ftate, the other may afford very great and important aid. By this means you will have an incorporated force without putting the Government to unneceffary expence. The advantages of this kind of armament are co-extenfive with the actual population of the country. The peafantry and other fuch inhabitants of the country, I would propofe to be affociated and collected by people of influence and confideration, dwelling in the neighbourhood, without troubling theni with forming to a nicety particular lines and columns, with hollow fquares, with eyes right, and eyes left [a laugh], and all the trifling punctilios, which are now-a-days observed in the manual exercife of this country. I know, indeed, that this practice was originally introduced by a most experienced officer, and it is, no doubt, very proper and eligible in a certain degree, and in certain places, but not neceffary on all occafions. I would with people to reflect how much of what is molt practifed in our army, was thought quite unneceffary in former times, fuch as in the campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough. At that period, I believe it was not even the custom of his armies to march all with the fame leg at the fame time. A laugh.] The great King of Pruffia, if I remember right, alfo practifed fuch a fyftem; and, if I am not mistaken, the French themfelves have done fo. In short, they seem to have adopted this plan for the purpose of casting away the hufk, and keeping the kernel, [a laugh], and thus have gone back to the old fyftem, in order to effect their numerous and hafty schemes. A certain knowledge of tactics will by this method be more eafily infufed into every fet of people; even in the very cottages you will find the peasants converfing on military affairs, and about what fchemes they will purfue in cafe of an invafion. The prefence of such an officer as I wish for, would be the means of training his diftrict almost into a military corps: he would foon be able to teach the peafantry the principal tactics of war; and would be a kind of clinical lecturer upon the art of war. [A laugh.] I may add, that with regard to this force, I am inclined to reckon it a fine qua non; for if we are not in poffeffion of such an irregular force, we cannot altogether rely upon our regular force. [A cry of hear! hear!] I agree with the right hon. Secretary at War, who opened this difcuffion with fo much propriety, with regard to the situation of the country: I reckon, however, that it is damnable and heretical for Government not to inform the country of its real dangers. It is a bad fign of the people of the country, if they cannot

be

be told of their dangers. I am certain of this for one thing, that if fuch information is not afforded them, they cannot be properly prepared when the danger comes. Early fears are neceffary: it is proper to give them time to fortify their refolution, to endure what they will have to fuffer. There is nothing in my mind fo alarming as a kind of calm indifference; I mean that calm of fome men, who look with contempt at their dangers. There are many forts of calm; the calm of fanguine hope, the calm of defpair, the calm of grief, and the calm of people who have inactivity joined to that calmness. There is even another kind of calm, I mean the calm of cowardice, in a certain defcription of men, who would hide themselves under their bed-clothes in order to avoid danger [a laugh]; but of thefe I hope and trust there are few in this country. Notwithstanding all the pompous expreffions I have heard ufed by fome people in defence of fome of thefe ftates of calmnefs and filence, which they have conceived moft proper to be adopted on particular occafions, I am inclined to think that it is rather an erroneous doctrine, that Government thould appear to be extremely filent and tranquil at the very moment they are doing a great deal. That may be very prudent, I must confefs, on fome peculiar occations. I know that Bonaparte is at prefent proceeding with great fecrefy, perhaps, too, even with more fecrefy than his fchemes may require. I thould not be furprised to hear it faid, that the right hon. Gentlemen compofing the Government of this country are actually endeavouring to imitate Bonaparte. [A laugh.] Such a principle, however, may be very good and commendable on the part of thofe who are planning an attack, but it is very different in regard to those who are to be the objects of that attack. In order to expofe yet further the abfurdity of adopting such a plan of filence, I would beg leave to ftate this fhort and plain cafe: If an officer were to fay to his guard," we are to be attacked to-night; but hufh! don't fay a word, otherwise it would be dangerous;" I would afk thofe Gentlemen whether, in their opinion, fuch an impofed filence could be reckoned prudent? It is not becoming in Minifters to exhibit this affected calm; they muft fhew the country its real danger; that the people may not be difmayed when it arrives. I however think, whatever may be the difmay occafioned by fuch a conduct, that the people will do their duty, be the conduct of Government in this particular what it may. But 1 with to imprefs upon the Houfe, that Government itself

must

must also do its duty. Every thing ought to be done that the mind can invent or genius plan. Every officer of consideration in the country fhould be called on to give his opinion; not flightly, or in words, but deliberately, and in writing; and for fuch opinion he ought to be refponfible. A number of new ideas which no fingle man could produce, would thus be' ftruck out. I am furry to be under the neceffity of thus objecting to the only mode of railing a force which Ministers have propofed; and must enter my protest against it, so far as it tends to cut up the regular army. Upon the whole it is the most impolitic ftep that could be taken in the prefent fituation of the country.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer faid it was not his intention. to follow the right hon. Gentleman through the great variety of obfervations he had thought proper to make; but he would fubmit it to the candid judgment of the House, whether his Majefty's Minifters were liable to the right hon. Gentleman's charge of bringing forward tardy and ill confidered meafures of preparation. It was now only five weeks fince. his Majesty's meffage had been delivered to the House, and. within that period 50,000 men had been voted, and the fupplementary militia had been called out. Therefore he thought Minifters had not preferved that kind of dignified calm which the right hon. Gentleman would afcribe to them. He difclaimed the imputation which the right hon. Gentleman would attach to him and his colleagues, of wifhing to conceal the actual flate of the country; and the facts he had flated relative to the increafe of the navy and the calling qut of the fupplementary militia were fufficient to fhew that the affertion of the right hon. Gentleman, that Minifters were fecret in their preparations, was quite unfounded. In addition to thofe facts it was now propofed to raife 50,000 men by ballot, fimilar to the militia, and free from two great objections which that right hon. Gentieman himfelt had frequently urged against the militia fyftem. namely, that it was to be more extended in its fervice, and that it was to be officered by men of military experience; a circumstance which muft fecure that difcipline which conflituted the life and foul of an army. The propofed force, therefore, was not liable to the objections which the right hon Gentleman would apply to the militia. Many of the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman he was ready to admit were entitled to great weight; and if it was now a matter of option whether it was better to have a regular than a militia force, he was

free

free to fay that he would have no difficulty in preferring the former, if in the prefent circumftances it were practicable to raife fuch a force by the ordinary means within reasonable time. The greater part, however, of the objections which the right hon. Gentleman advanced that evening to the militia fyftem, would have come with more propriety in the courfe of the difcuffions which took place laft feffions upon that fubject; but, though the right hon. Gentleman now thought proper fo ftrongly to urge his oppofition to the meafure before the Committee, because it was founded on the plan of the militia, yet he admitted that the railing of a regular army in lieu of it was quite impracticable. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman's only reafon for declining to vote against this measure was, that it was better to have the propofed force than none at all: but the right hon. Gentleman's chief charge against Minifters was, their delay in bringing forward this measure. That delay, however, was defigned with this view, that both the regular and fupplementary militia fhould be fully fupplied before the balloting neceffary for the force now under confideration fhould commence. Such was the motive which influenced that conduct in Minifters of which the right hon. Gentleman complained, and the rectitude of this motive he submitted to the confideration of the Committee. Minifters had proceeded by a gradual fucceffion of measures to provide for the complete resistance of the enemy, and in a way which he trufted would, on the fulleft and faireft review, meet the approbation of the Houfe. As to the right hon. Gentleman's revifion of the militia fyftem, he would say that this was not the proper time for that difcuffion; and he would ask the right hon. Gentleman how he could fuppofe it poffible to recruit a regular army to the number of 50,000 men without reforting to means of compulfion, which he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not himfelf approve?

With respect to the danger of the country, he had no hefitation in faying that he never underrated it-neither in public nor private did he ever attempt to difguife it. He felt it to be of that nature which could be contemplated without difmay, but which no rational man could contemplate with indifference. To the right hon. Gentleman's ideas upon the propriety of railing men for the regular army for a limited time, there were many objections, the force of which he felt, particularly in confequence of our colonial poffeffions; for, fuppofing men were enlitted for only five or fix years, (and VOL. IV. 18c2-3.

M m

he

he doubted whether recruits in general cared much whether the period was for life or for a limited period) what numerous inconveniences would arife to the fervice, especially where regiments were ftationed in America, the Weft Indies, or any remote quarter of the empire. Perhaps in the event of a whole regiment being ordered home, or on any expedition, only the fkeleton of fuch regiment would be forthcoming. In fact, he remarked, the fyftem of the right hon. Gentleman fcarcely ever prevailed in any nation which had colonial poffeffions, and in this country it would be quite ab. furd. Returning to the meafure before the Committee, and the obfervation of the right hon. Gentleman, that it would create a difficulty and impediment, if not an infurmountable obftacle, in the way of recruiting the army, he would ask of the Houfe to confider its character and object fully, and if any better thould be fuggefted, to prefer it. If any Member could devife a plan for raifing a force within the proper time by means more effectual and conftitutional, he certainly thould embrace it; but even the right hon. Gentleman himself admitted that it was impoffible. Why then did he oppose it? But his oppofition was not quite correctly founded, for his arguments generally applied to extremes. He always dwelt upon comparifons between the regular army and the militia, and overlooked that middle courfe between them which was precifely the defcription of the force now under confideration; therefore the right hon. Gentleman's objections did not trialy apply to this meafure. He highly valued the fervices of the regular army, of which the right hon. Gentleman had said so much; but however he relied on the affistance, or upon the zeal and exertions of our other forces, he begged the right hon. Gentleman, the Houfe, and the country to understand, that Government did not mean entirely to rely on thefe means, and that the propofition now before the Committee was not the limit of the arrangements in which they meant to confide for the attainment of those objects which induced the commencement of the war; for, independently of the means already referred to, he had no doubt whatever, fhould circumstances render it neceffary, the great body of the population of the country would, upon an appeal from their Sovereign, ftand forward in defence of their rights and independence. Upon the prompt affiftance of fuch a voluntary force he confidently reckoned; fuch a force as mult render the country impregnable, and as must convince the person who now directs the government of France,

that