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T would appear, from what has already been exhibited of man's nature, that if it were perfect, – that is, if it were all in harmony, each part maintaining the original relation, each part balanced by other parts, the appetites and desires in subjection to the reason and conscience, and the will influenced by those motives only which were proper, and which would lead to the fulfilment of the true purposes of our nature, then man would perform all the obligations, duties, and virtues which pertained to him. He would see plainly what he ought to do, and he would have power to do it. that man's nature has lost that balance, and that it has become disorganized, and that the lower parts have usurped a power and an authority which do not belong to them. The conscience is dethroned, and the will is not able to perform its function; and the result is sin, the transgression of the law of his being as well as the divine law.

But we have seen also

I. The question now arises, Can we construct a system of morals according to the nature of man as it is? Can we, from the materials such as we see that they are, and in the face of the obstacles which we must encounter, indicate the obligations, the duties, and the virtues which a man should observe and cultivate? Does sin so interfere with our perception of the relation of the parts of our nature, and our perception of our relations to each other, to classes of men which are created by kinship and relationship, and by society, and by country, and by race, that we cannot see what are the duties which appertain to these relations? Can we not see what are the duties and what are the excesses, what are the virtues and what are the vices, which arise from the appetites ? Although we see daily that men are under the dominion of the appetites, and commit, in consequence, crimes which are shameful and cruel, yet can we not also see, very clearly and quite precisely, what are the uses of the appetites, and what must therefore be the result of a right use of them, and what are the virtues which appertain to them? Take each of the desires: we have seen how the abuse of them leads to sin. Can we not, in like manner, determine the bounds within which they should be held, and consequently the actions which it was originally intended that they should cause us to perform? The desire of personal safety was in

tended to guide us in certain relations; and in those relations, if the desire was kept within the limits, which would respect the safety of others and our own so that it would in no way interfere with theirs, should we not get the virtues which would belong to this division of our nature? Or, again, the desire of property, of the control of what is our own, when carried to excess, and not balanced by other desires, we have seen leads to sin, and is the fruitful source of crime. But we can also see how that desire may be restrained, how it may be confined to the purposes which were intended, how it may be used so that we can fulfil the purposes of our nature, how it may enable us to perform more truly the obligations and duties of man. We may not find thus one who is exhibiting all the virtues which pertain to this desire; yet we may find one performing one, and another another, virtue, so that, in a number of individuals, we may find all the obligations and all the duties exhibited. We can thus find from the nature of man what is the virtue which pertains to this desire. We can exhibit it free from covetousness, and characterized by temperance, and the desire exercised in harmony with all the other parts of the soul.

It may not be necessary to recur to the other desires and passions in order to illustrate this. It must at once be apparent that the nature of man itself

furnishes evidence that it was made for virtue; and we can, not only from an ideal man, but from one actually living in society, obtain a just view of the obligations and duties which he owes to others. We do not deduce this line of conduct from any one man, for we shall not find any one man exhibiting all the virtues. He would be a perfect man who would do this. But we find different men, and men in different circumstances, exhibiting different virtues, and different courses of conduct. We may thus attain a view of all the virtues which make the perfect man. We could thus construct the perfect man. Thus, we find one characterized by temperance and self-restraint, which are virtues of a very high degree. We find another in whom justice is prominent. This one seems nearly to reach perfection. Whatever defects there may be in that character, however lamentably the person may come short in other respects, yet in the virtue of justice he stands pre-eminent, so that we can clearly see from his conduct what this virtue is. We can picture it and recommend it. So, again, the virtue of truth may be seen in certain individuals to be an eminent virtue, standing above all others. It is told of Hawkins, provost of Oriel College, Oxford, that he seemed to be in constant fear of exaggeration in the relating of facts and in his conversation, so that it became apparent how scrupulously true he wished to be in every instance, and to

what a high degree the virtue rose in him. We do not take the ordinary man as the type, but we take the one who exhibits the virtue in its best form. We study him because he is giving an opportunity to his nature to exercise itself freed from the control of other desires, and from the usurpations of the other parts of his nature. His nature, as far as truth is concerned, is in a normal state, and allows us to see what the tendencies of that nature would be were it free from the enslavement of corruption.

So in regard to the other faculties of our nature; for instance, the will. We constantly see character which we denominate weak. The person is always failing in his purpose. He seems to have no power to carry into operation his resolutions. But it is visible, even in his failure, what the virtue is which his nature requires, and which, it indicates, was intended to be exhibited and exercised. We see such a person, we meet him constantly, who cultivates the will, who has a purpose, and a right purpose, for it advances his own manly interests, and we see him carry that purpose into operation. We can rely upon him. We confidently look for the fulfilment of the purpose which he has named, and we are not disappointed. We say that in this direction he is almost perfect. Here we get from his nature our perception of the right operation of the will. We can deduce from it the virtue of the will. And we

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