BOARD OF SUPERVISORS.

1. SUPERVISORS-PRINTING.-Prior to the enactment of § 4047 of the Political Code (April 1st, 1878), there was no limitation upon the general powers of the board of supervisors to contract either for printing or publication.— Maxwell v. Supervisors, etc. 114.

CASES OVERRULED, CRITICISED, LIMITED, DISTINGUISHED OR
EXPLAINED.

Lassing v. Paige, 51 Cal. 577, criticised, 142.
O'Neil v. O'Neil, 51 id. 187, explained, 175.

Noland v. Reese, 32 id. 486, explained, 368.
Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 id. 513, explained, 369.
Himmelmann v. Hoadley, 44 id. 224, explained, 369.

Same v. Same, id. 277, explained, 369.

O'Connor v. Blake, 29 id. 47, explained, 458.

Meeks v. S. P. R. R. Co. 52 id. 604, limited, 517.

Hatch v. Bayley, 12 Cush. 27, explained, 604.
McDonald v. Hatch, 54 Cal. 245, distinguished, 655.

CERTIORARI.

1. CERTIORARI-MANDAMUS.-The writ of certiorari cannot be made to serve the purpose of the writ of mandamus.-Townsend v. Copeland, 612.

2. JUDICIAL ACT-DEFINITION.-The action of a board of supervisors in rejecting a bid for county printing is not judicial in the nature, and therefore cannot be reviewed by certiorari.-Id.

See RECEIVER, 1, 2.

CHANGE OF PLACE OF TRIAL.

1. CHANGE OF PLACE OF TRIAL.-Upon a motion for change of place of trial, on the ground of the residence of the moving parties, and the convenience of witnesses, all the defendants must join.-Pieper v. Centenella L. Co. 173.

2. CHANGE OF PLACE OF TRIAL-CRIMINAL LAW-JURISDICTION.-The jurisdiction of the Superior Court to change the place of trial of a criminal case is special, and can be employed only in the case mentioned in § 1033 of the Penal Code, and must be based upon an application in writing, asking for the removal, on the ground that the defendant cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the county where the indictment or information is pending. Where the judge is disqualified, § 71 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a mode of securing the attendance of another judge. Held, accordingly, that an order changing the place of trial in a criminal case, on the ground of the disqualification of the judge, was without jurisdiction, and void.People v. McGarvey, 327.

See AFFIDAVIT, 3.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

1. CHATTEL MORTGAGE-DAMAGES.-If an officer, under process, seizes personal property mortgaged, without paying or tendering the amount due, the detriment proximately caused by the seizure is not the value of the property, but the amount of the mortgage debt; and this detriment the officer, in seizing the property, assumes to make good.-Wood v. Franks, 217. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. See CRIMINAL LAW, 11; INSTRUCTION, 4. TAIM AND DELIVERY.

TION FOR THE RECOVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-CLAIM AND DELIV-
-REPLEVIN-PLEADINGS.-In an action for the recovery of personal

CLAIM AND DELIVERY (Continued).

property, where the property has been delivered to the plaintiff under proceedings in the action, it is not necessary, in order to entitle the defendant to a return, that he should allege affirmatively that he, or a third person, is entitled to the possession of the property. The general denial, if the plaintiff fails to prove his averments, determines that the property should be restored to the defendant.-Pico v. Pico, 453.

2. ID.-ID.-ID.-CASE EXPLAINED.-The power of the Court, as asserted in O'Connor v. Blake, 29 Cal. 47, to refuse a return where the defendant has lost his right to it pending the suit, does not depend upon allegations of the answer, but is employed upon equitable principles, and because it would not be advisable to return the property to defendant, merely that it might again be replevied by the plaintiff.—Id.

AMENDMENT OF ANSWER

3. ID.-ID.-ID.-JUDGMENT.-A defendant cannot have judgment for a return of the property, or its value, unless he has claimed a return in his answer. But this, even if it be held to require a formal demand, is not because such demand is necessary in order to eke out the denials, or constitutes of itself an affirmative allegation, but because it is arbitrarily made the duty of the defendant to assert his formal claim for a return as a prerequisite to a judgment for the return of the property or its value.-Id. 4. ID. - ID. — ID. — ID. — FINDINGS SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT.-In an action for the recovery of personal property, where the property had been delivered to the plaintiff pending the suit, and the answer was a general denial, without any claim for a return of the property, the case was referred to a referee for trial, who found the value of the property, and that the plaintiff was not at the commencement of the action, or at all, the owner or entitled to the possession of the property, and reported a judgment for a return of the property or its value; and the Court thereupon permitted the defendant to amend his answer by inserting a claim for the return of the property; and the judgment of the referee was entered. Held, (1) that the referee properly found the value of the property because it was denied by the answer, and the jursdiction of the Court depended on it; (2) that the finding that plaintiff was not entitled to the possession was in effect a finding that defendant was so entitled; (3) that as to the question whether the right to the possession had passed from the defendant to the plaintiff pending the suit, that question was not presented by the pleadings, and that, if constructively put in issue by the original pleadings, it was disposed of by the findings; (4) that the facts found would have fully sustained the judgment entered, had the original answer contained a formal claim for a return of the property; (5) that a formal claim would not have broadened the issues, and that therefore the Court did not err in permitting it to be inserted.-Id.

COMMISSIONS. See ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 1.

COMMON CARRIER. See WAREHOUSEMAN.

COMPLAINT.

1. TITLE OF COMPLAINT-ACTION BY PARTNERS-VARIANCE.-In the title of a
complaint, the names of the plaintiffs appeared without being described as
partners, but in the body of the complaint it was averred that they were
such; and on the trial a partnership contract was proven, and it was ob-
jected and proven that the plaintiffs had not filed or published the certifi-
cate required by § 2466, Civil Code. Held-the plaintiffs claiming that the
action was brought by them in their individual capacities, and that the
allegation of partnership was surplusage-that the Court was inclined to

COMPLAINT (Continued).

agree with them, but that proof of a partnership contract could not sustain that theory of the complaint.-McCord v. Seale, 262.

2. INFANT PLAINTIFF-GUARDIAN AD LITEM-COMPLAINT-PLEADING.-Where an infant sues by a guardian ad litem (as provided in § 372, Code Civ. Proc.), the complaint must allege the due appointment of the guardian, for the appointment of such guardian is a traversable fact, and must be stated in order that it may be traversed. Held, accordingly, that a special demurrer to a complaint, on this ground, was rightly sustained.-Crawford v. Neal, 321. See JUSTICES' COURT, 4; GUARDIAN AND WARD, 2, 3.

COMPOSITION. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

Art. 4, § 2, subd. 3, cited.....p. 292 | Art. 14, cited.....

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

.p. 237, 239-241

1. COUNTY GOVERNMENT ACT-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JUDICIAL NOTICE.-The Act of the Legislature of April 27th, 1880, commonly known as the County Government Act, is in conflict with the Constitution of the State, and therefore void.-Leonard v. January, 1.

2. APPOINTMENT OR ELECTION OF COUNTY OFFICERS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.It seems that under § 5 of article xi of the Constitution, the legislature has the power to provide that all county officers shall be appointed, instead of being elected.-Barton v. Kalloch, 95.

3. ID. - MCKINSTRY, J., concurring in the judgment, dissented from the proposition that the legislature has power, under the Constitution, to de