the whole would in a short time have been involved in the darkest night. Every difcuffion would have been discountenanced by Minifters, and converfation in the public prints would have fupplied the place of official documents on a matter of the highest importance. It would not be forgotten what the docunients were which Minifters had laid down on this fubject. In cafe of war they were not unwilling to grant what information was required. On the other hand, if there had been a favourable period put to the negotiations, Ministers did not indeed fay that they would refuse all explanation, but they referved themselves as to the cafes on which they confidered fuch information expedient, useful, or neceffary. Having gone through thefe obfervations, as tending to thew the propriety of the two first resolutions, the right hon. Gentleman proceeded to examine in detail the grounds on which the third refolution was founded. From the two first refolutions, the third appeared to flow as a necellary inference. It involved a variety of ferious and weighty obfervations. First, in the attacks which had been made on our fhips by the officers of the French Government. One hon. Gentleman feemed to confider, that on this point there was no reasonable ground of complaint. If injuries had been received, British fubjects had only to appeal to the national courts of juftice. But, what he begged the House to confider, were thefe national courts of justice.

The

The principal ground of complaint was, that these courts of appeal decide only by taking immediate poffeffion of the prizes fubmitted to their decifion. But what does the First Conful fay to the complaints of British fubjects? Why, he tells them they must appeal to the tribunals of the country, to the very tribunals from which all the injuftice complained of had been received. Let juftice take its courfe, is the language of the First Conful; and the groffeft injuftice is the courfe which this pretended juftice invariably purfues. capture is divided, and the British claimant is forced to bear thofe loffes, against which the remonftrances of Ministers had failed to protect them. In failing to remonftrate with vigour against a fpecies of aggreffion, fo contrary to every principle of intercourfe between civilized nations, Minifters had incurred a very grave and ferious refponfibility. The tmiffion of the French military conful did not appear to him to be defcribed in his Majefty's declaration, in terms at all correfpondent to the nature of the infult. It was an outrage in all refpects fo grofs, that Minifters ought with much

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greater

greater fpirit to have refented the attempt to violate the ufages of independent nations. It afforded him no inconfiderable degree of fatisfaction, on a former occafion, to find that two eminent, and the most confiderable Members of the Houfe, were completely agreed in opinion that the million of these individuals was a grofs infult, and that in twenty-four hours after their arrival they ought to have been peremptorily required to quit the country. But this was an inadequate fatisfaction; and, if the French Government refused to give fatisfaction, there could be no doubt that war, to avenge this national infult, would have been juftifiable. In vain, however, had these two great characters expreffed fuch an opinion. Minifters had chofen to pursue a courfe totally different. No memorial could be laid before the Houfe, not because they had not remonftrated, but because the remonstrance had taken place merely in a verbal conference with the French Amballador. Here, as well as with refpect to many other parts of the documents on the table, he could not but lament that every thing had not been reduced to a regular memorial, instead of being fubmitted to a statement dependent on verbal recollection. This was an evil in diplomatic proceedings which was frequently attended with very ferious confequences. It left too much dependant on memory, neceffarily liable to confiderable deficiency. It placed important statements too much expofed to be distorted by party prejudice and private views of intereft. The next point on which he wished to touch, was one which, he faid, he confidered as of the highest importance. He meant to allude to the fituation. of Holland.

On this fubject it also afforded him real delight, as he was fure it must have done to the Houfe at large, to find the two right hon. Gentlemen (Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox), to whom he had already alluded, fpeaking, with refpect to the policy which this country ought to purfue with refpect to Holland, thofe truly British fentiments, which every true Englishman could not fail cordially to approve. For his own part he had no difficulty in faying, that he confidered the conduct of the French Government to the Batavian Republic, independent of all other confiderations, to be a full, fair, and unanfwerable ground of war. What he had to complain of in the conduct of Minifters was, that they had not fhewn that zeal and activity with regard to the neceffity of remonstrating against the violence and injuftice of the French Government to the Dutch, which their duty to the public imperiously

called

⚫ called on them to difplay. So far from making the cause of the Batavian Republic diftinctly the caufe of this country, they appeared on all occafions backward to take up the bulinefs. So far from availing themfelves of opportunities which occurred of reviving the folid connection of friendship and intereft, which it was fo obviously the mutual intereft of both countries to maintain, their conduct was marked by weakness, irrefolution, and timidity. It had been remarked by one hon. Gentleman, that in making their stand for Malta, Minifters had made their ftand for a truly British object. When he confidered the manner in which the stand was made, whatever he might think of the importance of Malta, he could not perfectly coincide with that sentiment. But even granting that Malta was a fair British object, he would afk of Minifters whether, on their own principles, a stand in favour of Holland was not of infinitely more importance in a national point of view. Was there any man who did not think that Minifters ought firmly and manfully to have remonstrated against the continuance of the French troops in Holland? Was there any man who expected that Ministers had neglected making fuch remonftrance with energy and fpirit? It was, he must confefs, to his infinite aftonishment, that he found that no memorial had been prefented to the French Government on the fubje; not that no memorial or remonstrance had been drawn up with the view of being prefented; not that it had been tranfmitted to Paris, with the view of being laid before the First Conful; but that after being in the hands of our Ambaffador, Minifters had at length difcovered that it would be more wife, prudent, and proper, that it fhould not be delivered. And on what motive was it that fo extraordinary a neglect of the most imperious duty was attempted to be justified? The juftification was more humiliating and degrading than the neglect itself. It was not true that Minitters were not sensible of the importance of getting the French troops removed from the Batavian Republic; it was not that they did not conceive that, according to the cleareft principles of the law of nations, and the most obvious maxims of a national policy, they had an undeniable right to interfere; but they declined interfering, on the bafe and difhonourable principle, that their interference might have excited the jealousy of the French Government. Was fuch language to be endured in. an English Parliament? Was a British Secretary of State o tell a British Houfe of Commons, that a memorial drawn up

in behalf of an ancient and valuable ally, in fupport of the independence of a power with which we have a mutual intereft, fhould, from confiderations of prudence, propriety, or wisdom, from a dread of irritating France, be cancelled or buried in oblivion. Such was the difgraceful picture which the conduct of Minifters to the Batavian Republic prefented. Now, as to their conduct to Switzerland, he confeffed that here too Minifters feemed to prove highly reprehenfible In offering a few obfervations on this fubject, he begged 'leave to go back a good deal farther than had been gone by any of thofe by whom the fubject had been mentioned. What he fhould ftate in the first inftance, he fhould state on the authority of very prevalent rumours, though he would not take upon himself to say that these rumours were in all refpects accurate as to the facts. He had good reafon, however, for believing that as early as the fpring of last year, feveral perfons of eminent character, and invested with confiderable fituations, had come from Switzerland to London, with the view of confulting about the beft means of providing against that interference of the French Government in their internal affairs they had even then begun to dread. He had heard that these individuals, fo far from being received with favour or with kindness, it was not till after a folicitation of near two months that they could gain admiffion to any one of his Majefty's Ministers. This was a circumftance of confiderable importance, and could not fail to make a strong impreffion on the Houfe. But he wifhed to point out particularly the application of this eircumflance, as throwing light on the conduct of Minifters. They must have known long before October, when their remonftrance in behalf of Switzerland was prefented, what was the real fituation of that country.

In June, the fears, the wifhes, and the views of the inhabitants had been explained to them. He withed to know from Ministers what circumstances existed to induce them to` remonftrate in October, which did not operate with equal force in June? Was not the right of interference equal? Were not the claims of the Swifs as powerful? Was not their fituation as much recommended to protection? Was there not then a much greater probability of successful refistance than at the time when the remontrance was presented, when in fact, that was done be; ond the power of reparation, which it was the object of Mr. Moore's journey to prevent? Did Minifters expect that any thing myflerious was to refult

from

from this journey? Did they hope to find an Austrian army at Conftance, ready to afford protection to a perfecuted country. The whole remonftrance evinced neither dignity nor forefight. It was equally deftitute of policy, wisdom, or ability.

But, there was another circumftance attending this remon ftrance, to which he thought it might not be improper to call the attention of the Houfe. The memorial had been prefented to the French Government on the roth of October, and nothing more is heard of it till the 27th of February, when Lord Whitworth is inftructed to demand an answer to the remonstrance. Was no inquiry made during the whole intermediate space, in what light the memorial was regarded by the French Government? Was this a matter of fuch trifling importance, that Minifters chofe to overlook it? Was not this refufal to give any answer, an indirect way of telling Minifters, that the French Government was determined not to permit them to interfere on the continent? Was it not a tacit mode of establishing what Minifters could not but know was the avowed and favourite object of the ambition of the First Conful? Minifters, on every confideration of wisdom and policy, ought much earlier to have demanded explanation. But this was just a part of their general fyftem. As to Piedmont, he had to offer a few obfervations.. On a former occafion the fituation of the King of Sardinia, had given rife to a good deal of difcuffion. On the debates on the definitive treaty, when it was objected that no provi fion was obtained for that Sovereign, a noble Secretary of State oppofite (Lord Hawkesbury) had faid, that he had not only loft all right to interference on his behalf on the part of this country, but had, from his conduct, placed himself in the fituation of being confidered as an enemy.

Against fuch a view of the fubject he did proteft at the time, and muft at all times proteft in the ftrongest terms. Becaufe a Prince who, fighting in our caufe, had been stripped of his dominions, and deprived of his all, was for a while obliged to affume the nominal appearance of a fce,. he could never admit the doctrines which the noble Lord had laid down. But on a fudden a most important change is introduced in the fituation of this Sovereign. From being fomething little short of an avowed enemy, he is at once converted into a favoured ally, for whom ample fecurity is to be obtained for all his loffes. And how is this new inindemnity to be procured? Why, by the rare fcheme of the

ceffion