Supreme Being-and the Divine institution of civil government. These notions were, however, left to the dust and cobwebs which the neglect of ages accumulated over the Platonic Republic; and the transcendental view of human policy' was lost sight of until the investigation was revived by Leibnitz, who proposed the theory of Optimism as the universal solvent. The celebrated Bayle, in various parts of his dictionary-more particularly in the articles Manichéens, Marcionites, Paulicienshad, with his characteristic subtlety, given a plausible aspect to the erroneous sentiments of Manes on the nature and origin of evil. With a view to counteract the mischievous tendency of these principles, Leibnitz entered the lists, and published his theological master-piece, the Theodicée; a work which Dr. Miller does not appear to be acquainted with, since he no where refers to or names it, but makes up an imperfect account from second-hand authorities. The following abstract of one of the most singular and (as we once heard it characterised by one of the most gifted men of the present day) awful' representations that ever occurred to the human imagination, is cited by Dr. M. from the academic Eloge of Leibnitz, without any mention of the Theodicée, to which it forms a most impressive conclusion. The abridgement is very far from giving a complete view of the original, and we should feel gratified, were it fairly required by the tenor of the present article, in furnishing a more adequate transcript. The doctrine of Optimism rests upon the hypothesis, that, notwithstanding the undeniable existence of natural and moral evil, the world in which we live is yet the best which it was possible to construct, the evil of either kind being in the smallest quantity possible, and being followed by the most advantageous consequences.' • The manner in which the existence of evil is reconciled with the doctrine of Optimism, has been illustrated by its author in a philosophic fiction. The story had been begun by Laurentius Valla, who feigned that Sextus, the son of Tarquin the Proud, went to Delphi, to consult the oracle of Apollo, in regard to his destiny. The oracle foretold that he should violate Lucretia; and when Sextus complained of the prediction, Apollo replied, that he was but the prophet, that Jupiter had regulated every thing, and that to that deity his complaint should be addressed. Here terminated the fiction of Valla. Leibnitz supposed, that Sextus went to Dodona, to complain to Jupiter, as he had been directed by Apollo; that Jupiter replied, that he needed only to absent himself from Rome, and that Sextus declared, that he could not renounce the hope of acquiring possession of the crown. The high-priest is then described as inquiring of Jupiter, after the departure of Sextus, why he had not granted him a different will. Jupiter sent the high-priest to Athens to consult Minerva, who showed him the palace of the Destinies, containing a representation of every possible universe, from the worst to the best. The high-priest perceived in the best the crime of Sextus, from which sprang the liberty of the Roman state, a government fruitful in virtues, an empire beneficial to a large portion of the human race; and he could urge no further objection." pp. 41, 42. To the theory of Optimism, there are obvious and plausible objections, among which it has been suggested, that the system in question represents the Divine Being as himself trammelled by the necessity of ordaining that arrangement of human affairs, which approaches most nearly to perfection. To this, Malebranche could find no better reply, than the lame proposition, that the Deity was at liberty to have not acted at all.' A better answer would have been, to concede the point without hesitation; placing the argument in its true light, and admitting that the Supreme Being is so far under the control of his own infinite perfections, as to choose invariably that which is wisest and best Thus Hooker says very finely: The Being of God is a kind of law to his working; for that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to that he doth.' The principle of piety on which this system was established, was quite sufficient to discredit it among infidel philosophers; and Voltaire assailed it with that peculiar species of ridicule in which lay his forte. Condorcet proposed another scheme, and endeavoured to establish the doctrine of Perfectibility as the great secret of human nature. We entirely agree with Dr. Miller, that we are authorised to adopt both these principles within certain limits, in our general estimate of man and his history. It is, most unquestionably, the intention of Infinite Benevolence, from the moral chaos of the universe, to elicit ultimate good; and an accurate survey of the general course of events will satisfy the observer, that, notwithstanding frequent signs of retrogradation, there has been, from the begining, a traceable tendency to improvement in human affairs.. Availing himself of the labours of his predecessors in this important track of inquiry, as far as they may be suited to his to take a consistent view of one purposes, Dr. Miller proposes great section of the history of man, considered as constituting one great drama of the Divine government, all the parts of which are, with a strict unity of action, subordinate and 'conducive to the result.' In his execution of this plan, he adopts a somewhat unusual course: instead of a minute induction of particulars, and a gradual ascent to first principles, he begins by assuming the latter, and then establishes their accuracy by demonstrating their strict harmony with consequent events. When Newton had explained, by the theory of gravi-` tation, the regular movements of the celestial bodies, he en deavoured to trace upward to the same principle, the minute and complicated perturbations consequent on the action and reaction of the different parts of the planetary system. In this difficult investigation he completely failed. His inferences from observed phenomena were at variance with the hypothesis, and insufficient for the explanation of the circumstances from which they were evolved. But when La Place adopted the opposite course, and, assuming the truth of the Newtonian theory, proceeded at once to ascertain the disorders which would naturally result from such a constitution, he arrived at results which were in precise accordance with actual observation. This is precisely the plan of Dr. Miller. In the second lecture, he arranges and adopts a regular classification of political causes, as inferred from their ascertained operation; and then devotes the remaining sections of his work to an exami'nation of the results which have arisen from the diversified. combination of these causes, as they have affected the various nations of the world within the period of their modern history.' The different causes of political events are, according to Dr. M., reducible to six distinct classes: 1. General Causes; 2. Local; 3. Personal; 4. Adventitious; 5. Existing Institutions; and 6. External Compression. Now we confess that this arrangement appears to us altogether unscientific, and essentially deficient in that precision which is indispensible in systematic inquiries. For any thing that appears to the contrary, the whole of these classes may be merged in the first; and if not referrible to that, can only come under some head that may balance against it. The sole antagonist to general, is particular; and if a third class may be admitted, it can only be the fourth. On the scheme of classification adopted by Dr. M., majors and minors are confounded; and, instead of a simple distinction between primary and secondary causes, we have a scheme that baffles every attempt at specific discrimination. Why not divide influential causes into theoretical and circumstantial?-the first including all those regular motivés and impulses which occur in the natural course of human operations; the second, all those incidental interferences which are irreducible to any invariable rule or order. At this point, however, our most decided objections cease; for, though we are by no means prepared to agree with Dr. Miller in all his views and statements, we cheerfully give him the praise due to an able and learned man, who has employed himself to excellent purpose, in the skilful investigation of a difficult and most important subject. He writes well, and although we think he sometimes mistakes mere writing for effective illustration, he has thrown much light on obscure and entangled points. Of his system as a whole, we are unable to judge, since the work is not yet completed. We have not any great expectation that it will accomplish its avowed intention, of exhibiting, as in dramatic consistency, the beginning, middle, and end of the Divine dispensations, during the period of history comprised between the dissolution of the Western Empire and the recent adjustments of European affairs; but, even to its present extent, it contains a great mass of weighty and interesting matter, and furnishes a valuable contribution to the philosophy of history. We are deterred from entering into more copions details, by the absolute impracticability of comprising, even within much more extended limits than we could afford, an adequate abstract of matter so multifarious and complicated. We have, moreover, a strong suspicion that some of Dr. Miller's political doctrines may, in their final exposition, assume a form, in our view at least, exceedingly in opposition to sound and liberal principles. When the remaining lectures shall appear, a fitter occasion will present itself for reviewing the work as a sys tem. Art. V. The Origin of Frauds detected; or, a Brief Commentary on Paley's Exposition of the Law of Houour: being the Substance of a Discourse preached at Laura Chapel, Bath, Oct. 31, 1824. By the Rev. E. W. Grinfield, M.A. 8vo. pp. 31. London. 1824. אן -- N this discourse, the subject of which appears to have been suggested by events of recent occurrence, Mr. Grinfield expatiates in an earnest and convincing manner, on the danger of substituting the capricious code of worldly honour, for the Law of God as revealed in the Scriptures. The argument is well summed up in the following paragraph. The religion of the Bible, cordially embraced and sincerely acted on, is the only sure and stedfast anchor amidst the storms and temptations of society. Unlike the principles of worldly honour, it is addressed to men of all classes and conditions, "high and low, rich and poor, one with another :" it teaches us to consider ourselves as members of one family, and as children of one parent. Unlike these false and fallacious principles, it does not invite us to rush into scenes of peril and difficulty: it encourages no prodigality or needless `expend iture: it commands to owe no man any thing, but to love one anoth er. Unlike these transient and uncertain motives, it teaches us to regard the sentiments of man as at best dubious and variable; not to place our highest affections even on reputation or character when most deserved, but to remember that we should still appeal to a higher and better standard and tribunal, even to Him" who seeth in secret, and who will reward us openly." Such is the principle which is alone fit to be deemed a rule of life, because it comes to us invested with proper authority, and fortified with proper sanctions. It is adequate for time, because it is commensurate with eternity: and it can support us upon earth, for it comes to us from heaven. The man who has drawn his principles from the motives of worldly honour, may hope, by cunning and duplicity, still to retain the good opinion of the world and to avoid detection; but he who cares more for realities than appearances, cannot be satisfied even with the strongest hopes of such an escape. He looks forward to the period when that which is secret shall be made manifest, when every thought of his heart shall be brought into judgement; and whilst his faith enables him to support his present trials or losses with patience, it guards him from many of those difficulties and temptations which must always encircle the votary of fashion.' pp. 31-3. In his commentary on Paley's Exposition of the Law of Honour, Mr. Grinfield may be thought by some persons to have dealt rather harshly with that celebrated writer. Paley's intention was, to describe, and nothing more. He says in effect, Here you have a naked statement of the system which a certain class of mankind have thought proper to construct for the regulation of their conduct. Is not the deformity of the system self-evident? Can it be worth while to throw away a word upon it in the shape of argument?' Yet, we cannot but agree with Mr. Grinfield in thinking, that Paley's statement is liable to much objection. He draws no line of distinction between true and false honour; yet, he speaks of honour as a law prescribing and regulating the duties betwixt equals.' Now, according to his account of it, what one duty does it prescribe, what one vice does it not tolerate? Paley's law of honour is as much beneath the honestum' of Cicero, as that again is inferior to the morality of the Gospel. Why then, Mr. G. fairly asks, gravely introduce it in connexion with the law of the land and the Scriptures, as a fundamental, though defective element of moral science? We think there is much force in the fol lowing remark. How imperfectly this eminent moral writer perceived the opposition of the Law of Honour to the spirit and motives of Christianity. may be judged of from his recommendation to military men of 66 a Court of Honour with the power of awarding those submissions and acknowledgements which it is generally the purpose of a challenge to obtain." (Part II. Book iii. Chap. 9.) Now this recommendation goes on the supposition, that honour, as distinguished from honesty, is a principle which may fairly be appealed to by men professing themselves Christians; for it would be unjust to suppose that Paley would have sanctioned any appeal that was adverse to the pre |