DiplomacySimon and Schuster, 1994 - 912 Seiten In this controversial and monumental book - arguably his most important - Henry Kissinger illuminates just what diplomacy is. Moving from a sweeping overview of his own interpretation of history to personal accounts of his negotiations with world leaders, Kissinger describes the ways in which the art of diplomacy and the balance of power have created the world we live in, and shows how Americans, protected by the size and isolation of their country, as well as by their own idealism and mistrust of the Old World, have sought to conduct a unique kind of foreign policy based on the way they wanted the world to be, as opposed to the way it really is. Spanning more than three centuries of history, from Cardinal Richelieu, the father of the modern state system, to the "New World Order" in which we live, Kissinger demonstrates how modern diplomacy emerged from the trials and experiences of the balance of power of warfare and peacemaking, and why America, sometimes to its peril, refused to learn its lessons. His intimate portraits of world leaders, including de Gaulle, Nixon, Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung, Reagan, and Gorbachev, based on personal experience and knowledge, provide the reader with a rare window on diplomacy at the summit, together with a wealth of detailed and original observations on the secret negotiations, great events, and the art of statesmanship that have shaped our lives in the decades before, during and since Henry Kissinger was himself at the center of things. Analyzing the differences in the national styles of diplomacy, Kissinger shows how various societies produce special ways of conducting foreign policy, and how Americans, from the very beginning, sought a distinctive foreign policy based on idealism. He illustrates his points with his own insights and with examples from his own experience, as well as with candid accounts of his breakthrough diplomatic initiatives as Nixon's foreign policy partner. Informed by deep historical knowledge, wit, a gift for irony, and a unique understanding of the forces that bind and sunder nations, Kissinger's Diplomacy is must reading for anyone who cares about America's position in the world. |
Inhalt
The New World Order | 17 |
Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson | 29 |
Richelieu William of Orange and Pitt | 56 |
Great Britain Austria and Russia | 78 |
Napoleon HI and Bismarck | 103 |
Realpolitik Turns on Itself | 137 |
European Diplomacy Before the First World War | 168 |
The Military Doomsday Machine | 201 |
The Success and the Pain of Containment | 446 |
The Korean War | 473 |
Adenauer Churchill and Eisenhower | 493 |
The Suez Crisis | 522 |
Upheaval in the Empire | 550 |
The Berlin Crisis 195863 | 568 |
Macmillan de Gaulle Eisenhower | 594 |
Entry into the Morass Truman and Eisenhower | 620 |
Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles | 218 |
The Dilemmas of the Victors | 246 |
Stresemann and the Reemergence of the Vanquished | 266 |
Hitler and the Destruction of Versailles | 288 |
Stalins Bazaar | 332 |
The NaziSoviet Pact | 350 |
Franklin Delano Roosevelt | 369 |
Roosevelt Stalin and Churchill in World War II | 394 |
The Beginning of the Cold War | 423 |
On the Road to Despair Kennedy and Johnson | 643 |
The Extrication Nixon | 674 |
Nixons Triangular | 703 |
Detente and Its Discontents | 733 |
Reagan and Gorbachev | 762 |
The New World Order Reconsidered | 804 |
NOTES | 837 |
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | 873 |
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