thofe ferjeants, trumpeters, and drummers, belonging to the cavalry and volunteers, that received pay, and for the better regulations of the yeomanry and volunteer corps.

SCOTCH CANAL.

Mr. Alexander brought up the report of the Committee of fupply, by which it was refolved that 20,000l. should be given for making a canal between Inverness and Fort William, in Scotland.

This refolution was agreed to by the House.

SCOTCH MILITIA FAMILIES.

Sir James Sinclair Erskine moved the order of the day for the third reading of the Scotch militia families' bill.

Mr. Ferguson fuggefted, that provision ought to be made only for the families of thofe upon whom the ballot had actually fallen, and who ferved in confequence.

Sir James Sinclair Erskine faid, that in England, at first, the provifions had been confined within the limits mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. The principle, however, had been afterwards extended to all those who served in the militia. He should have been very well pleafed that the principle fhould have been confined according to the idea of the hon. Gentleman; but it was but fair that the Scotch militia fhould enjoy the fame advantage as the English, with whom they ferved.

Mr. Ferguson explained; after which the bill paffed.

PAPERS.

Mr. William Dundas rofe and faid, that the papers, for which a noble Lord had lately moved, and for the production of which he had obtained an order, refpecting the carrying of corn coaft-ways in Scotland, could not, he understood, from the beft authority, be now produced. A Committee was to be appointed to examine into this matter. He therefore fuggefted to the hon. Baronet (Sir William Pulteney), the propriety of withdrawing the order at prefent, and fixing it for the beginning of next feffion.

Sir William Pulteney agreed on the part of the noble Lord alluded to, and the former order was difcharged.

Upon the queftion, whether it ought to be renewed for next Seffion,

Sir James Sinclair Erfkine faid, that Gentlemen ought to paufe before the order was made, as he doubted, upon good authority, whether the papers in question could be produced

even

even next feffion. He therefore fuggefted the propriety of putting off the motion till Monday, that the matter might be confidered in the mean time. This was agreed to.

Mr. Rose also gave notice that he should the next day move for leave to bring in a bill, directing overfeers of parishes to deliver in an account of the number of poor perfons relieved in their respective parishes, together with the amount of the fums expended for that purpofe.

ARMY OF RESERVE.

The Secretary at War moved the third reading of the bill for raifing 40,000 men as an additional force for that part of the United Kingdom called England.

Mr. Johnstone rofe, and faid, that no man in or out of that House, was more difpofed than himself to employ the most vigorous efforts, and make the most important facrifices, that might be neceffary for the fupport of the honour and independence of the country, or more defirous to use the most ftrenuous measures, than he was, to weather the enormous and overgrown power of France. But, fully impreffed as he was with thefe fentiments, and determined as he ever should be in that difpofition, he did not know that any exertions however great, or any facrifices however large, could place the country in a greater degree of security, than it would have been maintained in, had the late peace been preferved. If there fhould appear to be any force either in what he had said, or what he had yet to add, it would only lead to give some effect to the mediation which he understood to be now offered through the interference of the Court of Ruffia. What, he would afk, were the objects which led to the war? Oftenfibly, as he understood it, the objects were thefe: the annexation of Piedmont, the invafion of Switzerland, the demand of the furrender of Malta, and fome other points, which, however, appeared to be of a fubordinate nature. But, on a due confideration, however, confpicuous these points stood in his Majesty's declaration, he was convinced that the two firft at least were not the grounds of the prefent war. On the 29th of January, it appeared, from the papers now on the table, that the Minifters refolved to conform to the ftipulations of the treaty of Amiens, and confidered the guarantee of Ruffia as a sufficient fecurity for Malta. Nothing happened to alter their minds or shake their determination, from that time till the 9th of April, except the miffion of Sebaftiani to Egypt. He would not at prefent argue, whether it was or was not that

fingle circumstance that changed their refolutions, nor should he trouble the Houfe with purfuing the whole train of negotiation, as that was a ground which had been very much travelled over already. Minifters had afferted, in round and unqualified terms, that the enemy gave them no other alternative but the ceffion of Malta or war. They faid, that Malta, or war," was the cry of the French Ministers; but, notwithstanding thefe confident affertions, he had no hefitation to maintain that fuch was not the fact. In the French note prefented. to our Ambaffador on the 9th of April, France offered to confent to any arrangement that would render Malta independent both of England and the French Republic; and on the 3d of May it was proposed, on the part of the French Government, that the island thould be placed in the hands of Ruffia, Auftria, or Pruffia. It would be feen, from Lord Whitworth's correfpondence, that the French proposed to have this island furrendered to Rullia; but it was a material and important omiffion in that communication, that no paper was produced avowing the reasons which we affigned for refufing it. He did not indeed know, that any other reafon was affigned for rejecting the propofal of giving the place up to Ruffia, than, that it would be incompatible with his Majefty's just pretenfions. This incompatibility, therefore, with the juft pretenfions of his Majelty, he was authorized to confider as the real and true ground of the war. Should this pofition be difputed, he would afk, whether, if we had offered to give it up at that time to Ruffia, either provifionally or in perpetuity, that arrangement might not have been concluded, and the prefent rupture avoided? The diftinct offer was made in Paris, to give up Malta to the emperor of Ruffia, on the completion of which the French troops would be withdrawn from Holland. Had the offer then been accepted, and HolJand evacuated by the French troops, nothing was more probable, than that things would have remained in that state, at leaft for fome time; and, fhould they continue out of the country for two or three years, it was only reafonable to conclude, that the fpirit of the people would make it extremely difficult for them to re-enter it afterwards. He would afk, what great difference it would make, under any circumftances, whether Malta was in our own hands or in thofe of Ruffia? Would it not be, in fact, even in every point of view, better for this country that Ruthia fhould be the occupier of that ifland? The value of the Cape of Good Hope

was

was confidered to be diminished on account of the expence of retaining it but furely the fame argument would apply equally to the retention of Malta, and more fo indeed, for we fhould then have the fame ufe of it, while we were exonerated from the expence. There was further a principle of policy, which, on that occafion, ought not to have efcaped the notice of his Majesty's Ministers. The Emperor of Ruffia had hewn a great difpofition to interfere in the affairs of Italy; he had before exerted himself, though ineffe&tually, in behalf of the King of Sardinia, and retained, till very lately, a body of troops in the capital of Naples. It could not be fuppofed, that Bonaparte would gratuitoufly involve himself in a quarrel with so near a neighbour as the Ruffian Emperor would then be, or that fo powerful a monarch would not, at Malta, have been a check upon his enterprizes. Nay, thould France even renew its attempts againft Egypt, Malta would be of more fervice to us in the hands of Ruffia than in our own. If it could for a moment be suspected, that Ruffia would condefcend to play an underhand game, and, after getting poffeffion of the place, turn it againft us, there were numerous reafons, independently of the high character of that monarch, to diffipate fufpicions fo injurious and une founded. If Ruffia was difpofed to affift the views of France against our India poffeffions, it had it in its power to give Bonaparte a more advantageous port in the Perfian Gulph, whence he could annoy us with more effect than he poffibly could from Malta. He, however, denied, that France could entertain these views on India which had been attributed to it. There was no part of the dominions of this country less vulnerable, and more out of his reach, than our Eift India poffeffions. If England itself were not lefs acceffible to the attacks of France than our oriental territories; if Bonaparte could fucceed against all the dangers and obftructions which we should neceffarily oppofe to him, in conveying. fufficient troops, ftores, and ammunition, in fafety, to fome point of attack; what refource after all could he find against a difciplined and experienced army of 100,000 men, and a revenue of 12,000,ocol. annually? To effect all that fuccefs fully, would he bidding defiance to all human calculation.

The hon. Gentleman next proceeded to fpeculate or argue on what was likely to be the result of the present war. France would, no doubt, try all means in its power to shut us out from all the ports of the continent, and would draw, numerous and formidable bodies of troops to its coafts, threatVOL. IV. 1802-3.

3 D

ening

ening us with invafion. Of the event of an invafion of this country, should the enemy be desperate enough to attempt it, he had not the flightest fear; but, having loft the affections of one part of the people of Ireland, without conciliating the other, the fituation of that country must be confidered as dangerous and critical. Upon that fubje&t he fhould forbear to dwell; and would next call the attention of the Houfe to what were our means of annoying France. It seemed to be agreed on all hands, that a defenfive war merely would be ruinous to the nation; and let him now afk, after we thould have taken fuch fhips as the enemy had then at sea, and become poffeffed of the colonies, what were our further means of offenfive operations? An hon. Gentleman below him (Mr. Sheridan), who feemed ftrenuous for the war, had not propofed any. But a noble Lord (Temple) who seemed ftill more fanguine, pointed out three modes: 1ft, A combination of the continental powers; 2d, a direct attack by this country upon France; and 3dly, the iffuing of a declaration against the French Government. He would take the liberty of making a very few obfervations upon these three hopeful projects. As to the first, the only powers on the continent by which a confederacy could be formed, were Auftria, Pruffia, and Ruffia. With regard to Auftria, nothing was more plain than that the dared not enter into any fuch alliance. With broken and difpirited armies, demolished fortifications, and deranged finances, the confequence to her of a rupture would be, that the emperor would quickly behold the French in the heart of his dominions, perhaps in poffeffion of his capital, and impofing on him a peace infallibly more galling, humiliating, and difadvantageous than that to which he was laft war compelled to fubmit. Pruffia would never unite cordially with Auftria, and was as unable to contend with France, without affiftance, as the emperor himself. And to all this, it must be added, that the dark, crooked, and covetous policy of the court of Berlin, would rather induce it to forward than oppose the ambitious defigns of the First Conful. There remained, then, only Ruffia to which we could poffibly look as our ally; but fuppofing the Emperor of Ruffia ever fo well difpofed to co-operate with us, he could do but little unfupported by Auftria and Pruffia, whose dominions were be tween him and any point of contact with France. And, after all, fuppofing that difficulty to be removed, what had France to fear from an army which must have 5co uniles of a difficult