sermon. No doubt the preacher might have been more explicit on the need of grace, and might more clearly have pointed out how the virtue of courtesy could be cultivated by the aid of the grace of the gospel. But Chalmers, and men of the views which he had embraced, seemed to think that they should never go into the pulpit but to proclaim the entire sinfulness of man, the atonement of Christ, and justification of faith alone. Under such circumstances, it is not at all singular that preachers fell into a course of thought which they supposed must be their constant theme. They looked exclusively at one side of religion. They never turned away from that view. They looked with suspicion on those who did, and accused those who dwelt even occasionally on the ordinary duties of life as neglecting the gospel for law, and as if they were turning the mind from the merits of the atoning Saviour to let it rest on their own good deeds. It is not, then, wonderful that the preaching of morals almost ceased. But another view of religion came up in what was know as the Oxford Tract movement. The evangelical view kept out of sight not only human conduct, but also some of the important means and instruments of grace. It was faith almost exclusively which it put forward. The Church, its organization, its faith and worship and sacraments, received little or no attention. Here was occasion for another re-action. Keble and others began to talk about the apostasy of the nation,' and the necessity of doing something for the revival of the Church and her doctrines. The programme laid down embraced these doctrines. The themes of the pulpit now became Church order and apostolical succession, sacraments, regeneration, and real presence. These were the tests of orthodoxy. The presence of God in the human soul was insured only by an acceptance of sacerdotalism of this stamp. This view of Christian doctrine absorbed the attention, and became the almost exclusive subject, of the preacher in this school of thought. It is not, then, wonderful, under the circumstances, that one like Froude the historian 2 should say, "Many a hundred sermons have I heard in England; many a dissertation on the mysteries of the faith, on the divine mission of the clergy, on apostolical succession, on bishops and justification, and the theory of good works, and verbal inspiration, and the efficacy of sacraments, but never during those thirty wonderful years, never one that I can recollect, on common honesty, or those primitive commandments, thou shalt not lie, thou shalt not steal." 1 Dr. Newman, in his Apologia, p. 83, says, "July 14th, 1833, Mr. Keble preached the Assize Sermon in the University pulpit. It was published under the title of National Apostasy. I have ever considered and kept the day as the start of the religious movement of 1833." 2 Inaugural Address as Rector of the University of St. Andrew's. --- Under this revived view of sacerdotalism, there was the wish to extend it to the consideration of the Christian life as it may be presented in confession. In the Church of Rome, this is called Moral Theology. But it is a peculiar and narrow view of the moral life. It is not the moral life as it belongs to man, as he is a partaker of the common human nature, but only as he is bound by his vows of baptism and confirmation; and the sins are generally termed "sins after baptism." It looks to a sacrament to restore the soul to the justified state from which it may have departed. Here, again, it was not morality the whole moral life which came up for discussion and consideration, but it was only casuistry-cases of conscience—which occupied its attention, and furnished the subject for sermons. Casuistry is, no doubt, a necessity. Casuistry simply means cases of conscience. Every one has them. Every one who attends to his moral duties will find himself at times in a strait, and will ask aid in finding the path of duty. The third book of the "De Officiis" of Cicero is a discussion of the claims of conflicting duties, and so is a book of casuistry. But casuistry is not a list of moral duties, with a penalty attached to each for its violation, and which may atone for it. The work of Cicero is a philosophical discussion of moral duty, and the third book is a natural sequence of the former two. Casuistry in its place, and kept in its proportions, is, without doubt, a very good thing. But it must come with a thorough discussion of the moral nature, and with a deduction of moral duties and virtues. It is then that duty must be discussed, explained, and enforced, as part of the moral life. But there is another way in which the inculcation of morality becomes very important. It is in the enactment of law, and in the sustaining of law. Markby, an English Calcutta judge, has remarked' with great truth that the office of a legislator is ethical. A very great deal of law has reference to mercantile operations, which may be only a part of political economy. But there is involved also other law in which the conduct of men is concerned. It involves the rights of men, and the relations of men in society. A lawgiver a legislator — ought to have studied profoundly the nature of man, and the conditions and relations of civil society, how men are related to each other, and what are the duties and obligations which arise out of those relations. It is especially the moral nature which is here involved. No man is fit to be a legislator who is not a student of morality as well as a student of political economy. I Elements of Law, sect. 14. By William Markby. "The functions of the legislator are in reality not legal, but moral. With him the primary inquiry is, What ought to be?' and he only inquires, 'What is?' in order to suit his provisions to the law already in force, and to make himself intelligible. With the lawyer, on the other hand, 'What is?' is always the primary inquiry " The great monument of moral relations and of moral progress is the "Jus Civile." For a thousand years, the great body of the Roman law was forming. In its maturity, under Justinian, in the fifth century, it was reduced to a compact form. The "Code," the "Pandects," and the "Institutes" form the "Corpus Juris Civilis." But it is wonderful in the accurate knowledge which it exhibits of man's nature, human relations, and the needs of civil society. It marks the progress of civilization from its rude beginnings until it attained its maturity. It was the growth of a moral system, because it embraced every obligation and every relation which arose in society. The Roman law has furnished not only the basis of our modern civilization, but it is in a very large measure the law of every civilized state in Europe and in America Our conceptions of justice come from this source. They are formed on this model. The details of that system of law give character to our modern society and our modern life. For instance, we may take up some of the "Titles of the Digest," such as these, "De ritu nuptiarum" or "De statu hominum," and study the law of family relations, which will, of course, involve those of husband and wife, and parents and children; and we shall find definitions and descriptions, and the recognition of relations, which will reveal to us the conditions and obligations of modern society. We shall find |