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fons to work as may be sufficient, provided that it did not take away so many hands from agriculture, as to be likely to proluce a famine, and that it did not materially interfere with the other military services. With regard to the manufactures, he said, that on such an occasion he made little account of them ; for when the country was in danger of invasion, it was a very subordinate consideration that the manufactures should be suspended ; and in such an extremity he thought agriculture itself was little more than a secondary confideration. He did not know whether his Majesty did ur did not already possess the power alluded to, but if he did not, it should be immediately given to him, at least all the workmen about London and its vicinity fhould be immediately set to work. He knew that in this country there existed a strong prejudice against fortifications, as the people were more disposed to look for security from that frontier which God had given them. Viewing the state of the nation, however, as a military man, he saw four objects upon fortifications should be erected without further delay. First, for the security of our naval and military depots. He perceived in some gentlemen, he said, a kind of apprehenlion, as if he was about to proceed indiscriminately, but he assured them that he should not uiter a fyllable which could tend to give the enemy any kind of information. Perhaps it may not be in his power to give them any, for theie was less secrecy in these things than people imagined. It had been faid by a very competent authority, that it was not right to have a secret which the enemy may not know, and he confeffed that he could scarcely imagine any other secrecy than what was required on the day or night before a barile, such as where the attack was to commence, or the great effort was to be employed in something connected with the arrangement for the action. All the nations of Europe were long since perfeâly welt acquainted with the topography of each others country, and what were the most advantageous points both of offenfive and defensive operations. As a proof that all the points of this country were very accurately known, he stated, that when he was Refident Commitlary with the Austrian army, in the year 1799, the Archduke Charles sent him a plan, taken from the pocket of a French officer, for a descent upon England. On examining that plan, he observed it contained a projet for a march from the coast in four columus, to unite in the metropolis, which it proposed to gain porfefsion of; and in it all the points and lines were so distinctly and accurately laid down, that on riding over the same places since, he was thoroughly convinced that it could never bave been so exacily traced by any man who had not gone over, and carefully examined the ground in a military
Another plan, at the same time, was drawn up, and as it should seem, also, upon the spot, by a brother of Marshal Broglio. In fact, the plans and memoirs, on the best mode of invading England, were undoubtedly innumerable, and ihere was no part of the island which had not been explored and examined by the enemy from time to time with the utmost degree of minuteness. General Cuf. tine, who made a great figure in one part of the French revolution, employed himself in the same manner. He had some knowledge of ihat man, a stupid fellow he thought him 100; and having, in the early part of his military educalion, met with him at one of the Pruflian reviews, Cuftine had the impudence to tell him that he had been in England, and when an accurate surveyor had drawn up a plan for the invasion of the country, the business, in fa&, was very easily accomplished. For instance, he made no doubt but the works a: Dover were as well attended to as at any other place, and yet when he happened to be there fome rime ago, and had the curiosiy to inspect thein, though they did not know him, they asked no other question, than whether he was an Englishman ; and on his answering in the affirmative, suffered him to go on with his observations without further notice. Some time since also he passed over to Calais, to observe how they were going on ihere, and on riding a litile way from the town, he observed something like a block house, which he was not allowed 10 visit. It could not but strike him as a singularity at the time, that so much vigilance should be observed in France, which never was in less danger of invasion, and so little in England, which was daily threatened with it. In addition to this, he observed additional fortifications erecting all along his ride from Calais to Boulogne. He then reverted to his objects of fortification-1st. To secure the depois naval and military ;-2d. To prevent the enemy from landing ;-3d, To obftruct their progress when landed :—and, 41h. Fortifications for the defence of the metropolis. He was as well aware as any man, that it would be impossible to fortify the whole line of the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland, in any length of time, or at any expence however enormous. He pledged himself, that the whole craft, from Yarmouth Roads to the Downs, might be sufficiently for tified by a national exertion, as quickly as the other mode of national defence, and in time could be sendered effectual; shar is, within one or two months at the farthest. This he acknowledged to be a strong assertion, but it was one that he would abide by ; nor would he yield up his own opinion to any authority whatever. He spoke from fome know Jedge of a profession which he had assiduously studied for four and twenty years. He hoped he had not studied it áltogether to no purpose, nor was it from personal vanity he now mentioned that a man of the highest military reputation, the Marquis Cornwallis, offered to make him Quariermaster-general in Ireland, when he was but a very young lieutenant, which he would not have thought of were he ignorant of his profession. If therefore he was wrong, let Those who thought so censure him; but let him not be anSwered by any one's saying, he was talking about what he did not understand. The position was, that in two months the coast from Yarmouth Roads to the South Foreland inay be securely fortified ; and if any naval Gentleman thought his affertion too extravagant, he would first confess to him, that he could not calculate tides, winds, and eddies, and in his turn would iake the liberty of asking that naval Gentleman, whether he would say, "make yourself easy on that head, we will protect you?” He was sure 'none of them would undertake so much, but would content themselves with admitting, why such a thing as invasion may happen, notwithstanding all our exertion. Under these circuinItances we should take the same measures of combating the enemy by land, as if we were sure of their landing ; and if the fortifications he spoke of were completed, all the preparations going on in the ports of Holland would be good for nothing. if the fleet they were getting ready thould attempt to get round, they must be dispersed, and this fortification would oblige them either to attempt going round, or else stay at home; they could not attempt or expect to get into the Sireights of Dover, and would therefore be useless. It was further to be observed, that all the harbours west of Calais were only one-ride harbours, which no large fhips could come out of. If they came into the outside port one tide, and waited for another to take them out, they must be deItroyed, as by that time our fleet would be upon them; and in fact the effe&t of this fortifying operation would be, that the fate of London would not depend upon the event of a single battle. In addition to all this, he added, that by the same great national effori, it would not require a great deal more time to fortify the coast from the Downs 10 Portsmouth. The fortification he proposed from the Downs to Yarmouth was not, in one case, ihe same thing as arming one side of a fortress; for, by securing ourselves in that impregnable quarter, we should have an opportunity of rurning our whole force to the defence of every other. The point we had to consider was, that of impeding the enemy's march to the metropolis. The enemy would take several lines, by which they might advance to London as a centre Against this he would propose to interfere a principal semicircular line, and behind that draw lines of communication, which would enable us to manceuvre with more rapidity behind our principal line, and to cross that of the enemy. All the principal points in these lines should be immediaiely fortified, which would cause the enemy the trouble and delay of aílaulling and taking them before they could proceed. Accurate plans should be drawn and preserved of all these positions for a variety of reasons. He was far from saying, that the military affairs of this couniry were misconducted, but in that House he must speak very freely as a Member of Parliament. He would have the plan fo minute as to point out every hedge which might be cut down for the purpose of giving scope to the expeditions of our cavalry. To Obviate any obje&ion to his plan," he said, that it is came too late,' he had only to observe, that the other plan would be too late also. If the enemy should come before the plan Thould be carried inio effect, we should lose nothing but some money, by making the attempt ; should it be adopted, he should have the hopes of doing much good ; ihould it be rejected, he had the consolation to refled that he had done his dury. Should he be asked why he did not propose it before, he should answer that he was too insignificani, and did not suppose Government would pay any attention io his suggestions ; but had he observed such a measure proposed in that House, he fhould then very readily have given his opinion on it. He thought it would be of the highest consequence to this country that in the present crisis a Military Council should be established for the direction of the most important opeMarions at this arduous crisis. He paid many complimenis
to the illustrious Commander-in-Chief, and the excellent officers by whom he was furrounded; but they were too inuch occupied in their official situations to examine every plan that should be laid before them ; and, if they did not approve it altogether, take such ideas as were good, and out of a number of plans, make out one which might approach perfection. In justification of such a ineasure, he reprefented he great advantage which the French had in the Military Council, consisting of Carnot, and other scientific men, who directed most of the successful operations in the course of the last war. He had himself, he said, prepared a military memoir, which he should be very glad to submit to such a council as he described, and he knew that many other officers were in a similar fituation. But were he to deliver it now, none of the present officers, though exceldent judges, he confessed, could possibly spare sufficient time to.exainine it. A right hon. Gentleman (the Secretary at War) had faid on a former occasion, that any military changes should be deferred to more quiet times; but he on the contrary maintained, that if they were good for any thing this was the very time to adopt them. The only military objection be ever heard against fortifications was, ihat they absorbed a greater nuinber of troops than could be Spared for them ; but if there was any thing in that ohjection, it must be removed by the measure lately relorted to; for every one acquainted with fortifications muft kuow, that if there were men enough, they require but very few regular troops to defend them, as the greatest part of the works could be as well performed by peasants, as far as merely regarded the defence of them.
The Secretary at War replied, that he was neither able nor willing to follow the right hon. Gentleman through the whole range of his military description ; but though he was Do military man, he should think himself highly blameable if he had not, at least, made some inquiries into the subje&. He was glad to hear the honourable Officer speak in such high commendation of ihe character of the Commander in Chiet and the Officers by whom he was surrounded, which was the more necessary, as his speech betrayed so much want of confidence, and seemed to accuse them before Parliament of a neglect of their dury. He perfe&ly agreed with him, he said, in most, but not all of his obfervations, and lamenied that so little attention was paid in this country to the ant of foreiñcation ; thouglı
, since the year 1796 or 1797,