tary art can do no more; we must trust to God and our own exertions. He thought we were far thort of this point. He had a very great refpect for the opinion of a noble Baronet oppofite to him, (Sir William Erfkine) who certainly had fpoken like an Englishman and a foldier; but he was of opinion than an army of 60.000 landing at different points, might pufh on fo near the capital, that a fingle battle might decide the fate of it. The molt certain means of preventing this would be to increase the regulars, and to have recourse to the fortifying art. The first measure neceflary was to increase the regular troops. He did not wish to fay any thing to the prejudice of the militia in favour of the regular troops; but he would afk the hon. Baronet he had already referred to, whether, if he was going to attack fifty thoufand French troops, he would prefer regulars or militia regiments? It was a long time before new regiments could be formed. When a new regiment was made, it was a long while before it became a good regimen. It might confift of brave and good irregulars. For these reasons, he regretted that measures were not adopted for reducing the militia force to the proportion which it ought to bear to the regular army, for the defence of the country. The militia ought not to be more than one-third of the force of the regular army. If the militia colonels were to give their affiftance, the regiments of the line might all be completed. There were fome regiments that had not above 150, others 6 or 700 men. He would carry every one of those regiments to its full complement. The regiments of the line contained that which conftituted the excellence of the army, the very foul of the army, if he might fo exprefs it. He had been mifunderstood when he was fuppofed to have been talking of the Auftrian regiments as machines. He felt that it was a measure of neceffity to have recourfe to the militia to fill up the regiments of the line, and he was convinced we had the means of doing it. If the militia colonels. were difpofed to co-operate with Government, we might have 20,000 trained men, of the militia in the course of a month. The present, however, he confidered an energetic meafure. He thought the army of referve was not made ufe of in the best way it might have been. If the regiments of the line were carried to 1200, we might in a few weeks have an army of old regiments. In fact, we fhould have an army that would be able to contend with any enemy that thould 1 fhould land in the vicinity of the capital. Without having recourfe to the measures he had alluded to, he thought we were in the most imminent danger of London falling into the hands of the enemy. If 50,000 landed and pushed forward, and a battle took place, in which the French were victorious, it would be impoffible to collect another army time enough to prevent their taking poffeffion of the capital. He had never faid that England would be conquered by London's being taken, but he believed it would place the country in the most difafttrous fituation any country ever was placed in, without being conquered. Thefe were his opinions; he had expreffed them only to induce the House to make every poffible exertion for increasing the army by the most prompt and military measures. Even when this was done, he thould not be fatisfied. If this bill was carried into effect, and fomething further was done for increasing the regular army, he fhould ftill think we had not done.. enough, while the military art afforded refources for doing more, till we had done all that was poffible in order to prevent a defeat, from throwing the capital into the hands of an enemy. While any thing was left undone, we ought to proceed-it was impious to fall thort.. He had rifen to blame no man, but to give his opinion. If he was asked why he had not brought thefe obfervations forward in for mer ftages of the bill, all he had to answer was, that he had no reason to fuppofe his opinion would have influenced his Majefty's Government, or that they would have been induced to have adopted what he recommended; he should not even have expreffed his opinion of the army of referve, had he not found that it was propofed to raise 40,000 by ballot.. He knew, he faid, that it was not cuftomary to occupy much of the attention of that Houfe upon the details of fuch profeffional fubjects, as he was defirous to treat of: but at a time when the country was called upon to fight for its existence, he thought fo:ne fmall portion of time may as well be employed upon military topics, as whole days frequently upon commercial and other fubjects. The first thing he would advert to was, that fince the alarm of invafion became fo general, he obferved that every thing had been done in the way of fortifications. This he con fidered to be a very material branch of defence; nothing could be done in it in the ufual way of contractors, or by any other mode than as a great national work, in which his Majefty should be empowered to compel as many perVOL. IV. 1802-3. fons 4 M fons to work as may be fufficient, provided that it did not take away fo many hands from agriculture, as to be likely to produce a famine, and that it did not materially interfere with the other military fervices. With regard to the manufactures, he faid, that on fuch an occafion he made little account of them; for when the country was in danger of invafion, it was a very fubordinate confideration that the manufactures fhould be fufpended; and in fuch an extremity he thought agriculture itfelf was little more than a fecondary confideration. He did not know whether his Majefty did or did not already poffefs the power alluded to, but if he did not, it fhould be immediately given to him, at leaft all the workmen about London and its vicinity fhould be immediately fet to work. He knew that in this country there existed a strong prejudice against fortifications, as the people were more difpofed to look for fecurity from that frontier which God had given them. Viewing the ftate of the nation, however, as a military man, he faw four objects upon fortifications fhould be erected without further delay. First, for the fecurity of our naval and military depots. He perceived in fome gentlemen, he faid, a kind of apprehenfion, as if he was about to proceed indifcriminately, but he affured them that he should not utter a fyllable which could tend to give the enemy any kind of information. Perhaps it may not be in his power to give them any, for there was lefs fecrecy in thefe things than people imagined. It had been faid by a very competent authority, that it was not right to have a fecret which the enemy may not know, and he confeffed that he could fearcely imagine any other fecrecy than what was required on the day or night before a battle, fuch as where the attack was to commence, or the great effort was to be employed in fomething connected with the arrangement for the action. All the nations of Europe were long fince perfeâly well acquainted with the topography of each others country, and what were the most advantageous points both of offenfive and defenfive operations. As a proof that all the points of this country were very accurately known, he ftated, that when he was Refident-Commillary with the Auftrian army, in the year 1799, the Archduke Charles fent him a plan, taken from the pocket of a French officer, for a defcent upon England. On examining that plan, he observed it contained a projet for a march from the coaft in four columus, to unite in the metropolis, which it propofed to gain pof feffion feffion of; and in it all the points and lines were so diftinely and accurately laid down, that on riding over the fame places fince, he was thoroughly convinced that it could never bave been fo exactly traced by any man who had not gone over, and carefully examined the ground in a military manner. Another plan, at the fame time, was drawn up, and as it fhould feem, alfo, upon the fpot, by a brother of Marthal Broglio. In fact, the plans and memoirs, on the best mode of invading England, were undoubtedly innumerable, and there was no part of the island which had not been explored and examined by the enemy from time to time with the utmost degree of minutenefs. General Cuftine, who made a great figure in one part of the French revolution, employed himself in the fame manner. He had fome knowledge of that man, a ftupid fellow he thought him too; and having, in the early part of his military education, met with him at one of the Pruffian reviews, Cuftine had the impudence to tell him that he had been in England, and when an accurate furveyor had drawn up a plan for the invafion of the country, the bufinefs, in fact, was very eafily accomplished. For inftance, he made no doubt but the works at Dover were as well attended to as at any other place, and yet when he happened to be there fome time. ago, and had the curiofi'y to infpect them, though they did not know him, they afked no other question, than whether he was an Englishman; and on his anfwering in the affirmative, fuffered him to go on with his obfervations without further notice. Some time fince alfo he passed over to Calais, to obferve how they were going on there, and on riding a little way from the town, he obferved fomething like a block-houfe, which he was not allowed to vifit. It could not but ftrike him as a fingularity at the time, that fo much vigilance fhould be obferved in France, which never was in lefs danger of invafion, and fo little in England, which was daily threatened with it. In addition to this, he obferved additional fortifications erecting all along his ride from Calais to Boulogne. He then reverted to his objects of fortification-1ft. To fecure the depots naval and military-2d. To prevent the enemy from landing ;-3d. To obftruct their progrefs when landed :—and, 4th. Fortifications for the defence of the metropolis. He was as well aware as any man, that it would be impoffible to fortify the whole line of the coafts of Great Britain and Ireland, in any length of time, or at any expence however 4 M 2 enormous enormous. He pledged himself, that the whole coaft, from Yarmouth Roads to the Downs, might be fufficiently fortified by a national exertion, as quickly as the other mode of national defence, and in time could be rendered effectual; that is, within one or two months at the fartheft. This he acknowledged to be a ftrong affertion, but it was one that he would abide by; nor would he yield up his own opinion to any authority whatever. He fpoke from some knowJedge of a profeffion which he had affiduously ftudied for four and twenty years. He hoped he had not ftudied it áltogether to no purpofe, nor was it from perfonal vanity he now mentioned that a man of the highest military reputation, the Marquis Cornwallis, offered to make him Quartermafter-general in Ireland, when he was but a very young lieutenant, which he would not have thought of were he ignorant of his profeffion. If therefore he was wrong, let those who thought fo cenfure him; but let him not be anfwered by any one's faying, he was talking about what he did not understand. The pofition was, that in two months the coaft from Yarmouth Roads to the South Foreland may be fecurely fortified; and if any naval Gentleman thought his affertion too extravagant, he would first confefs to him, that he could not calculate tides, winds, and eddies, and in his turn would take the liberty of afking that naval Gentleman, whether he would fay, "make yourself easy on that head, we will protect you?" He was fure none of them would undertake fo much, but would content themfelves with admitting, why fuch a thing as invafion may happen, notwithstanding all our exertion. Under these circumtances we fhould take the fame measures of combating the enemy by land, as if we were fure of their landing; and if the fortifications he spoke of were completed, all the preparations going on in the ports of Holland would be good for nothing. If the fleet they were getting ready thould attempt to get round, they must be difperfed, and this fortification would oblige them either to attempt going round, or else stay at home; they could not attempt or expect to get into the Streights of Dover, and would therefore be ufelefs. It was further to be obferved, that all the harbours weft of Calais were only one-tide harbours, which no large fhips could come out of. If they came into the outfide port one tide, and waited for another to take them out, they must be deftroyed, as by that time our fleet would be upon them; and 1 |