record, more venerable than tradition itself) our laws were, as it were, under that climate, habituated to that air and diet, grafted into that stock; and though they have, God be thanked! forgot their Norman*, yet they will hardly learn Greek†, much less Utopiant. That, in the late Protector's§ times, our lawyers, with one voice, importuned him, rather to assume the stile and power of a king, to which they found all our laws were shaped, than retain that of a Protector, unknown to the law; that nothing had rendered our architectors of a commonwealth more obnoxious, than that their infinite discords, in other things, generally agreed in the necessity of subverting all our fundamentals, in order to their design; which hath likewise obliged all sober men and true patriots, even the chiefest pillars of the parliament's cause, in the late war, to unite themselves with the royal interest, as not enduring to hear of those violent and dangerous alterations, which they see a republic must introduce.

For its compliance with our genius consider, that as our English nature is not, like the French, supple to oppression, and apt to delight in that pomp and magnificence of their lords, which they know is supported with their slavery and hunger; nor like the Highland Scots, where the honour and interest of the chief is the glory of the whole clan; so doth it as little or less agree with the Dutch humour, addicted only to traffic, navigation, handy-crafts, and sordid thrift; and (in defiance of heraldry) every man fancying his own scutcheon. Doth not every

one amongst us, that hath the name of a gentleman, aim his utmost to uphold it? Every one that hath not, to raise one? To this end, do not our very yeomen commonly leave their lands to the eldest son, and to the others nothing but a flail or plough? Did not every one, that had any thing like an estate, pinch himself in his condition, to purchase a knighthood or small patent? What need further proof? Our late experience of that glimpse and shadow of monarchy (though in persons hated and scorned, and upon a most scandalous account) yet, for mere resemblance, admitted as tolerable, and, in respect of a commonwealth, courted, clearly evinces, how grateful the subtsance would be to Englishmen.

For our interest briefly (we wave tedious and politic discourses) certain it is, that our republic, were it like to settle, would alarm all our neighbours, would make our best allies our bitterest enemies, and, upon several accounts, probably draw upon us the united forces of christendom to crush the embryo. Which, the nation being so weakened and divided as it is, must evidently endanger our total oppression, or, at least, to bring in the king by conquest. Besides, by what title shall we pretend to hold Scotland and Ireland, since that of descent is now avoided, and consent we know there is none; nor, indeed, can any be expected?

I come now to assert, that our former government eminently in

• Brought in by William the Conqueror, Duke of Normandy.

ti. e. The forms of government which the Grecian republicks submitted to, which were as various as the humours of the people.

A chimerical sort of government, which never had any existence.

Oliver Cromwell.

Under Richard Cromwell. See his speech and letter to the parliament in this number

By king and parliament.

cluded all the perfections of a free state, and was the kernel, as it were, of a commonwealth, in the shell of monarchy. First, I will begin with the essential parts of a commonwealth, which are three, viz. the senate proposing, the people resolving, the magistrate executing. For the senate or parliament, if ever there were a free and honourable one, it was here; where the deputies of the whole nation, most freely chosen, did, with like freedom, meet, propound, debate, and vote all matters of common interest. No danger escaped their representing; no grievance, their complaint; no public right, their claim; or good, their demand; in all which, the least breach of privilege was branded as a civil sacrilege; and though there lay no appeal to the dispersed body of the people (a decision manifestly impracticable in government, and fitter indeed for tribunes to move than nations to admit) yet, elections being so popular, and assemblies frequent, the same end was attained with much more safety and convenience. The prince had, likewise, in effect, but an executive power, which he exercised by ministers and officers, not only sworn, but severely accountable. For, though both he and the lords had their negatives in making laws, yet (no tax being impossible, but by consent of the commons, nor any law, without it, of such validity, that the ministers of justice durst enforce it) there was a wise and sweet necessity for the king, and likewise for the lords, who were but as a grain in the royal scale, to confirm all such bills, as were convenient for the people, and not greatly hurtful to the prince; and so this bugbear negative was resolved into a meer target, to shelter and preserve the government from being altered, at the will of the commons, if, at any time, they should prove factious; which (being in reason manifest) hath been also confirmed by great experience. Our kings having, rarely, obstructed any bill, which they might safely grant; but, on the other side, passed many high acts of meer grace, circumscribing their prerogative, and clipping its wings; nay, I could wish they had not pierced its bowels. This was that triple cord, which, one would think, could not be broken; nor, indeed, was it broken, but cut asunder*. This was our gold, seven times refined; for every bill, being thrice read, debated, and agreed, in either house, was, at last, brought to the king, for his royal assent, the mint of our laws. A trial so exact, that, surely, no dross could escape it; since all interests must thereto concur, as truly it was but fit they should, in the establishment of that, which must bind them all. This was that temperament, which poised our humours, and, at once, endued us with health, vigour, and beauty. No vote was precipitated, no act was huddled up; as by sad events we have since seen, that, power being ingrossed byt one of the estates, purged and modelled to the interests of a faction; a consequence natural to such premises. As in a balance consisting but of one scale, nothing hath been weighed; our laws have been made mandrakes of a night's growth, and our times as fickle as the weather, or multitude.

The king, indeed, had the power of making war, but he had not the means; and then it signified no more than giving him leave to fly,

• When King Charles the First's head was cut off.

+ The rump parliament.

if he could get wings; or to go beyond sea, so he went without shipping. He had a sword, but he alone could never draw it; for the trained-bands were a weapon, which he decently wore, but the nation only could use. He chose his ministers (as who doth not his servants?) but alas, he was accountable for them to the triennial parliament, which none but the soundest integrity could abide. He could hinder the stroke of justice with his pardon (though still, the jaws not being muzzled, it would bite terribly) but certainly, it was great wisdom rather to give way, since, with his own scandal, he could afford offenders but a lame and scurvy protection; and since the power of relieving his wants rested in the commons, to balance his will, and oblige him to a correspondence with parliaments.

That his person should be most sacred, it was but needful, to avoid circulation of account; reasonable, since it carries with it the consent of nations; just, that he should not be the meer butt of faction and malice, in worse condition than the basest of vassals; honourable, that the nakedness of government might not be daily uncovered; wise, in the constitution, not at once to trust and provoke, by forcing him to shift for his own indemnity, no danger to the public seeming so extreme as the outlawry of a prince; no task, by daily experience, so difficult, as the arraigning of any power, whether regal or popular; and since we make golden bridges, for flying enemies, much more may we afford them to relenting sovereigns; (upon which account, in our neighbour kingdom of France, even princes of the blood are not subjected to capital punishments;) finally, very safe, in the consequent, for, being, by the danger, threatening his corrupt ministers, in all probability, stripped of agents, his personal impunity might well signify somewhat to himself, but nothing to the people.

A revenue he had, for the support of his state and family, ample; for the ordinary protection of his people, sufficient; but for any undertaking, defective; and for public oppression, so inconsiderable, that when prerogative was most rampant, our greatest princes (and some, doubtless, we have had the most renowned warriors of their ages) could never prudently aspire to make themselves sole legislators, nor presumed to maintain red-coats in times of peace. If any object (as some concerned are ready enough) that kingly power could here no longer subsist, for want of revenue; it is easily answered, that a king of France, indeed, could not, and God forbid he should! but a king of England might, and, for aught I see, still may (the sale of crown-lands, which exceeded not the value of £100,000 per annum, being, methinks, no matter of utter ruin, but rather of easy compen→ sation). For the public revenue was proportioned to the maintenance of courts, not camps and fleets. A gentleman of reasonable estate may live well on his rents; but then, it is not convenient he should keep wenches, or hangers-on, nor build, nor study chymistryt. In fine, the revenue was very competent for ordinary disbursements; as

• The army.

+Alluding to the bewitching study of finding out the philosopher's stone, which employed so many brains and drained so many pockets in those days.

for extraordinary, if he resorted to parliaments, the wiser he, the safer and happier we.

I desire all our projectors of commonwealths, to contrive greater freedom for their citizens, than is provided by magna charta, and the petition of right; or shew us, that it is not much easier to violate, than to mend them: for, thereby our lives, liberties, and estates were under monarchy secured and established, I think, as well as any thing on this side heaven. It were no solecism to say, the subject had his prerogative, as well as the king; and, sure I am, he was in as good (if not better) condition to maintain it, the dependence being less on his side. Liberty was no less sacred than majesty; noli me tangere was likewise its motto; and, in case of any, the least infringement (as escapes in government may happen even in the most perfect) it was resented, as if the nation had received a box on the car. If it be, as they say, the glory of a free state, to exalt; the scandal of tyranny, to embase our spirits; doubtless, this was our only commonwealth for, ever since*, methinks, we have learned quietly to take the bastonade.

I wish we now could, or could ever hope, under our commonwealth (whatever promises may be made us) so perfectly to distinguish the legislative from the ministerial authority, as once we did; when the house of commons had not the power of a court-leet, to give an oath, nor of a justice of the peace, to make a mittimus: which distinction, doubtless, is the most vital part of freedom, and far more considerable to poor subjects than the pretended rotation; as, on the contrary, the confusion of them is an accomplishment of servitude; for which the best republicks, I fear, have more to answer, than any limited prince can have. Certain it is, that as our king, in his personal capacity, made no laws, so neither did he, by himself, interpret or execute any. No judge took notice of his single command, to justify any trespass; no, not so much as breaking of an hedge; his power limited by his justice, he was, equally with the meanest of his subjects, concerned in that honest maxim, We may do just so much and no more, than we have a right to do. And it was most properly said, He could do no wrong; because, if it were wrong, he did it not; he could not do it; it was void in the act, punishable in his agent. His officers, as they were alike liable, sc, perhaps, they were more obnoxious to indictments and suits than any other, by how much their trespass seemed to be of an higher nature, and gave greater alarm. His private will could not countermand his public; his privy seal, ever buckled to the great seal, as being the nation's more than his; his order superseded no process, and his displeasure threatened no man with an hour's imprisonment, after the return of habeas corpus. An under-sheriff was more terrible, a constable more saucy, a bailiff more troublesome, than he; and yet, by his gentle authority, this scabbard of prerogative, as some in derision have called it, which, if it would, could scarce oppress an orphan, tumult was curbed, faction moderated, usurpation forestalled, intervals prevented, perpetuities obviated, equity administered, clemency exalted, and the people made only nice and wanton with their happiness,

The usurpation of the ramp parliament.

as appears by their now so impatient calling for that manna*, which they so causelessly loathed.

To conclude, what shall I add? The act, enjoining the keepers of the great seal, under pain of high-treason, to summon a triennial parliament, of course, by virtue of the act, without further warrant; the act, forbidding the privy council, under like penalty, to intermeddle with meum et tuum; the laws, abolishing the star-chamber, high-commission, &c. branding all past, and bridling all future enormities; the statutes, limiting the king's claims, and relieving his tenants from exaction of forfeitures; besides many other principal immunities, wherewith (by the special favour of God, and bounty of our princes) we were blessed, far beyond any of our neighbours; above all, our assurance, that we might readily have obtained such farther addition and perfection of liberty, if, yet, any such there were, as would consist with modesty or liberty itself, to ask. Do they not aloud proclaim that we were then the mirror of governments, envy of monarchies, and shame of commonwealths; who could not but blush to see themselves so eclipsed and silenced, in all their pretences to freedom? Do they not more than justify my assertion, That, with all the ornaments of the noblest kingdom, we had, likewise, all the enjoyments of the freest state?

A LETTER

Written by the Emperor to the late King James, Setting forth the true Occasion of his Fall, and the Treachery and Cruelty of the French.

As the foregoing Tract gives us the great Advantages of Monarchical Government, when justly limited, and content with the just bounds prescribed to it by the Laws of the Land; so this Letter, written by the Emperor of Germany to King James the Second, after his Abdication, setting forth the Causes of his Majesty's Desertion by his Subjects, is a proper Caveat to such Princes, always to preserve their Subjects in their just Rights, both in Church and State, as the best means to deserve their Affection, and to secure the Throne to themselves and their Posterity.

LEOPOLD, &c.

WE

E have received your majesty's letters, dated from St. Germains, the 6th of February last, by the Earl of Carlingford, your envoy in our court. By them we have understood the condition your majesty ' is reduced to; and that you, being deserted after the landing of the 'Prince of Orange, by your army, and even by your domestic servants, ' and by those you most confided in, and almost by all your subjects, 'you have been forced, by a sudden flight, to provide for your own 'safety, and to seek shelter and protection in France. Lastly, that you desire assistance from us, for the recovery of your kingdoms. 'We do assure your majesty, that, as soon as we heard of this

• Monarchy, to be re-established in the person of King Charles the Second.