It was certainly right that the regiments of militia, confider, ing the fort of fervice they were most likely to undergoj fhould have the fame affiftance from regular bred profeffiona perfons as the regulars; but, at prefent, the encouragement in the former department was fuch, as to offer no temptation, except to raw and inexperienced young men, who might be under fome difficulty to find any other mode of employment. By the regulations now in being, militia furgeons, in time of peace, must have been thirty years in the fervice, before they could be entitled to the finall provision of three thillings per day, which the House must be fenfible was extremely inadequate to the expectations, and just pretenfions, of experienced profeffional men; and from fome calculations he had feen, it would appear, that fhould the prefent war continue for even five years longer, there were but a very few furgeons of militia, who could be entitled to the fcanty provisions made by the act of parliament. He was not, he faid, provided with any motion on this fubject, but threw out these few obfervations for the confideration of his Majesty's Mihifters.

No answer was made, and the refolutions having been agreed to, the bill was ordered to be read a third time the next day.

ARMY OF RESERVE.

The order of the day being read for the fecond reading of the Irish additional force bill,

General Gascoyne rofe, he faid, with very great reluctance, to trefpafs once more upon the indulgence of the Houfe, by a few obfervations upon a fubject which had already been fo fully difcuffed on a former night, namely, the fituation in which thefe countries ftand, with refpect to the danger of the threatened invafion, and the means of our defence. On this fubject a very confiderable impreffion had been made upon the minds of many Gentlemen in that Houfe, and had very ferious effects without doors upon the funds, and the monied and commercial interefts of the country; nor was it matter of furprife, as arguments of fuch defponding tendency had fallen from fuch high authority, as that of a right hon. Gentleman near him (Mr. Windham), and that of an hon. Colonel near him, of high military experience, and well known to the Powers of Europe, and alfo from several other Gentlemen of high military experience. His purpofe for fifing that day, was to do away thofe impreffions, for which he really felt no ferious grounds, notwithilanding all the menaces

menaces of the enemy, and his difplay of preparations to invade this country. It must be in the recollection of every Gentleman who heard him, that in 1798, the menaces of French invafion were to the full as loud, and talked of with as much alarm as at the present moment; that a French army was affembled upon the oppofite coafts, avowedly for the purpofe, and affuming to itfelf the pompous and daring appellation of "The Army of England;" but it must be alfo recollected, that in the courfe of a few months, this army was withdrawn, and the next thing heard of it was from the fhores of Africa, on its way to Egypt, where it was finally deftroyed, or taken by the real Army of Eng land, whofe name it had audaciously ufurped. Was it not therefore to the full as likely, that the army now affembled upon the oppofite coafts, though avowedly defigned for the invafion of this country, was really intended for fome other defign; probably for the recapture of Egypt, which Bonaparte had avowed to be his favourite objet, and one of which he never would lofe fight; or, pollibly, for an attack against our poffeffions in the Eaft or Weft Indies? If, therefore, we continue to retain the whole of our force, to ftand upon a mere defenfive fyftem at home, without any attempt to attack the enemy in his vulnerable points, or preparing to meet his defigns in other quarters, our finances would be exhausted, in endeavouring to fupport fo tardy and inactive a fyftem. An hon, Gentleman, formerly a Member of that Houfe, but now no more, had often expreffed his furprise at the novelties produced by the French revolution in the courfe of the war; but what would he have faid at this day, had he lived to have feen fuch an extraordinary novelty as this country, poffeffed as the was of fuch a formidable navy, flufhed with victories, and fo ably manned and appointed for our defence; with a difciplined army of 20,000 troops of the line within our country, befides 70,000 militia, well armed and difciplined, and fo numerous a body of volunteers, alfo well difciplined, exclufive of the 50,000 men to be raised under those bills, alarmed at the menaces of an invafion from an enemy who has no navy the dare fend to fea without a moral certainty of finding their way into British ports, instead of ever re urning to France? For his own part, he thought the apprehenfion of invasion from fuch an enemy almoft ridiculous; and that instead of standing upon the defenfive, we ought to fill up the regiments of the line with the men to be raised, to the number of 1200 or 1300 men to a regiment, as at once the

best mode of accelerating their difcipline, and of being prepared to ftrike an effectual blow, whenever and wherever opportunity thould offer. Much had been faid of the difadvantages attendant on imperfect difcipline; he was ready to admit the importance of good difcipline, but he by no means thought it fo difficult to be acquired, to fit troops for action. He remembered in the laft war three regiments brigaded for continental fervice, who, the very day after they were joined by a body of 450 recrui ́s in their coloured clothes, marched to attack Pichegru; and thofe brave fellows fought with as much steadiness and gallantry as any men in their corps. Confidering the powerful manner in which our navy was manned; confidering that the garrifons of Gibraltar and Malta had a confiderable number of troops more than they required, he was confident that a body of 50,000 men could. with great propriety, be fpared for offenfive operations, and they ought to be kept ready embarked, to feize on the first opportunity for a mafterly blow, inftead of confining the country to a ruinous and inactive fyftem of defenfive war, which would abforb our refources to no manner of effect. With respect to the menace of French invafion, there was nothing new in the project towards this country, though there was certainly fomething extremely new in the mode now propofed for carrying it on. Under the Kings of the House of Bourbon, it had been frequently threatened; it had been menaced in all their wars with England. But even in the zenith of their power, and when they poffeffed powerful flee's, they never durft venture; much lefs did they fucceed in carrying their menaces into effect. Even in the reign of Louis XIV. when they might have looked for the aid of a ftrong party in this country (the adherents of the abdicated Houfe of the Stuarts), a force was prepared on the coast of France, more than once, for the purpose of invading this country, and at one time they would have carried this purpofe into effect, had it not been for the fignal victory obtained by the gallant Admiral Ruffel. But if in the proudest days of the French navy fuch a project was impracticable, where was the probability that it could fucceed when France has no navy that we should not take or destroy, fo foon as they dare venture to fea? Nothing could excufe the unfounded apprehenfions that had operated to alarm and difmay any portion of the community; but having familiarized themfelves with imaginary terrors, they had not the fortitude to difcard them on reflection. But to fuppofe thata project impracticable

practicable when France had a powerful navy, would now be attempted with fuccefs, in open boats, was too ridiculous. a ground of alarm. What would our ancestors fay of such apprehenfions? or would they have fuppofed their pofterity would in the proudeft era of their naval ftrength, have indulged fuch filly fears? He defired to afk any military man, if a broad river, instead of a sea, divided the countries, and that the enemy were to attempt croffing it in the face of an army poffeffed of every strong hold upon the whole oppofite line, while he was obliged to leave behind him all his cavalry and artillery, what would be his chance of fuccefs? and fuch must be the fituation of the French army attempting an expedition in open boats. Was it probable that the ambition of Bonaparte would prompt him to fuch an attempt upon this country, where he would meet an enemy in every treefor wherever there was a tree, he would be fure to find an Englishman behind it (a laugh).—But fuppofing them to have boats enough for fuch an expedition, how could they af femble on their coafts in a collective fleet, while our frigates were conftantly looking even into the receffes of their harbours, and prepared to deftroy their force wherever it was collecting? And even if this were not the cafe, their voyage, to reach our fhores, muft have the concurrence of fingularly favourable circumftances. They must have an unruffled fea, a fair wind, a dark night fucceeded by a fog next day, and our frigates muft have abandened their ftations and returned into harbour, to fuffer fuch an expedition to approach our fhores unmolefted. It was, however, ridiculous to fuppofe any open boat would venture on such an attempt, while our frigates were able to keep the fea; fo that mad as the prefent ruler of France may be, and defperate and infatiable as his ambition evidently is, he cannot be fuppofed mad enough to proceed upon a project, where himfelf has acknowledged the risk of deftruction to be as one hundred to one against him; and while we can look with fuch confidence to fo powerful and gallant an army and navy, we may laugh at his menaces. It has been faid, that we might be approached by three divifions. He did not profefs to be a calculator, but if it was one hundred to one that one expedition could not fucceed, it was three hundred to one that three could not fucceed [a laugh). And he wished to afk any naval officer, if there was the flighteft probability of fuch a concurrence of circumstances-now even that the equinoctial gales [a laugh]

were

were approaching-for fuch an expedition to approach our fhores, without meeting deftruction?. Befide, as he before remarked, without cavalry (which he never heard it was in tended they should bring) and artillery, on which they fo much relied, and which they muft leave behind, their attempt must be unsuccessful, even if they were permitted to land: fo that the attempt must be the very acme of folly, rathness, and frenzy. Much, however, as he ridiculed the menace, he by no means wished to throw the country off its guard, or to flacken its exertions for fecurity. He wished that a moft formidable force might be conftantly kept up, and one ready embarked, prepared to ftrike a blow, which would encourage the enslaved and outraged powers of Europe to roufe from their humiliation and debafement, and throw off the French yoke; and he doubted not, that the oppreffed and infulted people of Switzerland, Batavia, and Italy, the moment they Thould fee any chance of fuccefs, would be up to a man, for the purpose of regaining their liberty and independence. If there ever was a period during the late war, at which there was real caufe to apprehend the fuccefsful invafion of thefe islands, it was at the period of the rebellion in Ireland, which would never have occurred, but for French promifes of ample fuccours to the difaffected. But the deluded people of that country had experience enough of Gallic faith, and its confequences, to truft them again. Nor could he think it poffible, after all that was fo notorious of the enslavement of the countries of Europe where the perfidious French found footing, that the deluded people of Ireland could be at this day fo befotted, as to be defirous of exchanging the invalua ble bleffings of a British conftitution, to become the flaves of France, who, instead of friends at this day, would meet in Ireland a whole nation of the mofl decided enemies. He could not call to mind any inftance furnished by history, of a formidable invafion, which was not marked under the pretext of redreffing some wrong, or reftoring fome monarch or family, which might be faid to have a title to the throne. There were no pretentions of that kind to be fet up now, and the enemy would now find in all directions, only (warms of people ready and willing to meet them in the field. It had been faid, that the object of the enemy, after landing, would be to push for the capital; but the example of history would fhew, that it was always the policy of invaders to avoid the capital of a country. That was the policy of

William