into the militia? Men, who happen to be drawn for the militia, will give any fum of money fooner than ferve. It would be impoffible for many of them to enter into the fervice, and I know that to compel them to ferve perfonally would be a hardthip fo intolerable, as not to be endured, and which nothing could juftify. The evil, therefore, refted with the institution itself, by which fubftitutes were allowed; for by that means the market was raifed fo high, that the army had no chance of coming in for any fhare of the commodity offered for fale. There was a mode once fuggested which I think it would be very proper to adopt at this time: it was, that when men were drawn for the militia, if they did not wish to serve perfonally, you should commute their fervices for a fixed fine, to be impofed by Government, who fhould lay up the money in order to procure fubstitutes by means of it; and that these should not ferve in the militia, but in the army. There is one point, however, of the prefent plan which I approve of, and that is, the part by which the force to be raised is to be commanded by officers of experience. But, at the fame time, I muft deny, that this can ever be confidered as a difpofable force; or that any of thofe advantages can be derived from it which we might expect from a ftanding army. Inftead, therefore, of purfuing fuch a plan as this, I will ftate what my ideas are with regard to the kind of force I would have in the country. I would recommend, that a commutation fhould be made for perfonal fervice for a fixed fine; and that all fubftitution in the militia fhould be abolished for a fixed time. I would by that means encrease the army as much as poffible. If, inftead of adopting a plan of this kind, you reft your defence on a large military force, and never carry on any offenfive operations, the nation must inevitably be undone. Without waiting for that tranquillity which we cannot expect, for we know not when it will come, I would have you encrease the regular army by every poffible means. would have you change the footing of the fervice, and let it be for a certain term of years; and then you would stand a better chance of getting recruits. I know of no objections that can be made to this plan; I know officers of great experience, who are perfuaded that many advantages would arife from it. An author of fome eminence has faid, that the firft merit of a book is that it fhould be read. I fay then the firft merit of laws relating to the army is, that they fhould give us an army. I would not only remove all comVQL. IV. 1802-3. petitions

LI

petitions in the market, between the army and the militia but I would bring in other circumstances in aid of the recruiting of the army. The great bounties hitherto given, have done incalculable mischief; and perhaps it might happen, that when thefe fhould be done away, men would for a time refufe to enter, from an expectation of the bounties being again encreased. In order, therefore, to obviate the inconvenience arifing from men not coming forward voluntarily, I would refort to other measures, which I fhall fuggeft. We are given to understand, Sir, that one kind of force will answer very well for home fervice, while the regular force may be applied to general fervice: and it is fuppofed that the regular and irregular troops are all of the fame quality. That I deny: there is a moft material difference between them. I do not mean, in any refpect, to depreciate the fervices of the militia force, nor to take away from the great merit of many officers in that fervice. I know they have diftinguifhed themfelves by their zeal for the advantage of the country, and that their active exertions have contributed to bring their corps to a high fate of difcipline. But I muft fay, that after they have done the utmoft, which zcal, a&tivity, ardour, and courage, could do, it is, from the very nature and conftitution of that force, impoffible they can poffefs the qualities of a regular army: they either cannot have the difcipline or the experience of an army. You may as well fay that men can become failors before they get into "deep water." They must neceffarily want the opportunities of feeing fervice, and without that they must be deftitute of the advantages of a regular army. The officers cannot have the fame authority over their men that officers of the line have over theirs: they cannot have the fame reputation for fervice, and therefore they will never be looked up to with the fame confidence: and on thefe grounds I must contend, that the militia cannot be fo efficient even for the purposes of defence and home fervice, as an army. We can never rely on them as we should on veteran foldiers; nor expe&t that they could do as much as men taken from a diftant fervice, and who had been in different parts of the world. Is it nothing that your enemy knows all this? Is it nothing that he knows you have a force which is confined within, and cannot act out of your own ifland? If any openings fhould prefent themselves, by which we might carry on offenfive operations on the Continent, with a profpect of fuccefs; if any chafm fhould

appear

appear through which we might hope to overthrow the revolutionary power of France; is it nothing that your enemy knows the conftitution of your force to be fuch as to render the attainment of that great object impracticable? Is it nothing for him to know that he can, whenever he pleases, come and attack you here, in a state of inactivity, refting on your oars, and waiting for his approach? Therefore, I contend that this fpecies of force is inefficacious and mifchievous; and that a ftanding army is the only force on which you can place a full and complete reliance, whether you mean to use it for the purposes of defence or attack. In anfwer to my arguments it may be admitted, that the army is the beft force; but that it cannot be encreased immediately; that militia is the next beft; and the volunteers next after them. You may fay as fchoolboys do," the mafculine is more worthy than the feminine, and the feminine more worthy than the neuter." You make choice of the militia firft. Why not take the army firft and the militia after? I again repeat, that by this injudicious and mifchievous practice you put it out of your power to get an army. I have the fame objection to officers raifing men for rank, namely, that they will, in order to get their rank, give large bounties to procure men. There is a danger that they will do fomething worfe, that they will ftoop to improper practices to get men. The officers of the British army have never done fo; and I am happy to fay they have this great fuperiority over all other officers in the world, that they are better gentlemen. What I have already said, contains the fum of my objections against this meafure, which I confider as a moft dangerous one, and one that will cut up the defence and fecurity of the country. Now, Sir, in confidering the real fituation in which we ftand, there is one great problem which it would be highly useful and neceffary to folve; and that is, how to manage the great phyfical force of the country, fo as to make it an over-match for any force the enemy may bring against it? Such is my opinion of the military force we have already on foot, that if the enemy fent a force here no more than equal to our own, 1 fhould entertain no fear for the refult. But it is more probable that the enemy will fend a much greater force than any which we can immediately apply for the purpofe of refifting them. How then are we to make up for this deficiency in our means of defence? In every invaded country the phyfical force of the people is much greater than that of the invaders can be. If the enemy fent 100,000

men to invade us, the very population of this town would be able to send out a force equal to them in point of numbers. This idea may lead us to indulge hopes that can never be realized. We fhould confider the difference between thofe two bodies when oppofed to each other, and know that phyfical force alone could not decide the queftion. If that could be done, no country would ever be invaded. Hanover would not have been lately taken poffeffion of by the army under Gen. Mortier, which was very fmall, compared to the population of the invaded country. We fhould not, therefore, rely on our phyfical force, and fall into a blind confidence with refpect to our ftrength. We fee that immenfe bodies of people in other countries fubmit to thofe who may, comparatively, be called a handful.

Of what, I would afk, Sir, what is the whole of that force which governs his Majefty's kingdom; what are all the members of the Government, the legislature, and even the military, but a handful of men, compared to the great mafs of our population? Was it not upon this very ground, that the Jacobins made their chief attack against us fome years ago, when they complained that a fmall minority governed a large majority? And happy, indeed, is it for mankind that a handful of men can govern the many, for otherwife we fhould have no hope of repreffing the injuftice, the turbulence, the licentioufnefs, and the fury of an immense body of people, when left to themselves without any controul. Bonaparte has the power of keeping the population of France in order. While we have the controul over the phyfical force of this country, we ought to try in what manner we can best make ufe of it, in repelling the immenfe armies by which there is a probability of its being attacked. If we make this difcovery, if we folve this great problem, we fhall go a great way in accomplishing our object, and enfuring ourselves against ruin. Surely the way to do this is, not by increafing the militia; for the force now propofed is to be raifed by the common machinery of the militia; and, except in the mode of its being officered, it will be in every refpect like the militia. I would not, in the first inftance, apply to a force of that kind. Brought down to the degraded fituation in which we now find ourfelves, after having, in the midst of a fallacious peace, had our armies and our` navies difbanded, on the pretence of purfuing a plan of economy; and after having the prefent measure delayed for fo long a period after the bringing down of his Majesty's mef

fage,

fage, and until the enemy is, perhaps, within two or three months of coming upon us; in fuch a fituation you must look to a great plan of immediate defence. For this fituation in which we are placed, a great and heavy responsibility refts upon his Majefty's Minifters; but this is a fubject which I will not now dwell upon. These measures, Sir, will no doubt tell very well in Parliament, as being the firft time they are broached; but I am convinced that they will not be approved of by thofe people who have acquired experience in fuch matters, nor will they afford fatisfaction in the end. Thefe propofals or measures, which have been thus inconfiderately planned, put me in mind of goods expofed for fale in the windows of our fhops, which fhew to great advantage when artfully and judicioufly placed, and please the gazing paffenger; but which, on trial, do not afford that degree of benefit or fatisfaction which was expected, nor at all anfwer the purpofes intended. Volunteers

raifed upon the footing of thofe we have already reaped fome confiderable advantage from, are not at all to be looked upon as a proper body of men to oppofe a French army. They are, I must confefs, very useful in regard to rendering internal services to their country; but we all know that they are in general men who, from their conftitutions, mode of life, and refpective profeffions, are ill adapted for the oppofition of an enemy. I would wish that our whole military force were one which an experienced officer would really approve of, had he the command of our army. Were 1 to encreafe my regular force, I fhould conceive myself in a much better fituation of defence, although I might other wife poffibly have a greater nominal force. After making the army as great as you can, then is the time to refort to militia; and after this laft mode has been found prudent and expedient, then you may have a volunteer force of a different defcription, and fuch as would be no burthen to the country, nor be the means of drawing men from their homes. I allude, Sir, to the most efficacious and spirited step of raising the country en masse; and I think we ought at the prefent moft alarming crilis, to be employed in adopting fuch means as may be neceffary for that purpofe. By this mode we might be enabled, upon all neceffary occafions, to command our armed peafantry. I am well aware, Sir, that a force of this fort can do nothing of itfelf; and I know that a regular army may do without fuch affistance; but where that regular army happens not to be fufficient for the exigencies of the

state,