our name refpectable in Europe, and was glorious to the British arms. The noble Lord then read an extract from his Majefty's Declaration, expreffive of the repeated acts of infult and aggreffion on the part of the French Govern ment, ever fince the time of the figning the Treaty of Amiens. The hon. Member oppofite (Mr. I. H. Browne) had particuJarly required that he might have the precife dates. He would therefore take the trouble to inform him: the Treaty of Amiens was difcuffed on the 14th of May; after that, the fequeftration of the property belonging to the Spanish Langue, the annexation of the island of Elba, &c.; but all prior to the 23d of November, the day on which the right hon. Gentleman oppofite to him (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) affured that Houfe, there was no probability of the treaty being broken. In reviewing the report of Sebaftiani, he conceived there was nothing new in it; Government, and he fuppofed almost every Gentleman in the kingdom, knew pretty well what was the intention of the French Government before the publication of that report. Whatever of infult or reflection fuch a pamphlet contained, he could not think it a fufficient caufe for war. He concluded by giving his fupport to the refolutions for inquiry.

Lord Temple rofe, and faid that the fubject offered to the confideration of the Houfe on that night, was to him, as he had no doubt it was to many other Members, cause of conGiderable fatisfaction. It afforded to his Majesty's Ministers a fair opportunity of vindicating themfelves; and to the country the gratification of being enabled to apportion its applaufe or cenfure in the degree that Minifters might defeive. It must be in the recollection of the Houfe that his Majefty's Minifters, fince the ratification of the Definitive Treaty, on the 23d of April, 1802, until the 8th of March, when his Majefty's Meffage was communicated to Parliament, did invariably hold out to the country the most flattering hopes, and he might add certainty of peace. How, he would ask, could they justify themselves for having done fo? Have they not, and do they not now offer as a juftification, that the ambitious views, infults and aggreffions of France face the figning of that difgraceful treaty, are a juft ground of recommencing hoftilities-do they not roundly declare, that it is indifpenfably neceflary for Great Britain, even fingle-handed, to oppofe the gigantic ftrides of the First Conful? Perufe with attention the papers they have laid before us, and it must appear, that his Majefty's Mi

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nifters were convinced, from the figning of the treaty, that it could not be executed. It is the fame principles which diftracted and degraded France internally, which fubverted feme states and menaced the deftruction of Europe. In the course of the revolution have they not been developed and partly executed, before the 23d of November, when Parliament and the country were led to believe, by the affurances of Minitters, that peace was certain, and that affurance was given at a time, and after a conviction in their own minds, that the treaty was incapable of being executed? From the hoftile difpofition of the First Conful to this country, and the feveral acts he had already committed in direct violation of its fpirit and object, could any thing elfe be expected from the man who renounced the religion of his country, and embraced that of Mahomet? who fupported the followers of Mahomet's doctors, Ali and Omar? and, as it beft fuited his intereft, profeffed with either, that the ablution should or should not begin at the points of the elbows? How could it be expected that a treaty could be held facred by a man who had murdered his prifoners, and poitoned his own hofpitals? Notwithstanding the provocations, the injuries, and aggreffions, offered and committed by this very man, now at the head of the French Republic, Minifters came down to the House and gave every affurance of the permanence of peace, although there is fcarcely any ground fubfequent to the 23d of October that did not exift before that period, and confequently Minifters must acknowledge, that they told us what they did not believe, what could not take place, and what they were determined fhould not take place, namely, the execution of a treaty which had been already violated by the French Government. But it was not until the report of Colonel Sebaftiani that Minifters feemed to take the alarm, and inform the country of the hostile intentions of the First Conful. Was not the fending of commercial agents to this country antecedent and fufficient ground for war? Need he mention what had happened repecting the King George Packet on the 13th of Gtober? Were we not given to understand that Holland was feed from the French troops? and on the 29th Bergen op Zoom and Breda were occupied by them; and ftrange as it may appear, Mr. Lifton wrote a letter, in which he recommended to leave them there, and this at a time when the annexa, tion of that country to France was actually in the contemplation of the French Government, all this was known pre

vious to the 23d of November. But after all this, the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens comes to be confidered, and it is found impoffle to carry it into effect. It is difcovered that the general interefts of the guaranteeing powers, of all Europe, and of Great Britain in particular, render the execution of it, under exifting circumftances, totally impoffible. Minifters knew all this before the 23d of November, and de ermined to act upon it, and fill the country was led to indulge the fallacious hope of peace. On the twentyfeventh of April, 1802, a Madrid Gazette had announced the annexation of the poffeffions of Malta in Spain by the Government of that country; was not that a cause why the treaty could not be executed? But on the 22d of Auguft the noble Secretary writes to the French Government, informing it that if the guaranteeing powers could be induced to accede to the wishes of both Governments refpecting Malta, there could be no further difficulties in the way of peace; and this was done at a time when fufficient ground for hoftility had long before (ccurred, and when Minifters knew that even the 10th article of the treaty could not be carried into effect. He would come now to Switzerland, and fee what had occurred. Before the 23d of September Mr. Moore was ne gotiating at Conftance. Was that a moment for Ministers to come down and lull the country into an almost fatal fecurity, when they had alfo known the policy that was to be obferved relative to the ftates of the Empire, and that the Stadtholder would not be indemnified? On the 9th of Eebruary his views on Egypt, on Turkey, and on India, were known; the refources, the wealth, the commerce of this country in the Eaft were to be cut off; Turkey was to be difmembered, difinembered at leaft in part, and of this Miniiters were in poffeffion long before that communication of his Majefty's Minifters on the 8th of March. He would not go into the question, of how far it was adviseable or politic for this country to engage in the fupport of the inde pendence of Switzerland, or whether the circumftances of Europe were fuch as to make it an object that should be purfied at the hazard of renewing war; but he would confider the conduct of Minifters towards it, and prove their inconfilency and weakness. On the 13th of July the Cantons of Switzerland remonftrated againit the oppreffion they endured; on the 12th of September they were in arms; and on the 12th of October, Mr.. Merry writes that a Swiss deputy had applied to him for the interference of England,

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and on the 10th of Oa. Minifters remonstrated to M. Otto. What the answer was, we are not told, or whether there was any. But there undoubtedly was an anfwer, and the most infolent that was ever given to the Ministers of any country; they were told that they thould have nothing to do with the Continent; they fhould have the benefit of the Treaty of Amiens and nothing more. On the very day that this infulting answer was received, Mr. Moore fet off with his inftructions, and on the 23d of October arrived at his deftination. He had fcarcely ftepped out of his carriage when he was informed that the Diet had withdrawn, and fcarcely had he recovered from his fatigue and aftonishment, when on the 25th Ministers let him know that he might come home. Is not this inconfiftent conduct, a fevere reflection on the government and character of this country? No anfwer was ever given to the Swifs deputy in Paris. On the 11th of March Talleyrand tells Lord Whitworth that on the evacuation of Malta by the English troops depended either peace or war, and that the Treaty of Amiens must be strictly executed. Was this information Minifters were not prepared to receive? Did they not know long fince that it would be impoffible to execute it? And yet with all the grounds of war which he had already ftated, arifing out of the infults, ambition, and the infraction of the treaty, Ministers did prefent an ultimatum as incapable of being executed on any permanent grounds, or with any hope of removing the fe verith uncertainty which had pervaded the country, and de, preffed the fpirit of commercial enterprife. What was this ultimatum? That this country fhall keep poffeffion of Malta for ten years, during which time we shall be colonizing and. improving Lampedofa, and enlarging its harbours; and at the expiration of that term we thail be requited with the fovereignty of that invaluable ifland, which would be the refort, not of feamen, but of fea-gulls. On the fubject of the prefs I do feel like an Englithman, and hope England will never be reduced to the neceffity of regulating it to gratify any power. But when the infult refpecting it was offered-for I will call it the groffeft infult he could offer was there any remonftrance prefented? was his infolence repelled, with that firmnefs and indignation which should be felt by every Englishman? Next comes the demand that the French Nobles fhall be deportater to Canada→is not this ftill more degrading? What opinion can he entertain of Minif, fers to whom he could make fach an application? What!

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they fhall not dare even to wear their badges of distinctionthose honourable rewards of fervices rendered to their country, or the memorial perhaps of illuftrious ancestors. Here the noble Lord read the answer tranfmitted by our Government; and afferted that it conceded too much. He concluded with obferving, that it was manifeft from the documents and papers fubmitted to the Houfe, that his Majefty's Minif ters had feen from the first moment that the treaty could not be executed; and he would not hesitate, therefore, to fay, that they had shamefully fported with the feelings of the country, deluded it with falfe hopes, and abufed its generofity. He charged them with not having remonfirated with the decifion and energy which fhould characterize the Minifters of this great nation. But he hoped, that after having the fad experience of two years of peace, as they were called, no perfon would be found fo degraded as to facrifice any longer at the fhrine of fuch Minifters; efpecially at this mo ment, when every thing which was held moft dear and facred may be at iffue in the conteft.

Mr. Hobhoufe regretted that the hon. Gentleman (Colonel Patten) fhould have directed his attack fo pointedly against Minifters, or impute to them motives by which they were not actuated. It was flated, that grofs mifrepresentations had been circulated refpecting certain Members who had been in oppofition: that they were charged with lufting for power, by the minifterial prints; and by inference, that thefe calumnies originated with the Adminiftration itfelf: he world boldly fay, that his Majefty's Ministers had always given the oppofition credit for their integrity, for the purity of their principles, and for their patriotifm. As to the charges exhibited against them. he would undertake to fay, they would prove to be unfounded: the firft was, having neglected to come to the Houfe from time to time, and communicate the difpofition of the French Government, as it was progreffively developed in the course of the negotiation, and every act of aggreffion just as it had occurred. It appeared to him that they came precifely at the time they thould, and that they would have been highly reprehenfible if they made the communication fooner True, they might have experienced a great deal to irritate and diffatisfy them; nay, they might receive fufficient provocation, were they to yield to their feelings, to break off the negotiation, and recal their Ambaffador; but do they not deferve applaufe instead of cenfure for Tuppreffing thofefeelings and their indignation, and

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