To keep a just balance, we must consider magistracy, as it was first instituted by God Almighty, before it was depraved by the ambition, pride, and avarice of those who were invested in it. So that, in its original, it may be defined, a power delegated from God, for maintaining order, rewarding the virtues, and punishing the crimes of mankind; the application of which power is left free to any independent people or nation.

It cannot be doubted, but that God, as creator of all things, might, in his own person, have exercised a sovereign power over all his creatures, which, since he was not pleased to do, he thought fit, in his infinite wisdom, to appoint his lieutenants here on earth, to whom he communicates some rays of his divine majesty, both to beget a greater reverence for their persons, and procure a chearful obedience from those that were to be subject; so that the profound deference, and blind submission, which millions of men pay to a mortal, perhaps, subject to as many infirmities as the most part of those he rules over, can be ascribed to nothing else but the firm persuasion of a divine institution: but, that we may the more admire the goodness of God in ordaining magistracy, he hath no less proposed man's happiness, than his own glory, that we might find it our interest, as well as duty, in obeying. For though man was born free, and, consequently, by nature, desirous of liberty; yet, an unbounded freedom could have done him very little service in a natural state, when innocency was no protection from the oppression of the stronger; but rapines, violence, and murder were the chief ways of acquiring right; in this universal chaos, where homo was homini lupus, nothing was thought unlawful that ambition, malice, or cruelty, could propose; so that the weaker were driven to a necessity of uniting their forces against the stronger. Then began they to erect societies, and make laws for regulating them; the executing of which laws was committed to one or more persons, as the major part of the society thought fit to trust, who had the name of captain, general, or king: it was he who led them out to battle, who disposed of prizes, and punished malefactors; his commands were easily obeyed, because but few; and all just, honest, and profitable. These had not learned the arcana imperi, or secret ways to enslave their people; but their eminent virtue and singular valour both procured their dignity, and maintained them in it; and having no sycophant flatterers about them, to abuse their easy credulity, they had not forgot that the people's liberty was resigned for no other end, but for obtaining a greater happiness under their protection, than what they could have proposed, if every individual had retained it in his own person.

There is no other original of magistracy to be learned from sacred or profane history; for though the patriarchs had the government of their own families (which, by reason of their long age, were very numerous) yet that right was derived from the law of nature, and not from any civil obligation. They had for the most part no fixed habitation, but lived as strangers and sojourners, by the favour of other princes, and were never modeled into a commonwealth.

When dominions were enlarged, and empires began to be erected, different forms of government were established, according to the vari

ous inclinations of the people; when the conqueror gave laws to the conquered, it was called despotic; but when a free people did enter into a contract, and gave up their liberty on certain conditions, it was called a limited government, and these conditions the fundamental laws.

This sovereignity was either entailed upon a particular family, for considerable services done to the commonwealth, or it was only to be held during life, whence succession and election.

There is a majesty in every free state, which is nothing else but an independent power upon earth, tied to no laws, but these of God; these of nature and nations, and the fundamental laws of a kingdom.

This majesty is either real, or personal; real is that independency, which every free state hath in relation to one another; personal, that right, when it is lodged in a particular person; which, though it be inseparable from the sovereign power, for the greater splendor, yet it may be violate, when the real remains intire, otherwise the freedom and independency of a nation would be extinct, by the death or captivity of the prince.

To majesty or sovereign power are annexed the regalia, or regal right, which are, more or less, according to the measure of liberty given from, or reserved to the people, or their representatives at the first constitution: for instance, a king may have power to make war or peace, and yet cannot raise money; the legislative power may be also divided, as it is in England, betwixt king and parliament, and generally in all mixed governments; for that maxim, that jura majestatis sunt indivisa, does only take place in an absolute monarchy,

That power which the people reserveth from the sovereign, is called liberty, and it is either tacit or express; tacit liberty is the exemption of such things as cannot fall under the cognisance of the supreme power, which may be reduced to three. 1st. Religion, or the empire over the conscience, which belongs only to God Almighty. 2dly, The power of life and death, till we forefault them by the divine law, or municipal laws of a kingdom. 3rdly, Our goods and heritages, which cannot be taken from us without a judicial process, or when the good of the commonwealth we live in, requires a share of them. These three privileges were ever reserved in the most ample resignation of liberty; the first we cannot give away, because not ours; we have right to the second, as men, who are to be governed by reason; to the third, as members of a society or commonwealth.

Express liberty is a stipulation, whereby some things are by express paction eximed from the power of the sovereign, by the people or their representatives; which reservations are called privileges, and are either thus established by contract and agreement, at the first constitution, or are afterwards granted by princes, when they would either oblige or gratify their people; as was the magna charta in England, and the edict of Nantes in France; or when they desire any favour from them, as was the golden bull, wherein the emperor, Charles the fourth, granted considerable immunities to the electors, to engage them to chuse the stupid Vensiaslus, his son, successor in the empire.

This property of the subject hath ever been the eye-sore of monarchs, though he has as just a claim to it, as these have to their crowns; and whoever goes about to subvert it, dissolves the constitution, and forefaults his own title; since the same laws that bestowed this, at the same time secured that; and maintaining the one was made an inseparable condition of possessing the other. Neither can a rape, committed on our liberty, be excused, upon pretence that authority is derived from heaven. For, the great Sovereign of the Universe, ordained magistracy for the preservation, not the destruction of mankind; and he never sent down any person or family from heaven, with a commission to enslave a people or nation, to whom the application of the civil power was left absolutely free, so that they might bestow it on whom, and after what manner they pleased; for, though God loves order, yet he never approved of tyranny and oppression; and he, who is all justice and mercy, can never be supposed to authorise what is contrary to both. So that whosoever acts beyond his commission, and destroys the flock, instead of protecting it, is so far from being God's vicegerent, that he is to be looked on as the common enemy of mankind.

The violation of the subject's property is called tyranny. A name, which, at first, did only signify the regal power; but, when liberty began to be oppressed, through the ambition, wickedness, or evil management of the governors, it was made use of, to denote the excess of power.

There are two sorts of tyrants, those in title, and those in administration of the government. The first sort is he who usurps the crown without any title or just pretence; as did Oliver Cromwell in England: of the other, one who hath a just right to the crown; but, postponing the public good, acts arbitarily, and contrary to law such a tyrant was Philip the second of Spain.

The want of a title, or a bad one, may be supplied by prescription, or the subsequent consent of the people; to which, perhaps, the most part of princes must at last recur, unless they would derive their pedigree from one of the sons of Noah, and instruct an uninterrupted succession ever since.

Tyranny is the most miserable condition a commonwealth can be in; it dissolves the union betwixt king and subject, and exposes both to all the miseries that attend a civil war, and to the hazard of falling under a foreign power. Yea, even though a tyrant should be successful in his attempt, yet is he as far from his happiness as ever; for, besides the inward remorses that incessantly gnaw his conscience, he suspects all men, fears every thing, and is most justly hated by all. So that they did not represent a tyrant ill, who drew him sitting under a canopy of state, feasting in great riot, with a naked sword hanging over his head.

What remedy is there then against so great an evil? are we tamely to subject our necks to a yoke so insupportable to the more refined sort of men? or are we to resist the supreme magistrate and reclaim him by arms when other means prove ineffectual? The difficulty is great, and each opinion hath had its champions, who writ volumes in defence of their cause.

The horrid parricide of King Charles I. in the middle of this age,* was with great heat and zeal defended by Milton,† and impugned by the learned Salmasius, who being a stranger to our constitution, and the transaction of our country, (I speak it with reverence to so great a man) did but weakly defend so good a cause, in endeavouring to prove, that tyranny was not to be resisted, whereas he should have evinced (as easily he might) that Charles I. was a good prince and no tyrant.

The present revolution in England revives the dispute, and engages me, contrary to my humour, to impart my thoughts to the public, with no other design than to contribute my mean endeavours for vindicating the nation's honour from the heavy imputations of treason and rebellion; and, if I can make out that resistance in some case is lawful, I doubt not but I shall be easily able to demonstrate that the present taking up arms by the nobility and gentry of England, in defence of their religion, laws, and liberties, is both just and neces

sary.

There are three degrees of resistance. The first is the taking up arms against the civil magistrate. The second is, the deposing him, and shaking off our allegiance. The third proceeds to the inflicting of capital punishment. Which last seems inhuman; because God has placed a certain sacredness in the person of princes, so that none can touch the Lord's anointed and be guiltless. And the depriving them of their crowns is a great enough punishment; and our injuries are sufficiently repaired, when we are out of the hazard of being any more obnoxious to them. The other two may be allowed of, provided the remedies be applied by fit persons, after a due manner, and with such caution, as a matter of so great importance does require.

First, By fit persons, as the nobility, gentry, and other representatives of the nation, who, as they are most concerned in the laws, are supposed to understand them, and consequently, are the best judges of liberty. And they are persons of so much honour that it were a piece of ill breeding to suspect them of partiality.

Secondly, The tyranny must be evident and manifest; some few tyrannical acts do not constitute tyranny; private injuries must be suffered, rather than hazard the public peace; there must be a wilful subversion of the laws, not those of lesser moment, but such as shake the very foundations of government. David's murder and adultery were very arbitrary and tyrannical, and yet did not make him a tyrant; for, human frailty is still to be indulged, seeing, on this side of time, perfection is not be expected.

Thirdly, This is a violent remedy, and, consequently, should be the last; it ought to be gone about with the greatest deliberation and circumspection imaginable; when addresses, petitions, supplications, and such gentle methods prove ineffectual.

Fourthly, The commonwealth must be in such danger, that the whole fabric would otherwise be dissolved and overturned.

+ Anno 1648, in the seventeenth century. The poet and author of Paradise Lost, &c. King James II's misrule, flight, and abdication of the crown in 1688.

Lastly, The effectuating of the design must be certain, otherwise, we fall into a worse evil, than that we seek to shun; for, confusion and anarchy are worse than tyranny; and a wounded head is better than none at all.

What is objected against this opinion, from the old and new testament, is very judiciously refuted by the author of the "Inquiry into the measures of submission."

The second argument is taken from the oath of allegiance, which subjects swear to their prince, whereby they engage never to rise in arms against him. To which, it is answered, that this oath is accessory to the contract agreed on betwixt the king and people, and so must follow the nature of its principle. The nature of all contracts is obligatory on both parties; so that, if one of the parties fail in the performing his part, the other is loosed from his obligation. As it is in this case, the people devolve the power on the prince upon certain conditions, expressly specified. The accepting of a crown on such terms, binds the prince to perform the conditions; if he does not perform them, he, in effect, renounces his right, and tacitly consents that it return to those who bestowed it.

Lawyers say, that contracts can only oblige equals; and therefore no paction betwixt king and subject can be binding. There is no force in this argument, if we advert that, when this stipulation was made, the prince and subjects were equal, and were only distinguished after the power was conferred.

Thirdly, They instance, that this does not bind the successor. To which, it is answered, that the prince engages for himself and successors; who, if they would reap the advantage from their predecessors, must have also the disadvantage of being tied to the same rules they were adstricted to. But, for the further security, none is admitted to the government, till they take the coronation oath.

Fourthly, They upbraid us with the example of the primitive christians, who suffered the persecution of heathen emperors, with the greatest moderation and patience. I do admire, as well as they, the constancy, patience, and other virtues, which these holy men were endued with; but their case and ours is quite different. Paganism, at that time, was established by law, and christianity condemned; the professors whereof suffered, as the disturbers of the public peace; but, blessed be God, the law is now on our side; and our religion is become a great part of our property; and the peace of our country does very much depend on the preservation of it. Besides, if the christian religion had been propagated by arms, its worth had been diminished, and the reputation of the first founders of christianity had very much suffered; whereas the morality and justice of all its precepts, the holiness and purity of its doctrine, were of sufficient efficacy to recommend it; and the constancy and resolution, with which the first christains suffered martyrdom, were strong motives to convince the pagan world of the truth of it. But in our christian commonwealth, where there are no more heathens to convert, as the robbing us of our religion would be the highest act of injustice, so the parting with it tamely, would argue the greatest stupidity and inconcernedness that man can be capable of.