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In the hiftory of Ireland it would be found that fortifications were much more numerous in former times than those now propofed by the hon. Gentleman for this country. Under all the circumftances of the prefent times, he would therefore fay that fomething of that fort ought to be done. He did not mean to fay that we were to endeavour to erect fortifications as if they were the models of fotne great masters; neither did he think we required it. A vaft army could not fit down regularly before it, to besiege it with artillery, with bombs, and all the implements of war, and with a large covering army to protect it, as if it was before Lifle or Tournay. We had an illuftrious Sovereign, whofe memory the prefent fituation of our affairs brought to his recollection; he meant Queen Elizabeth, and he called her illuftrious, as being particularly for by her great genius and the illuftrious actions that were done under her aufpices. A Spanish fleet had been fitted out, exprefsly for the deftruction of England, and was called the Invincible Armada; but that fleet had been not only defeated, but difperfed, crippled and destroyed in fuch a manner by a new invention of that day, as made them ever fince give over any hope of fuccefs by any expedition against England. In like manner he had every reafon to hope that, if an invincible legion was now fent against us from France, for a fimilar purpofe of deftruction, the valour of our countrymen, when aided by the execution of the plan now propofed (though he had no doubt of their fuccefs at any rate) would almott immediately repel them, fcattered, confounded and difmayed to their own fhores; that is, the few that might by chance have the good fortune to escape from more fummary vengeance. He was well convinced that thofe few would return with trembling, to inform their haughty and arrogant Chief of the confusionthey had met with, and the bounds which had thereby been fet to his inordinate ambition. The idea of building fortifications in this country, however, had long been entertained by military men. It was an idea which had long been afloat in his own mind alfo. Military men had, in fact, deliberated on the plan many years fince; he indeed recollected to hear the opinions of the prefent Earl Howe, of Mr. Dundas, the prefent Quarter Mafter General, and of another perfon, to fpeak of whom might be deemed fomething of a diftant fort of perfonal vanity, or else fomething like a partial bias, fuch as friendship may not unfrequently give to the minds of most men. Of him, therefore, he should fay nothing.

General

General Howe was well known as an excellent General, and he had furveyed the different parts of the country that were fuppofed to be most likely to be attacked by the enemy, that is, he had furveyed it in a military view. General Dundas had even drawn a plan. He did not profefs, for his own part, any knowledge of military affairs; but from the high repute, the extenfive knowledge, and the well known experience of that General, who has now the whole of the Southern diftrict under his command, he expreffed his full conviction that fomething great would be achieved if any hoftile force appeared within that diftrict. He was even doubtful whether there had not beeh fome conimunication with his Majefty's officers in the civil department on that fubject. But, at the fame time that he remarked that the idea was not entirely new, though the plan might differ in detail, as indeed every plan muft do that was formed by two different perfons, ftill he thought it neceffary to obferve, that it was not founded either in the idea of a diminution of the power of the enemy, or on a falfe notion of our own fafety. On the contrary, he believed that there would be more difficulty in reftraining the people from too eagerly struggling for a share in the honours of the conteft-his awful fenfe of the danger was such as led him neither to despise the enemy, nor overrate the danger. There was the utmost reafon to rely on the increased ftrength of our regular army, which he understood the illuftrious Commander in Chief was exerting every me thod to augment. The steadinefs and difcipline of our militia had been proved on many occafions during the late war, and, from the ardour of the public fpirit, the enthusiasm he might fay, of loyalty and patriotifm which was now roused in every rank of fociety, he had the moft fincere hope, the most perfect confidence, that an expedition from France at the prefent moment must terminate in the honour, the glory, and in eternally establishing the fame of this powerful nation, in fuch a manner as that the nations of the earth would thereby know our power as a military people, as welt as they have for many years conceded to our known fuperiority as a naval power. A far greater portion of the fugitive French army would never reach their native thore, but that remnant would be fufficient to appal that monfter who has raifed his head above his fellows in atrocity, by a fcandalous abuse, a falfe application of the facred name of liberty; it would be fufficient to fill him with confufion and difmay and perhaps such a defeat, fo complete a difcomfiture of his forcess

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forces, might eventually tend to the overthrow of that proud ufurper and his mifplaced power. At all events, it would be the means of fecuring our independence for ages to come, by letting the world fee what an army of Britons could do in defence of their country and their inestimable constitution, and in clastising the infolence of an invader.

The Secretary at War beftowed fome compliments on Mr. Pitt for the brilliancy of his speech; but expreffed fome difference of opinion with refpect to fortifications.

Mr. Courtenay faid, it appeared that the principles now advanced had been long ago in contemplation, but that nothing had been done in pursuance of them. A General of great talents had approved of fortifications, but the right hon. Gentleman (the Secretary at War) had ridiculed the idea, at leaft fo far as refpected London. He did not mean that we fhould have fortifications like the walls of Troy, but that they fhould be confined to particular pofitions. When the Duke of Brunfwick was marching to Paris, the people of that city were employed for ten days in throwing up redoubts. It had been admitted that field redoubts had been reforted to, when the danger was not fo preffing. If fo, that was the reafon why we thould now ufe them. He wished to know whether the fkeleton regiments were to be filled up immediately from the army of referve (Mr. Addington anfwered acrifs the table" Clearly”). " If fo then," continued Mr. Courtenay, "Parliament has done its duty. It has raised the machinery; I with now to fee it poffeffed of animation; I wish to fee it in that ftate in which I could fay,

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Spiritus intus alit, totamque infufà per artus, "Mens agitat molen et magna fe corpore mifcet."

Mr. Courtenay concluded with recommending a council of war, to be compofed of Marquis Cornwallis, and other officers of great experience.

Captain Harvey faid, that every officer with whom he was acquainted, was of opinion, that confidering the different ports from which it would be neceffary for the enemy to fend their armament, it was impoffible that fuch concert could exift, as that 50,000 men could be embarked, come over, and be difembarked in twelve hours, as the hon. Gentlemon (Col. Craufurd) feemed to think might be done.

Colonel od faid, he was la ely at a meeting of the county of Surry, at which a very able plan for the defence of the city of London was fubmitted. After expreffing his apVOL. IV. 1802-3. 40 probation

probation of the army of referve, he recommended the example of Queen Elizabeth, one of whofe firft acts was, when threatened with invasion, to appoint a council of war. Such an establishment must be particularly ufeful now, when we have fuch officers as Marquis Cornwallis, Lord Howe, Earl Suffolk, Earl Moira, and feveral other eminent characters, tó compofe it. With refpect to fortifications, it would be foolith, he thought, to commence them now, unless we were certain of being able to finith them within a given time.

Mr. Vindham faid he had but little to add upon general topics in addition to the military details of the hon. Gentleman (Colonel Craufurd), enforced as they had been with fo much brilliancy and eloquence. That vigorous and impaffioned eloquence of his right hon. Friend he hoped would contribute to produce in the country that cool, steady, and fober courage which was neceffary in the prefent state of affairs He was rather furprifed to find that Gentlemen on the ministerial bench were difpofed to receive the opinions of the hon. Gentleman who fpoke firft with rather fomething of diflike; but of thofe opinions, difagreeable as they were, he was willing to fhare the odium. They had produced the most falutary effects, both in the country and upon the coun try, in rousing the people to a fenfe of danger, and the Government to the neceffity of exertion. He ftill was of opi nion that a military council ought to be formed, nor did he think that fuch an opinion implied reflection upon any one. But even if it did imply any reflection, and if he thought the thing neceffary for the public fafety, he fhould have no hefitation to prefs the adoption of it on Minifters. But in fact it did imply no reflection on any one, far lefs on the illustrious perfon who had been alluded to. It furely was no reflection to fay that one man could not embrace the whole details of commander in the field and all the objects of deliberation which might fall under the confideration of a council. There was ample room, therefore, as there was in the circumstances of our fituation, a ftrong call for the establishment of a milirary council. It was not to say that there was an officer in the Quarter-mafter-general's department to whom the confideration of plans of defence, and of warlike operations, &c. was particularly entrusted. But this was not the work of oneHe knew fomething of the officer in that department from report, and much more from reputation, and he was convinced that no man would difcharge more ably or zealously the duties of his ftation. He was glad that officer was

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fo employed, among other things, because it was a triumph over that vulgar jealoufy of foreigners which this nation was but too apt to indulge. He hoped that we would employ the fervices of able and enlightened foreign officers-and when could they be more properly employed than in the present war, which was common in its object to every nation in Europe that regarded its independence? Yet, to return from this digreffion, he must repeat, that the confideration of military operations was more than one man could properly under take. We had many officers of diftinguished merit, perhaps too old for active fervice, but fully able to fuggeft and to confider the fuggeftions that might be made for the conduct of operations. We had Lord Grey, Lord Howe, Lord Cornwallis, and others whofe fervices now were not employed. Were fuch a council eftablished, men of active minds would be more willing to lay their views before them, than before any one man, whofe abilities or whofe diligence they might diftruft. With refpect to fortifications, he thould not detain the House with any remarks, as his general views had been fo ably enforced. He could not help expreffing a hope, however, that the hints of the gallant officer who had spoken would have the effect to turn the attention of Ministers to the matter, and that not unwillingly, as they would not difdain to avail themselves of his views, as they had done of fimilar fuggeftions which they at firft feemed to undervalue. But if many things, at first neglected, were afterwards acknowledged fit to be done, Minifters in adopting the fuggeftion confeffed their own omiffions. There was a story of two French colonels, between whom there was thought, by their regiment, to be a very great difference from the use of the allons and the allez. Minifters feemed to have a favourite tenfe, and it was the future. When any thing was mentioned as defirable, they always faid it would be confidered, it was doing. They never faid it had been done. But fure, if, by their condu, they had admitted that the measures of defence now adopted were neceffary, why did they not adopt them fooner? Was the danger in which they were founded newly discovered? How many months is it fince Minifters faw that the country was menaced with threats of invafion? Yet, after all, the measures reforted to, however, are such as cannot be brought to perfection for a long period, though the danger is admitted to have long exifted? Can there be a tronger cenfure of their conduct? When a worthy magiftrate of London was that evening defcanting on the riling

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