cluded all the perfections of a free state, and was the kernel, as it were, of a commonwealth, in the shell of monarchy. First, I will begin with the essential parts of a commonwealth, which are three, viz. the senate proposing, the people resolving, the magistrate executing. For the senate or parliament, if ever there were a free and honourable one, it was here; where the deputies of the whole nation, most freely chosen, did, with like freedom, meet, propound, debate, and vote all matters of common interest. No danger escaped their representing; no grievance, their complaint; no public right, their claim; or good, their demand; in all which, the least breach of privilege was branded as a civil sacrilege; and though there lay no appeal to the dispersed body of the people (a decision manifestly impracticable in government, and fitter indeed for tribunes to move than nations to admit) yet, elections being so popular, and assemblies frequent, the same end was attained with much more safety and convenience. The prince had, likewise, in effect, but an executive power, which he exercised by ministers and officers, not only sworn, but severely accountable. For, though both he and the lords had their negatives in making laws, yet (no tax being impossible, but by consent of the commons, nor any law, without it, of such validity, that the ministers of justice durst enforce it) there was a wise and sweet necessity for the king, and likewise for the lords, who were but as a grain in the royal scale, to confirm all such bills, as were convenient for the people, and not greatly hurtful to the prince; and so this bugbear negative was resolved into a meer target, to shelter and preserve the government from being altered, at the will of the commons, if, at any time, they should prove factious; which (being in reason manifest) hath been also confirmed 'by great experience. Our kings having,

rarely, obstructed any bill, which they might safely grant; but, on the other side, passed many high acts of meer grace, circumscribing their prerogative, and clipping its wings; nay, I could wish they had not pierced its bowels. This was that triple cord, which, one would think, could not be broken; nor, indeed, was it broken, but cut asunder*. This was our gold, seven times refined; for every bill, being thrice read, debated, and agreed, in either house, was, at last, brought to the king, for his royal assent, the mint of our laws. A trial so exact, that, surely, no dross could escape it; since all interests must thereto concur, as truly it was but fit they should, in the establishment of that, which must bind them all. This was that temperament, which poised our humours, and, at once, endued us with health, vigour, and beauty. No vote was precipitated, no act was huddled up; as by sad events we have since seen, that, power being ingrossed by one of the estates, purged and modelled to the interests of a faction; a consequence natural to such premises. As in a balance consisting but of one scale, nothing hath been weighed; our laws have been made mandrakes of a night's growth, and our times as fickle as the weather, or multitude.

The king, indeed, had the power of making war, but he had not the means; and then it signified no more than giving him leave to fly,

• When King Charles the First's head was cut off.

The rump parliament.

if he could get wings; or to go beyond sea, so he went without shipping. He had a sword, but he alone could never draw it; for the trained-bands were a weapon, which he decently wore, but the nation only could use. He chose his ministers (as who doth not his servants?) but alas, he was accountable for them to the triennial parliament, which none but the soundest integrity could abide. He could hinder the stroke of justice with his pardon (though still, the jaws not being muzzled, it would bite terribly) but certainly, it was great wisdom rather to give way, since, with his own scandal, he could afford offenders but a lame and scurvy protection; and since the power of relieving his wants rested in the commons, to balance his will, and oblige him to a correspondence with parliaments.

That his person should be most sacred, it was but needful, to avoid circulation of account; reasonable, since it carries with it the consent of nations; just, that he should not be the meer butt of faction and malice, in worse condition than the basest of vassals; honourable, that the nakedness of government might not be daily uncovered; wise, in the constitution, not at once to trust and provoke, by forcing him to shift for his own indemnity, no danger to the public seeming so extreme as the outlawry of a prince; no task, by daily experience, so difficult, as the arraigning of any power, whether regal or popular; and since we make golden bridges, for flying enemies, much more may we afford them to relenting sovereigns; (upon which account, in our neighbour kingdom of France, even princes of the blood are not subjected to capital punishments;) finally, very safe, in the consequent, for, being, by the danger, threatening his corrupt ministers, in all probability, stripped of agents, his personal impunity might well signify somewhat to himself, but nothing to the people.

A revenue he had, for the support of his state and family, ample; for the ordinary protection of his people, sufficient; but for any undertaking, defective; and for public oppression, so inconsiderable, that when prerogative was most rampant, our greatest princes (and some, doubtless, we have had the most renowned warriors of their ages) could never prudently aspire to make themselves sole legislators, nor presumed to maintain red-coats in times of peace. If any object (as some concerned are ready enough) that kingly power could here no longer subsist, for want of revenue; it is easily answered, that a king of France, indeed, could not, and God forbid he should! but a king of England might, and, for aught I see, still may (the sale of crown-lands, which exceeded not the value of £100,000 per annum, being, methinks, no matter of utter ruin, but rather of easy compensation). For the public revenue was proportioned to the maintenance of courts, not camps and fleets. A gentleman of reasonable estate may live well on his rents; but then, it is not convenient he should keep wenches, or hangers-on, nor build, nor study chymistryf. In fine, the revenue was very competent for ordinary disbursements; as

The army.

Alluding to the bewitching study of finding out the philosopher's stone, which employed so many brains and drained so many pockets in those days.

for extraordinary, if he resorted to parliaments, the wiser he, the safer and happier we.

:

I desire all our projectors of commonwealths, to contrive greater freedom for their citizens, than is provided by magna charta, and the petition of right; or shew us, that it is not much easier to violate, than to mend them: for, thereby our lives, liberties, and estates were under monarchy secured and established, I think, as well as any thing on this side heaven. It were no solecism to say, the subject had his prerogative, as well as the king; and, sure I am, he was in as good (if not better) condition to maintain it, the dependence being less on his side. Liberty was no less sacred than majesty; noli me tangere was likewise its motto; and, in case of any, the least infringement (as escapes in government may happen even in the most perfect) it was resented, as if the nation had received a box on the ear. If it be, as they say, the glory of a free state, to exalt; the scandal of tyranny, to cribase our spirits; doubtless, this was our only commonwealth for, ever since", methinks, we have learned quietly to take the bastonade. I wish we now could, or could ever hope, under our commonwealth (whatever promises may be made us) so perfectly to distinguish the legislative from the ministerial authority, as once we did; when the house of commons had not the power of a court-leet, to give an oath, nor of a justice of the peace, to make a mittimus: which distinction, doubtless, is the most vital part of freedom, and far more considerable to poor subjects than the pretended rotation; as, on the contrary, the confusion of them is an accomplishment of servitude; for which the best republicks, I fear, have more to answer, than any limited prince can have. Certain it is, that as our king, in his personal capacity, made no laws, so neither did he, by himself, interpret or execute any. No judge took notice of his single command, to justify any trespass; no, not so much as breaking of an hedge; his power limited by his justice, he was, equally with the meanest of his subjects, concerned in that honest maxim, We may do just so much and no more, than we have a right to do. And it was most properly said, He could do no wrong; because, if it were wrong, he did it not; he could not do it; it was void in the act, punishable in his agent. His officers, as they were alike liable, sc, perhaps, they were more obnoxious to indictments and suits than any other, by how much their trespass seemed to be of an higher nature, and gave greater alarm. His private will could not countermand his public; his privy scal, ever buckled to the great scal, as being the nation's more than his; his order superseded no process, and his displeasure threatened no man with an hour's imprisonment, after the return of habeas corpus. An under-sheriff was more terrible, a constable more saucy, a bailiff more troublesome, than he; and yet, by his gentle authority, this scabbard of prerogative, as some in derision have called it, which, if it would, could scarce oppress an orphan, tumult was curbed, faction moderated, usurpation forestalled, intervals prevented, perpetuities obviated, equity administered, clemency exalted, and the people made only nice and wanton with their happiness,

The usurpation of the rump parliament.

as appears by their now so impatient calling for that manna", which they so causelessly loathed.

To conclude, what shall I add? The act, enjoining the keepers of the great seal, under pain of high-treason, to summon a triennial par liament, of course, by virtue of the act, without further warrant; the act, forbidding the privy council, under like penalty, to intermeddle with meum et tuum; the laws, abolishing the star-chamber, high-commission, &c. branding all past, and bridling all future enormities; the statutes, limiting the king's claims, and relieving his tenants from exaction of forfeitures; besides many other principal immunities, wherewith (by the special favour of God, and bounty of our princes) we were blessed, far beyond any of our neighbours; above all, our assurance, that we might readily have obtained such farther addition and perfection of liberty, if, yet, any such there were, as would consist with modesty or liberty itself, to ask. Do they not aloud proclaim that we were then the mirror of governments, envy of monarchies, and shame of commonwealths; who could not but blush to see themselves so eclipsed and silenced, in all their pretences to freedom? Do they not more than justify my assertion, That, with all the ornaments of the noblest kingdom, we had, likewise, all the enjoyments of the freest state?

A LETTER

Written by the Emperor to the late King James, Setting forth the true Occasion of his Fall, and the Treachery and Cruelty of the French,

As the foregoing Tract gives us the great Advantages of Monarchical Government, when justly limited, and content with the just bounds prescribed to it by the Laws of the Land; so this Letter, written by the Emperor of Germany to King James the Second, after his Abdication, setting forth the Causes of his Majesty's Desertion by his Subjects, is a proper Caveat to such Princes, always to preserve their Subjects in their just Rights, both in Church and State, as the best means to deserve their Affection, and to secure the Throne to themselves and their Posterity.

LEOPOLD, &c.

WE have received your majesty's letters, dated from St. Germains,

the 6th of February last, by the Earl of Carlingford, your envoy in our court. By them we have understood the condition your majesty ' is reduced to; and that you, being deserted after the landing of the 'Prince of Orange, by your army, and even by your domestic servants, and by those you most confided in, and almost by all your subjects, you have been forced, by a sudden flight, to provide for your own safety, and to seek shelter and protection in France. Lastly, that you desire assistance from us, for the recovery of your kingdoms. 'We do assure your majesty, that, as soon as we heard of this

Monarchy, to be re-established in the person of King Charles the Second.

4

severe turn of affairs, we were moved at it, not only with the com'mon sense of humanity, but with much deeper impressions, suitable to the sincere affection which we have always borne to you. And we were heartily sorry, that, at last, that was come to pass, 'which (though we hoped for better things) yet our own sad thoughts 'had suggested to us would ensue. If your majesty had rather given credit to the friendly remonstrances that were made you by our late envoy, the Count de Kaunitz, in our name, than the deceitful insinuations of the French, whose chief aim was, by fomenting continual divisions between you and your people, to gain thereby an opportunity to insult the more securely over the rest of Christendom; and if your majesty had put a stop, by your force and authority, to their many infractions of the peace, of which, by the treaty of Nimegen, you are made the guarantee, and to that end entered into con'sultations with us, and such others, as have the like just sentiments in this matter; we are verily persuaded, that by this means you should have, in a great measure, quieted the minds of your people, which were 'much already exasperated through their aversion to our religion*, ' and the public peace had been preserved, as well in your kingdoms as 'here, in the Roman empire. But now we refer it even to your majesty, to judge what condition we can be in to afford you any assistance, we being not only engaged in a war with the Turks, but 'finding ourselves at the same time unjustly and barbarously attacked by the French, contrary to, and against the faith of treaties, they then ⚫ reckoning themselves secure of Englandt. And this ought not to be concealed; that the greatest injuries, which have been done to our religion, have flowed from no other than the French themselves, who 'not only esteem it lawful for them to make perfidious leagues with§ 'the sworn enemies of the holy cross, tending to the destruction both ' of us and the whole Christian world, in order to the checking our ' endeavours, which were undertaken for the glory of God, and to stop 'those successes, which it hath pleased Almighty God to give us hitherto; but further, have heaped one treachery on another, even within the empire itself¶. The cities of the empire, which were sur' rendered upon articles, signed by the dauphin himself, have been exhausted by excessive impositions; and, after their being exhausted, have been plundered; and, after plundering, have been burned and 'erazed. The palaces of princes, which in all times, and even the 'most destructive wars, have been preserved, are now burnt down 'to the ground. The churches are robbed, and such as submitted 'themselves to them, are, in a most barbarous manner, carried away as 'slaves. In short, it is become a diversion to them, to commit all manner of insolences and cruelties in many places, but chiefly in Catholick countries, exceeding the cruelties of the Turks themselves;

Which made use of so many unjust and cruel means to gain its establishment.

+Under a prince, that, to accomplish the slavery of his subjects, was making himself tributary and vassal of France.

Popery.

§ The Turks.

Viz. all Christians.

How justly does this repre the present and late actions of the French in Germany.