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divine power of the gospel. He must be able to see what those duties are which arise out of his nature; and, seeing this, he must have the power to perform the duties which he thus sees to be due from him as a responsible and moral being.

And he will thus see that morality is part of that character which constitutes the perfection of his nature. Whatever approaches he may make in this life towards that perfection, must be made through the cultivation of the virtues as well as through the cultivation of the religious affections. And it is through the influence of the latter upon the former that they acquire their right proportions and their due strength. It is thus by maintaining the conscience void of offence towards God that he is able to maintain the conscience void of offence towards man. It is only as he shall love the Lord his God that he can love his neighbor as himself.



7E have seen from a priori considerations that


the nature of man would lead to a certain kind of life. The life of each species of animals is determined by its nature. There are certain propensities which urge the animal on to a suitable and proportionate life. This is as true of man as it is of brutes.

We have seen that man in every condition of society has shown certain tendencies; that these tendencies have developed into certain specific actions which may be classed under the five cardinal virtues of benevolence, justice, truth, purity, and order. In the rude state of society, we saw this tendency towards these actions, which were obligations and duties, but these obligations and virtues were more marked as the culture of society progressed; and that religion would necessarily make the development more specific.

I now propose to inquire whether these a priori considerations have been realized in the moral life

of our race. Has the race of man, in the various stages of civilization, exhibited the same moral life? Have the five cardinal virtues always appeared, sometimes in the germ only, at other times budding into life, and then putting forth the fully developed system of morality?

I. We begin our inquiry with the rude tribes. We are to inquire whether man in the rudest condition of his existence has exhibited the germ of the moral life, or the tendencies towards such a life? or does he show that there are in his nature principles which will develop into such a life? The inquiry meets its chief difficulty in the character of the witnesses which we bring forward. There is no literature of rude and uncivilized tribes, which we can investigate, and present as the proof of their views, of their knowledge of moral relations, and of the duties which arise out of those relations. We are dependent on certain actions and modes of life, on the treatment of persons in certain conditions, from which we must infer their knowledge of obligation and duty.

And, first, we see that every tribe and every people have the same human nature. There is not one set of appetites and desires and emotions to one tribe or people, and another to the enlightened Greeks and Romans, and still another to those who are partakers of Christian grace. When we investigate the principles of the nature of man in all ages, in all

conditions of civilization, and in all degrees of culture, we find that, in this respect, there is no difference. As far as nature is concerned, we must say with St. Paul, that "God has made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth" (Acts xvii. 26). There are in operation the same principles of human nature in the Mongolian and in the Ethiopian which are in operation in the Caucasian. We see the same principles exhibited in the darkest parts of the African continent, and in the islands of the South Sea, which are exhibited in the most civilized and cultured parts of Europe and America. It is the same intellect, the same mode of perception, the same manner of reasoning. The generalizations of the rudest people are made on the same principles that they are made by the most highly educated. The emotions and the motives, which operate in the most moral of the enlightened nations, are the same in the Indians, and in the Negro and the Hottentot. The will is influenced in the same manner, and the same actions are performed under the same circumstances and conditions.

Professor Max Muller has made it plain in his "Lectures on the Origin of Religion" that we must be careful in pronouncing judgment on the religious conceptions of rude tribes. The conceptions which they have of the Supreme Being are very indefinite. But the same cannot be said of morality. There are

the same general conceptions of the relations of men in a rude state of society that we find in civilized society. We see this in the word which was used, both by the Greeks and the Romans, to express morality. It was eos and mos, — ethics and morality. It was custom, the customary habits which grew up in the beginning, and took shape, and expressed and ruled the actions of society. We read in books on the origin of law in nations, of customary law. In England it was the common law. This was the beginning or foundation of all statute law. It was the first perception which was attained of the relations of men to each other in society, and of the duties which arose out of those relations. With the perception of those relations, and the corresponding obligations, came an expression of those obligations, and then a law. Those laws were first customs. But law in the beginning was not like law in an advanced stage of civilization. Law at the first embraced a larger range of subjects than law did when there came to be legislative bodies and jurists, whose office it was to expound the law. The customary law embraced courses of action which came to be separated afterwards from what we call law to-day. Thus, the Book of Leviticus embraces many precepts and commands which had reference to public and private duties, and to the performance of religious rites. So the Code of Manu, which is supposed to

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