to classify the emotions, and to exhibit the various directions in which they act on the will. No doubt, however, we should place the appetites as the most obvious and as the first which affect us. They have been called the bodily desires because they are connected with the body, and create in it an uneasy feeling. We act in order to allay this uneasy feeling. Thus, they have been classified as hunger, thirst, and sex, and the desire of heat and of exercise. We have them in common with the brutes. They stimulate us to action without the intervention of the higher parts of our nature, but the higher powers come in to restrain and guide them. But we are now considering only the existence of the appetites and their action. Without their action, we could not exist. The exercise of the appetites also creates artificial wants, and they move us to action quite as effectively as the original appetites. We must have food and drink; and we must, by proper shelter and clothing, and by the use of our limbs, keep the body in a state in which the gratification of the appetites will contribute to our pleasure and our comfort. And the gratification of the acquired habits will also become a necessity, and afford us a large measure of gratification. The artificial wants are a product of civilization and refinement. They arise in a large measure from the fact which Aristotle mentions, that man is a social animal.

Then, there are the mental desires. The appetites arise from the body, and are part of the constitution of the body. So these latter are connected with the mind. The mind of man, in its development and culture, must come to have these desires. They spring up just as spontaneously as the appetites spontaneously exhibit their function. The mind comes to view certain states and conditions and relations as a necessity. It does not take this view from choice. The view is not the mere result of culture. But when the mind sees things as they exist, and when it sees its own relation to them, then it begins to have certain conceptions. When man comes into relations to other men, when he comes to make one of a society, these relations in society require, for the satisfaction of these desires which spring up in the mind, certain acknowledg ments, and the performance of certain offices. These desires could not be entertained unless there were some modes in which they could be gratified. Hobbes of Malmesbury' attempted to maintain that there was only one principle in man, and that this was the source of all action. He made all the actions of man, on which the peace and happiness of society depended, to be a selfish bargain, the agreement

Thomas Hobbes: Human Nature; or, The Fundamental Elements of Policy; also, De Corpore Politico; or, The Elements of Law, Moral and Political. The Three Sermons of Bishop Butler have chiefly in view the selfish theory of Hobbes.

to yield many things, which self-love demanded, for the sake of other things granted as a recompense. But the analysis of human nature does not confirm this view. When man finds himself in society, into which he is urged by an innate principle, various desires spring up in the soul. We call these mental desires, because (1) they exist in the mind, and do not belong to the body; and (2) they are mental conceptions. They are not concrete things, but they are abstractions; yet not mere creations of the mind, but perceived by the mind, and realized in the actual relations and in the possessions of concrete things.

(1) There is first the desire of safety. The conception of man, as a man in society, is this, that he must be safe from attack, and that he must be left to the unmolested enjoyment of his own. He does not regard it as a concession, but as a necessity belonging to his nature as a social animal. If this cannot be maintained, then man is reduced to the condition of a brute, and he is subject to the violence of the strongest. The desire for safety is a picture before his mind. God has created him with such a desire, which must make itself felt in society. He must be able to realize this mental desire in his actual life, and in all its relations. Every individual of society must recognize it with regard to him, and society must enforce the recognition of it in all its members.

(2) Then, there is what is called the desire of property. It is a desire which exists in every human heart, and is, therefore, a natural desire. Society may create a great many artificial wants, and the use -and the habits acquired in the use- may greatly extend the conception of property; but the simple desire exists in the soul without any special reference to any kind or amount of property. Every man has something which he calls his own, and any interference with it makes him uncomfortable. Any thing which tends to deprive him of it, without his consent, causes him to feel that his natural desires are thwarted, that he is not treated as man. He can be happy only as he has the power of keeping possession of his own, of realizing this mental desire in the actual possession of property, or what is represented by that word.

(3) Another mental desire is that of family society. It is very obvious that this desire exists in man as part of his nature, and that he cannot be happy, and live as man, unless under the conditions which are included in the relations that marriage makes. The husband and wife and children imply relations for which we were made, and without which we cannot exist. It is not expediency or any utilitarian benefit which has brought us to adopt such a life or such relations, for there is nothing more manifest than that there are certain feelings affections, as

we shall presently point out - which can have their gratification alone in the existence of these relations. They are a part of the nature of man, of his constitution. They are movements in his mind emotions which are aroused, and act as stimulants on the will causing the determination to perform certain acts. It is these desires which prompt man to a certain course of action and to a class of actions. Those actions have their origin in those desires, and those actions would never take place unless they were prompted by the desire.

(4) We may name as the fourth, the desire of civil society, which manifests itself also in what is called patriotism, as another stimulant to action. It was this desire which Aristotle' particularly noticed when he said that "man is by nature (ToλITIKOV (WOV) a political animal." It necessarily comes out of the previous desire of family society. The family must lead to the State. The State could not exist unless there was the family; nor could the family, unless there was the State to give it form and protection. The family is dependent on the State for much that is necessary to its well-being. It cannot exist but in an imperfect form, in a community which has not attained a civilized condition. The family, then, necessarily leads to the State. The desire of Civil Society is, then, in close relation to the desire of family 1 Aristotle's Politics, chap. i.