final and irrevocable of the land. The phrase 'or otherwise disposed of' must signify some disposition of the property equally efficient, and equally incompatible with any right in the State present or potential, as deducible from the act of 1820, and the ordinance of the same year."

The court therefore held that the reservation from sale of the lands within the limits of the private land claim, did not prevent the title of the State from attaching to the sixteenth section specifically.

To the same effect is the ruling in the cases of Cooper v. Roberts (18 How., 173); Beecher v. Wetherby (95 U. S., 517); Buttz v. Northern Pacific R. R. (119 U. S., 55).

The principle announced in the cases cited as controlling the grant for school purposes, is alike applicable to the grant of September 28, 1850, granting to the State all of the swamp and overflowed land which shall remain unsold at the date of the grant, which included all land of the character specified, owned by the United States at the date of the act, although they may at that time be reserved from sale, or set apart for some temporary use of the government.

From your report it is clear that, if any reservation was ever made on account of the Arredondo grant, it did not amount to a disposition of the lands. It was at best an approximate location of the claim, and never acquired that fixity of character or definiteness of location as would amount to a disposition of the land included thereby.

Its effect upon the swamp grant must have been considered at the time of the approval of the list under consideration, and, after the lapse of so many years, I should hesitate to disturb the adjudication then made, unless it was clearly shown that the action then taken was without authority of law.

I have therefore to direct that patent issue upon the approval heretofore given.

DESERT LAND ACT-RESIDENT CITIZEN.

INSTRUCTIONS.

The phrase, "resident citizen of the State or Territory in which the land sought to be entered is located," as used in the desert land act, amended March 3, 1891, should be construed to embrace all persons living in such State or Territory and entitled to protection in the exercise of civil rights, without regard to their political rights, and must be read in connection with the provisions of sections one and seven of said act.

Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, June 22,

1892.

By letter of February 27, 1892, you ask to be advised of the views of the Department upon the provision of section eight of the act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 377) as amended by section two of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095) that "no person shall be entitled to make entry of desert land except he be a resident citizen of the State or Territory in which the land sought to be entered is located."

The amendment made by the act of March 3, 1891, consisted of the

addition of five sections numbered four to eight inclusive, and in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to the point referred to by you, it will be necessary to consider the whole act as it now stands.

Section one provides "that it shall be lawful for any citizen of the United States, or any person of requisite age 'who may be entitled to become a citizen, and who has filed his declaration to become such,"" to file a declaration that he intends to reclaim a tract of desert land, etc. This is the only provision or requirement as to citizenship found in the original act.

Section seven of the act as it now stands provides that at any time after filing the declaration, and within the period of four years thereafter, upon the applicant making satisfactory proof of reclamation and cultivation "and that he or she is a citizen of the United States," and upon payment, as required, a patent shall issue.

In section eight is found the provision quoted in your letter as follows:

and no person shall be entitled to make entry of desert land except he be a resident citizen of the State or Territory in which the land sought to be entered is located.

These quotations contain all that is said in this law, as it now stands, upon the subject of citizenship. There is at least one proposition as to which there can be no dispute, that is, that the applicant must, in his final proof, show himself to be a citizen of the United States. I can not, however, entirely agree with you that it is now required

that a party, at the time of making application to enter desert land, must be a citizen of the United States, and have his permanent residence in the State or Territory where the land sought to be entered is located, without regard to the length of time he may have been residing in the State.

This construction would, in effect, nullify that part of section one which declares that one who may be entitled to become a citizen of the United States and who has filed his declaration to become such may file an application to make an entry under said act, and such a result should be avoided if possible. Effect should be given to every part of this law unless there be provisions so contradictory as to render this impossible. I do not find in these two provisions that degree of repugnance that would require a construction disregarding either of these provisions. The proper construction seems to be that the eighth section specifies another qualification or attribute that must belong to one to entitle him to file his application under this act. If the provision found in section eight had been inserted in section one, where it might very properly have been placed, it would have had the same effect on the provisions of said section as it now properly has. That section would then have read as follows:

That it shall be lawful for any citizen of the United States, or any person of requisite age 66 who may be entitled to become a citizen, and who has filed his declaration to become such," and who shall be a resident citizen of the State or Territory in which the land sought to be entered is located, etc.

So far as said provision in section eight affects the question as to the qualifications of those who may file a declaration of intention to reclaim a tract of desert land, it should be given the same effect as if it had been found in section one of said act.

Said provision being placed where it is in this act must be read also in connection with that part of section seven reciting the facts required to be shown in final proof. The requirements as to personal qualification would then be as follows:

That he or she is a citizen of the United States and a resident citizen of the State or Territory in which the land sought to be entered is located.

It remains then to be determined what is meant by the added requirement that one seeking to acquire title to a tract of land under the provisions of this act must show both at the date he files his declaration of intention to reclaim and at the date he offers final proof that he is "a resident citizen of the State or Territory in which the land sought to be entered is located." In determining this point we may properly take into consideration not only all parts of the act in question and its scope and purpose, but also all other acts relating to the same subject. In this connection it may be said that statutes forming the general system of laws regulating the disposal of the public domain are to be considered in pari materia and are to be construed accordingly. Daniel G. Tilton (8 L. D., 368).

Under those laws which require a settlement on the land the title to which is sought to be acquired, the claimant must of necessity be a resident of the State or Territory in which the land is located. But a claimant under one of those laws is not required to show that he is a citizen of such State or Territory in the sense that he has a right to exercise political functions. No more should be required in this particular of claimants under this law now under consideration than of one under those laws requiring settlement, unless the language used is clearly and absolutely indicative of an intention on the part of Congress to require something more. I do not find in this act language indicating such an intention, but it is, in my opinion, clear that Congress intended to place claimants under this law in exactly the same position in this particular as claimants under those laws requiring settlement. You say "it has been suggested that a party qualified to exercise the elective franchise in any State or Territory might be considered a resident citizen' of that State or Territory." I agree with you that such a construction should not be adopted. It would shut out from the benefits of this act women in those States where the right of suffrage has not been conferred upon them, and it would also debar those who may be citizens of the State in the sense of being inhabitants thereof and entitled to participation in civil rights, but who are not electors or entitled to exercise political functions.

The fact that the word citizen does not always have the same signifi

cance has been frequently adverted to by the courts. Thus in The Dred Scott case (19 How., 393-422) we find the following language:

Undoubtedly, a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the community who form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political power, and is incapacitated from holding particular offices. Women and minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote; and when a property qualification is required to vote or hold a particular office, those who have not the necessary qualification can not vote or hold the office, yet they are citizens.

In the case of United States v. Cruikshank (92 U. S., 542–549) the court defined citizens as follows:

Citizens are the members of the political community to which they belong. They are the people who compose the community, and who, in their associated capacity have established or submitted themselves to the dominion of a government for the promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their individual as well as their collective rights.

After quoting this definition, in the case of Boyd v. Thayer (143 U. S., 135-158) the court said:

There is no attempt in this definition, which was entirely sufficient for the argument, to exclude those members of the State who are citizens in the sense of participation in civil rights, though not in the exercise of political functions.

In Baldwin v. Franks (120 U. S., 678–690) it was said:

In the Constitution and laws of the United States, the word 'citizen' is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who has the rights of privileges of a citizen of a State or of the United States. But it is also sometimes

used in popular language to indicate the same thing as resident, inhabitant, or person.

It was held that the word was not used in the law then under consideration in this latter sense, because all the surroundings indicated that it was intended in its political sense. None of the surroundings of the law now under consideration indicates that the word was used here in its political sense, but all support the theory that it was used in its wider and broader sense. To restrict it to the narrower meaning would be to render the law unequal in its application in the different States, and inharmonious with the whole system of land laws.

It may be said that if the construction indicated herein be given the word "citizen," the word "resident" is superfluous and adds nothing. That objection would, however, be equally torcible if the word "citizen" be given the other definition.

After a full and careful consideration of this matter, I have concluded that the phrase "resident citizen of the State or Territory in which the land sought to be entered is located" should be construed to embrace all persons living in said State and entitled to protection in the exercise of civil rights without regard to their political rights, and must be read in connection with the provisions of sections one and seven of said act, as hereinbefore indicated.

SCHOOL LAND-MINERAL LAND.

WARREN ET AL. v. STATE OF COLORADO.

The title to school land passes to the State without patent or certificate, at the date when the grant takes effect, and to except lands therefrom, on account of coal alleged to be found therein, it is necessary to show the existence of such mineral in sufficient quantity to add to the value of said lands and justify expenditure for its extraction, and that such fact was known when the grant took effect. Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office June 22, 1892.

I have considered the cases of M. V. Warren and J. M. Burkhart v. The State of Colorado and the Trinidad Coal and Coking Company, intervenor, on appeal by the former from your office decision of October 30, 1889, rejecting their applications to purchase the E. of Sec. 36, T. 33 S., R. 64 W., Pueblo, Colorado, land district.

The record shows that on June 8, 1887, Burkhart applied to the local officers to purchase the NE. of said section, under section 2347, of the Revised Statutes, and on July 7, 1887, Warren likewise applied to purchase the SE. 4 of said section.

The local officers rejected both applications on the ground that the land described in said applications was not subject to sale by the United States, because it had passed to the State of Colorado under the grant for school purposes, made in the act of Congress providing for its admission into the Union as a State. Burkhart and Warren appealed, and thereupon your office on the 2d day of November, 1887, modified the decision of the local officers by ordering hearings to be had to determine whether said land, "was known to be mineral prior to the admission of Colorado into the Union, to wit: August 1, 1876, and chiefly valuable for coal."

A hearing was accordingly had at which the parties appeared; the applicants in person and by counsel, the State of Colorado by its attorney-general, and the Trinidad Coal and Coking Company as an intervenor, claiming title to the land in question under a purchase from the State of Colorado.

It was agreed by all of the parties in interest, that the testimony taken should apply to both cases, and that the cases for the purposes of the trial, should be consolidated, and tried as one case.

The State claimed,

That said land was donated, granted and confirmed to the State of Colorado in aid of the support of common schools of said State, and for the creating of a fund for that purpose by act of Congress, approved March 3, 1875. That Colorado became a State August 1, 1876, and accepted said grant and donation of said land for such purpose, and made due selection thereof, at or about said time, as agricultural land, and had ever since by her or her grantees, held control and possession of the same. That said land at the time of said grant as well as at the time of the admission of Colorado into the Union, was not known to be coal land nor chiefly valuable as such, but on