suddenly, nor called from home without a 1 There are 61,352 square miles in Virginia-about 3,000 more than in all New England. Jefferson, a little later, computed there was one such gun only to four or five militiamen! |