No. 10,928. PEOPLE V. BENNETT. Department One. Filed May 20, 1884. RECEIVING A VERDICT IN THE ABSENCE OF COUNSEL FOR THE PRISONER.-If the jury in a criminal prosecution come into court with their verdict, in the absence of the counsel for the prisoner, the court may, after notifying such counsel, and waiting a reasonable length of time for him to come into court, if he had been so disposed, receive the verdict, poll the jury and discharge it. ERROR IN REGARD TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE, which could not have prejudiced the prisoner, is not grounds for reversal. APPEAL from a judgment of the superior court for Solano county, entered in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying the defendant a new trial. The opinion states the facts. McKenna and Lumont, for the appellant. Attorney Generul, for the respondent. SHARPSTEIN, J. Whether the deceased "usually walked with his hands in his pockets," would not have been of the slightest importance, and would, therefore, have been an immaterial circumstance, if the defendant had not after the admission of evidence as to the habit of deceased in that respect, attempted to prove that when deceased was shot, he had his hand in his pocket with the intention, as defendant supposed, of drawing a deadly weapon therefrom, with which to attack him. When the question objected to was asked, it was simply immaterial, and evidence that deceased usually walked with his hands in his pockets could not have prejudiced the defendant any more than evidence that the deceased usually walked with his hands outside of his pockets, would. Such evidence in no way tended to strengthen the case of the prosecution. The only effect it could have had was to weaken that of the defendant. And whether introduced before or after the defendant had developed his defense, the effect would have been the same. So that the only question is whether it would have been admissible at any stage of the trial. The insistence of defendant's counsel is that it would not "unless the knowledge of such habit could be brought home to the defendant." Precisely how this should have been done is not stated. If the deceased usually walked with his hands in his pockets, the defendant might or might not have observed it. The probability of his having done so would depend largely on the opportunities he had had for observing it. So that the weight of such testimony would depend on the circumstance, which it was proper for the jury to consider. But there is another ground on which such evidence was, in our opinion, clearly admissible. The defendant testified that when he shot the deceased the latter had his hand in his right pantaloon's pocket. Several witnesses for the prosecution testified that he was walking with both hands in the front pockets of his pantaloons. Under such circumstances evidence that he usually walked with them there, tended to corroborate the evidence of the witnesses who testified that when shot he was walking with them there. and defendant deraign, nor can defendant assail the title of the common grantor. The unity of possession where both derive from the same source cannot be denied by either. The deed from Evans and wife to plaintiff and Hammond (grantor of defendant) was executed February 22, 1854, prior to the passage of the act which, it is claimed, first-made quit-claim deeds operative as conveyances, without any precedent, estate or interest in the grantee. But, as was said in Graff v. Middleton, 43 Cal. 344, " In this state, from the earliest times, quit-claim deeds have been in everyday use for the purpose of transferring title to land, and have been considered as effectual for that purpose as deeds of bargain and sale." In Sullivan v. Davis, 4 Cal. 291, decided at the October term, 1854, it was held that a quit-claim conveyed all the right and title of the grantor or releasor. And in Frey v. Clifford, 44 Cal. 343, the supreme court said that under the registry law a quit-claim deed received in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, which is first recorded, will prevail over an older deed subsequently recorded. So in Lawrence v, Ballou, 37 Cal. 521, it was held that a quit claim deed passed the title. No reference is made to the statute of 1855. Without making the rule in any respect dependent upon the statute, Downer v. Smith, 24 Cal. 123, and Carpentier v. Williamson, 25 Cal. 154, concur in construing Sullivan v. Davis, supra, as holding that an ordinary quit-claim deed in this state is sufficient to pass any estate the grantor had, and to enable the grantee to maintain ejectment if his grantor could have done so. As we have seen, the defendant here cannot dispute the title of Evans, the grantor of plaintiff and Hammond. The complaint (certainly in the absence of a special demurrer) sufficiently alleges an ouster by defendants: Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 244. It avers: "Defendants are in possession of said lands and premises and the whole thereof, withhold the possession of the whole thereof from plaintiff, and exclude plaintiff from the same." Judgment affirmed. No. 10,928. PEOPLE V. BENNETT. Department One. Filed May 20, 1884. RECEIVING A VERDICT IN THE ABSENCE OF COUNSEL FOR THE PRISONER.-If the jury in a criminal prosecution come into court with their verdict, in the absence of the counsel for the prisoner, the court may, after notifying such counsel, and waiting a reasonable length of time for him to come into court, if he had been so disposed, receive the verdict, poll the jury and discharge it. ERROR IN REGARD TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE, which could not have prejudiced the prisoner, is not grounds for reversal. APPEAL from a judgment of the superior court for Solano county, entered in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying the defendant a new trial. The opinion states the facts. McKenna and Lumont, for the appellant. Attorney Generul, for the respondent. SHARPSTEIN, J. Whether the deceased "usually walked with his hands in his pockets," would not have been of the slightest importance, and would, therefore, have been an immaterial circumstance, if the defendant had not after the admission of evidence as to the habit of deceased in that respect, attempted to prove that when deceased was shot, he had his hand in his pocket with the intention, as defendant supposed, of drawing a deadly weapon therefrom, with which to attack him. When the question objected to was asked, it was simply immaterial, and evidence that deceased usually walked with his hands in his pockets could not have prejudiced the defendant any more than evidence that the deceased usually walked with his hands outside of his pockets, would. Such evidence in no way tended to strengthen the case of the prosecution. The only effect it could have had was to weaken that of the defendant. And whether introduced before or after the defendant had developed his defense, the effect would have been the same. So that the only question is whether it would have been admissible at any stage of the trial. The insistence of defendant's counsel is that it would not "unless the knowledge of such habit" could be "brought home to the defendant." Precisely how this should have been done is not stated. If the deceased usually walked with his hands in his pockets, the defendant might or might not have observed it. The probability of his having done so would depend largely on the opportunities he had had for observing it. So that the weight of such testimony would depend on the circumstance, which it was proper for the jury to consider. But there is another ground on which such evidence was, in our opinion, clearly admissible. The defendant testified that when he shot the deceased the latter had his hand in his right pantaloon's pocket. Several witnesses for the prosecution testified that he was walking with both hands in the front pockets of his pantaloons. Under such circumstances evidence that he usually walked with them there, tended to corroborate the evidence of the witnesses who testified that when shot he was walking with them there. It would have been better to have waited · introduced evidence on this point before ir objected to, and then to have introduced i: before suggested, it would then have been no defendant. At most, it was error without in When the jury came into court with a ve ant's attorney was informed of the fact, we waiting a sufficient length of time for said: court, if he had been so disposed, was just verdict, polling the jury and discharging it, possible to see, and no attempt is made to sh could have been prejudiced, in any degree court. Judgment and order affirmed. MYRICK, J., and THORNTON, J., concurred. Ross, J., concurring: I do not agree that right in admitting testimony as to the custor ing with his hands in his pockets; but in vie do not think it was such an error as calls for in the judgment. [End of Volume II.] water in the south channel, and after drifting out to sea in the night, brought her 6. DAMAGES RESULTING FROM A COLLISION between two vessels, when each is guilty of 7. THE CERTIFICATE OF THE CLERK TO THE RECORD IN AN APPEAL IN ADMIRALTY Wash. 51. 8. THE MANNER OF TAKING AN APPEAL IN ADMIRALTY IS GOVERNED BY THE RULES 9. AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT IN A CASE IN ADMIRALTY will not be con- 10. APPEAL IN ADMIRALTY, PETITION FOR.-A petition for an appeal in Admiralty 11. LETTERS DISMISSORY OF ADMIRALTY CAUSE.-The allowance of an appeal in ad- Id. 12. THE FILING OF AN APPELLATORY LIBEL IS UNNECESSARY in this country on an 13. AN APPEAL IN ADMIRALTY IS SUFFICIENT IN POINT OF TIME when the same was 14. NO MONITION FROM THE APPELLATE COURT is necessary to the perfection of an 15. MARITIME CONTRACT, COMPLETED VESSEL.-Whether a contract for putting ma- 17. PROCEEDINGS IN REM AGAINST VESSEL, POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO AUTHORIZE.- be, it has never sufficiently exercised such power so as to warrant a Court in up- 18. SUB-CONTRACTOR, LIEN OF ON VESSEL.-Under the lien law of this territory, a 19. FEES IN ADMIRALTY CASES.-Section 823 et sequitur of the Revised Statutes of the ADVERSE POSSESSION. 1. TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION CAN NOT BE ACQUIRED by occasionally cutting up 2. ADVERSE POSSESSION-COLOR OF TITLE-POSSESSION.-A plaintiff who claims, under |