State taking the place of the Church, and so the dissolution of spiritual authority, and the melting of truth into opinion (p. 109). The third essay in this volume, on "Christian and AntiChristian Education," is written with the same depth and comprehensiveness. According to Allies' able exposition, this is just where the dogmatical contrasts between Catholicism and Protestantism are more especially apparent. As Catholicism is the guardian of the principle of authority, so Protestantism favours individual views. Protestantism, by its revolt against God and the Church, has fallen into a state of absolute impotence to educate. It does not speak with any one consistent or determinate voice as to the relation between God and man. It is not agreed upon what He has revealed, and can but interpret a hundred different ways the volume which it not only asserts to contain the revelation, but to contain it so written on the surface that none can fail to understand it. What can it do for man? . . . . A divine authority distinctly setting forth a revealed truth is needed to educate spirits. Protestantism abdicates the spiritual government of man, and leaves him to his private judgment; whereas the very office of education is to mould and determine that judgment. Here Allies pertinently alludes to a masterly illustration of this point-one of the greatest importance in these days-in Cardinal Newman's "Loss and Gain," where the vicar, Mr. Reding, is made to say: me. The heart is a secret with its Maker: no one on earth can hope to get at it, or to touch it. I have a cure of souls. What do I really know of my parishioners? Nothing; their hearts are sealed books to And this dear boy, he comes close to me, he throws his arms round me, but his soul is as much out of my sight as if he were at the antipodes. I am not accusing him of reserve, dear fellow; his very love and reverence for me keep him in a sort of charmed solitude. I cannot expect to get at the bottom of him: "Each in his hidden sphere of bliss or woe As a latest consequence of the application of Protestant teaching to the question of education, the author signalizes the emancipation of the natural sciences from religion and theology, as well as the one-sided stress which is laid on science without regard to what should be its end. It is the last invention of Protestantism to resign this ground altogether. Dogmatic truth it declares to be doubtful, and moral agency beyond its control. It professes acquaintance with all sorts of gases, but declines managing the conscience. It treats of every disease which affects the blood, except concupiscence. Its professors are to "Loss and Gain," p. 1. write history, without the bias of morality or religion. It promises to impart every science, without consideration of their final ends (p. 153). The treatment of the school question in our German Fatherland during the last ten years has shown us unmistakably the truth of these words penned in June, 1851. A departure on the part of Catholics from the measures which it has necessitated would practically amount to a denial of the faith. The fourth essay gives a criticism of a book published by the then Archdeacon of York, who was afterwards converted, Mr. Robert Isaac Wilberforce. Its title is the "History of Erastianism." We have already mentioned the two last treatises. On numerous occasions we have had the honour and pleasure of being present at the meetings of the Academia of the Catholic Religion, founded by Cardinal Wiseman, and held at the Archbishop's House at Westminster. We were there last on Tuesday, the 25th of June, 1878. When the audience had taken their places in the spacious room, adorned solely with the busts painted in oil of the Vicars Apostolic of London during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and that of the first Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Wiseman, the lecturer approached the green table. He was a man of small stature, and thickly-set figure, with an open and pleasant face, lofty forehead, and eyes full of thought and power. It was Mr. Allies. He read a paper on "Church and State in principle as intended by Christ," which thoroughly went into the question. May God reserve many years in the service of religion and science to a man who is so necessary to his generation! ART. II.-MR. SHADWORTH HODGSON ON Dr. Ward on Free Will. IT FREE WILL. By SHADWORTH HODGSON. Mind, April, 1880. T has resulted from various circumstances, that our proposed argument for God's Existence has been gradually developed in successive Papers published from time to time, instead of being exhibited once for all in one or two volumes, as the case might be. This course involves, no doubt, certain serious drawbacks; but it is also attended with certain conspicuous advantages. Among the latter is to be reckoned, that we are able to profit by incidental criticisms, and correct our view on this or that minor particular. Another advantage is that, if we may so express ourselves, we can feel our readers' pulse as we proceed; that we can discover what parts of our philosophical structure we may assume as sufficiently established, and what are those other parts on which further discussion is needed. A prominent instance of the latter sort has already occurred. We set forth in an early paper what seemed (and seems) to us conclusive proof, that certain propositions are cognizable as "necessary." Our reasoning, however, on this head was assailed in various different quarters, and it was requisite to write several successive articles in its defence. Something similar is now happening on the doctrine of Free Will; a doctrine which, in our humble judgment, is hardly less important as a philosophical foundation of Theism, than is the very doctrine of Necessary Truth. In April and July, 1874, we exhibited what we consider an absolute disproof of Determinism. However, we have had to supplement those articles (see our Numbers for April, 1879, October, 1879, July, 1880*)—in reply to successive objectors; and the imperative task of rejoinder has not even yet terminated. In addition to our original opponent, Dr. Bain, a new champion has taken the field, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson. We said, indeed, in July, and we still think, that as regards the strict question of Free Will, there is no objection raised in this Paper which we had not answered by anticipation in earlier articles. But we infer from private communications which we have received that, even as regards some persons who warmly sympathize with our conclusions, we have not altogether succeeded in placing our argument before their mind with sufficient clearness. Moreover, much notice has recently been taken of our labours on this head by contemporary writers; and we have, therefore, just now a far better opportunity than might otherwise occur for obtaining attention to what we urge. Now there is no other way, perhaps, by which we could so successfully avail ourselves of this opportunity, as by replying to the objections of a new opponent; and we will devote, therefore, our present article to a rejoinder on Mr. Shadworth Hodgson. We are tempted, indeed, to say, " Italiam sequimur fugientem :" it seems as though we should never be permitted to arrive at the final stage of our reasoning-the direct argument for God's Existence. But, for the reasons we have given, we hope the course we propose will be generally admitted by our friends to be less unsatisfactory than the other alternative. Two preliminary remarks. (1) Mr. Hodgson has a philosophical system of his own, to which, very naturally, he refers The paper, to which we refer as of this date, appeared in the Mind of last April, and was appended to our number of July. throughout. We shall not attempt any appreciation of this system as a whole; but only so far as it impinges on the doctrine of Free Will, or on our reasoning in behalf of that doctrine. (2) Then we shall have no scruple in inserting frequent and sometimes lengthy repetitions of what we have already saidoften, indeed, in the very same words as before. We cannot expect our reader to have ready at hand all that we have previously written on this subject; and we must, therefore, place directly before him whatever we desire him to bear in mind. Mr. Hodgson is a consistent and very decided advocate of Determinism; though (in our view, most strangely) he considers himself also to maintain Freedom of the Will. On this latter head we shall say a few words before we conclude; but the former is, of course, our chief theme. Now, what is the doctrine of Determinism? Briefly this-that every man at every moment infallibly and inevitably, by the very constitution of his nature, elicits that precise act of will, to which his entire circumstances (external and internal) of the moment dispose him. Mr. Hodgson, then, we say, is a Determinist. That "Freedom" which he admits, is merely "the action and reaction of motives with each other within the mind, not fettered by external restraint, but free to exert each its own kind and degree of energy" (p. 229). All Determinists, we need hardly say, admit that, so understood, Free Will exists. In a later passage (p. 248) he states with great candour the Libertarian's well-known objection: "Since we did not make our own nature," argues the Libertarian, "then, if our acts of choice are determined by our nature (as they are in the last resort on the Determinist's theory), we should not be morally responsible for our acts of choice, unless we suppose that we have a power of choosing independent of our nature." Mr. Hodgson expresses himself "not insensible to the great apparent cogency of this argument, and accordingly attempts a reply; but in his reply he entirely identifies himself with the Determinist's position. Nor is it only with Determinism in general that he identifies himself, but also in particular with what may be called "Hedonistic " Determinism; we mean with the doctrine, that man's will is always infallibly and inevitably determined by the balance of pleasure. Thus he says by most manifest implication, in p. 238, that at any given moment the stronger pleasure will, with infallible certainty, carry the day against the weaker; though in judging the comparative strength of "disparate pleasures," "often the only way open to us is to see which of the two is actually obeyed at the moment of choice." But we need not proceed with further citations; as no one who reads Mr. Hodgson's paper can doubt-nor would he himself dream of denyingthat he is a Determinist pure and simple. For our own part, in treating this most vital theme before entering on the direct question of Free Will-we have always begun with maintaining a purely negative doctrine, which we have called Indeterminism. This, we say, is a purely negative doctrine; being neither more nor less than the doctrine, that Determinism is untrue. And so much having first been securely established, we have afterwards proceeded by help of further considerations to demonstrate the full doctrine of Free Will. Mr. Hodgson (p. 230) considers that "nothing can be clearer or more convenient" than this arrangement. At the same time, as he most truly proceeds to say, in one sense our doctrine of Indeterminism is positive and "aggressive" enough. We have brought, he says, "a long array of cases ”—he is kind enough to add "well-chosen cases"-"to prove no negative point, but a positive fact―viz., that the course of the will's action is often in opposition to the man's strongest present impulse." We cannot wish the purpose of our argument to be more clearly stated. Now, in arguing against Determinism, we have commonlyas we think most controversialists on either side have donebestowed our chief attention on that particular class of cases, in which two, and two only, alternatives are at the moment open; so that the agent has no resource but to choose between these two alternatives. Whatever doctrine is established in regard to these cases may most easily be extended to those other occasions, on which the agent has several different courses of action at his disposal. Let us suppose, then, that at this moment I am obliged to make a choice between two mutually inconsistent alternatives, both of which I more or less desire. Mr. Hodgson alleges that, under such circumstances, the "stronger" of the two antagonistic desires infallibly and inevitably carries the day. This statement, unless it be simply tautological and therefore unmeaning, is one which (in virtue of our theory) we entirely repudiate. But before we come into conflict thereon with Mr. Hodgson, we must begin by attaching to it some precise signification. What, then, is meant by a "stronger" or "weaker" desire? If by the "stronger " desire be merely meant "that desire which in action prevails over its rival,"-then the statement is (as we just now implied) purely tautological: it is purely tautological to say, that that desire which prevails over its one rival infallibly carries the day. On the other hand, if we use Mr. Hodgson's terminology-if we say that the "stronger desire" means precisely "the desire of that alternative which at the moment |