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be perfectly competent to conduct his affairs without injury to himself or to society. Horace says,

"Si quis emat citharas, emtas comportet in unum

Nec studio citharæ, nec musæ deditus ulli;

Si scalpra et formas non sutor, nautica vela
Aversus mercaturis; delirus et amens
Undique dicatur merito."

Here the words "delirus et amens" must not be literally taken, as the mental disorder, if confined to the description given, would not amount to more than eccentricity. But the moment the mental affection begins to deprive the individual of the power of proper self-direction, he, of course, becomes obnoxious to society and dangerous to himself; and at this period the law steps in, and charges itself with the duty of protection, both towards the individual and towards society at large. Horace tells us that when there was suf ficient evidence of aberration of intellect to render the individual incapable of taking care of his property, he was placed under the guardianship of the law, and his estates committed to the care of his relatives. He here draws a distinction between that kind of mental disease which constitutes real insanity, and that which results from the development of uncontrolled evil passions and propensities, and between these and the state of eccentricity before alluded to. He now puts a case of real monomania, in which a delusion or false mental impression exists, not connected either by the evidence of the senses or by the exercise of the reasoning faculties, by the powers of comparison and judgment.

"Si quis lectica nitidam gestare amet agnam
Huic vestem, ut natæ, paret, ancillas paret, aurum
Pupam aut pupillam appellet, fortique marito
Destinet uxorem; interdicto huic omne adimat jus
Prætor, et ad sanos abeat tutela propinquos."

A person in such a state of mind as here represented, would, without doubt, be considered a fit inmate for a lunatic asylum. His insanity would be at once recognised, and his social rights would with justice be suspended during the period of such an aberration of intellect; but what will be the answer to the following question, in which the sacrifice of Iphigenia by her father, Agamemnon, is alluded to?

"Quid si quis natam pro mutâ devovet agnâ
Integer est animi ?"

Under what title should such a deed be arraigned? Is it to be attributed to a kind of religious mania-to superstition become morbid in its excess-or rather, in the case referred to, the desire to return in safety to his country being more powerful than the natural affection of the father for his child, the latter was sacrificed to a superstitious delusion? Selfishness is a very prominent feature in the character of Agamemnon, throughout his whole history. There was here, certainly, "a morbid perversion of the natural feelings without any maniacal hallucination;" but there was a motive for the act, which constitutes the difference between crime and moral insanity; and this motive was not based on a false mental impression, but on a sound train of reasoning on sound premises. These premises we know to have been false; but to the Grecian monarch they were correct, because in that period of universal ignorance they were universally received and accredited. In the present day, in a civilized country, a man who sacrificed his daughter to avert the anticipated wrath of Heaven, would justly be deemed insane, as he would be acting contrary to the dictates of reason, influenced by a false mental impression. Agamemnon gives a reason for his act, and directly denies the charge of insanity. He says

"Verum ego ut hærentes adverso littore naves
Eriperem, prudens placavi sanguine Divos."

"Nempe tuo furiosse." "Meo, sed non furiosus."

Crime and insanity are nearly allied; ignorance treads on the heels of both. Horace says, with truth,

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This appears to be the plain truth. Unchecked immoral habits and unbridled passions constitute a kind of madness, and too often degenerate into real insanity. It remains doubtful whether such causes should be allowed to shield their victims from the penalties due for crime committed under their influence.

The question of the positive insanity of persons by whom crimes of the most dreadful character have been committed, and yet in whom no mental hallucination exists, has been much argued by medical jurists, and in many cases it has been urged that acts of violence committed under the influence of that peculiar state of mind, termed moral insanity, do not come under the denomination of crime, and, therefore, are not punishable by law.

It may be said, in reply, that when there is no mental hallucination there can be no insanity, since insanity consists in the existence of one or more false mental impressions, retained contrary to the evidence of the senses and of the reasoning powers, or in consequence of the diseased state of the former or the enfeebled or deficient state of the latter. The want of selfgovernment and the strength of the passions can with difficulty be considered as disease. In many cases which have been brought forward as of moral insanity, there has been evident delusion of mind; as in those persons who have been impressed with an irresistible desire to commit murder. In others, on the contrary, a long indulgence of the worst passions of human nature, the total absence of self-controul, of moral and religious constraint, impatience of contradiction and reproof, and utter selfishness, have led to a similar state of blood-thirsty and inhuman ferocity. This was the state of mind of Nero, of Tiberius, of Nadir Shah, and of many other scourges of the human race, who in their turn "have shut the gates of mercy on mankind ;" and it is the state of many who consummate a long life of wickedness by shedding the blood of a fellow creature. Though the excessive development of evil passions, and the perversion of the natural affections, are well characterized under the term moral insanity, it becomes a most difficult matter to define the boundary between a crime to be punished and a disease to be pitied and relieved. Well-marked hallucination, of course, exempts its unfortunate subject from the penalties exacted from the criminal; but, in cases such as those just referred to, the responsibility of the medical witness becomes very serious.

Horace alludes to a case in which some doubt appears to exist in his mind as to whether the crime was committed under the influence of insanity or otherwise. The case is that of the murder of Clytemnestra by her son Orestes, and the facts are these. Agamemnon, king of Mycena and Argos, on returning from the siege of Troy, was barbarously murdered by his wife (Clytemnestra) and her paramour (Ægisthus). Orestes, the son of Agememnon and Clytemnestra, arrived at manhood, revenges his father's death by the murder of Ægisthus and his mother. He afterwards became insane. Speaking of this murder, Horace asks,

"Au tu reris cum occisâ insanisse parente

Ac non antè malis dementem actum Furiis, quàm

In matris jugulo ferrum tepefecit acutum ?"

This, however, was evidently a case of premeditated murder, for

which there is clearly a real motive, to revenge the murder of his father. Orestes was suffering neither under delusion nor false impressions, nor was there any perversion of the natural feelings and affections (for such perversion must be without just cause); he reasoned rightly on real grounds, the power of doing which constitutes, in general terms, soundness of mind. His insanity commenced after the commission of the deed, and took its origin in remorse and horror at the magnitude of his crime. It was, however, only of temporary duration, and we find that he had entirely recovered at no long period afterwards.

Horace was fully aware of the great difficulty of distinguishing between these two species of insanity; for crime is, as has been before observed, the effect of an aberration of reason; and the man who commits a murder while under the influence of evil passions is not really in a sound state of mind. Struck with this view of the case, Horace asks

au commotæ crimine mentis, Absolves hominem, et sceleris damnabis eundem, Ex more imponens cognata vocabula rebus ?"

It has been frequently remarked, that no knowledge is so difficult of acquirement as self-knowledge; and yet none is of more importance to man, whether as regards his happiness in this world or his prospects in that to come. It would, indeed, be well if we were to commence the task of self-examination, and to put to our own breasts the question which the poet puts to the stoic philosopher :

"Quâ me stultitia, quoniam non est genus unum
Insanire putas? Ego nam videor mihi sanus:"

:

and fortunate if the result of the examination induces the confession, however humiliating, proceeding from a conviction of our own innate depravity :

race.

"Stultum me fateor (liceat concedere veris)
Atque etiam insanum."

Thus much and more may be elicited from a single satire of HoHow much of philosophy, of knowledge of mankind, of shrewd observation, and, in many cases, of excellent moral precept, may we not derive from the same source! This, I think, is at least an argument in favour of a classical education, and a proof that the

time spent in the acquirement of the dead languages need not be considered as entirely thrown away.

But it is time to conclude, lest my readers exclaim, as our favourite poet to Damasippus :—

"O major, tandem parcas, insane, minori !"

Cheltenham, May, 1837.

[We consider the utility or otherwise of classical pursuits to be placed on its right footing in Dr. Caldwell's Thoughts on the Study of the Greek and Latin Languages, to which excellent treatise we refer our readers.-EDS.]

THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTING THE BIAS OF YOUTH IN THE CHOICE OF A BUSINESS OR PROFESSION,

EXEMPLIFIED IN THE CASE OF LINNEUS.

[FROM A MS. MEMOIR].

AFTER spending three years more under the private tuition of Gabriel Hök, who ultimately married his eldest sister, Linneus was advanced to a higher grade in the school, and was, in consequence, privileged with more frequent opportunities than he had before enjoyed of indulging and cherishing his attachment to Botany-opportunities which he eagerly embraced, almost, indeed, to the utter neglect of the important branches of learning which he had been placed there to acquire. His highest pleasure was to escape from the thraldom of the school, in order to ramble, unfettered, in the country; not to avoid his task, or to indulge that listlessness of disposition which so generally influences truants in their stealthy rambles, but to hold secret and delightful converse with the fairies of the meadows.

On his removal, at seventeen years of age, to the gymnasium, or high school, he manifested, more decidedly than ever, his unconquerable aversion to the studies necessary to prepare him for the proper discharge of the sacred office. Rhetoric, Metaphysics, Ethics,

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