Another reprehension is, that things of greatness and predominancy, though they do not extenuate the things adjoining in substance, yet they drown them, and obscure them in shew and appearance. And therefore the astronomers say; that, whereas in all other planets conjunction is the perfectest amity, the sun contrariwise is good by aspect, but evil by conjunction.

A third reprehension is, because evil approacheth to good, sometimes for concealment, sometimes for protection; and good to evil for conversion and reformation. So hypocrisy draweth near to religion for covert and hiding itself.

Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni."

And sanctuary men, which were commonly inordinate men, and malefactors, were wont to be nearest to priests, and prelates, and holy men: for the majesty of good things is such, as the confines of them are revered. On the other side, our Saviour charged with nearness of publicans and rioters, said, The physician approacheth the sick rather than the whole.8

8. Quod quis culpa sua contraxit, majus malum: quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum.

That, which a man hath procured by his own default, is a greater mischief (or evil); that, which is laid on by others, is a lesser evil.

THE

HE reason is, because the sting and remorse of the mind accusing itself doubleth all adversity: contrariwise, the considering and recording inwardly that a man is clear and free from fault and just imputation, doth attemper outward calamities. For if the evil be in the sense and in the conscience both, there is a gemination of it: but if evil be in the one, and comfort in the other, it is a kind of compensation. So the poets in tragedies do make the most passionate lamentations, and those that forerun final despair, to be accusing, questioning, and torturing of a man's self.

Seque unum clamat causamque caputque malorum.9

Ovid. A. A. ii. 662.

8 Matt. ix. 12.

9 Virg. En. xii. 600. Se causam clamat crimenque caputque malorum.

And contrariwise, the extremities of worthy persons have been annihilated in the consideration of their own good deserving. Besides, when the evil cometh from without, there is left a kind of evaporation of grief, if it come by human injury, either by indignation, and meditating of revenge from ourselves, or by expecting, or fore-conceiving, that Nemesis and retribution will take hold of the authors of our hurt; or, if it be by fortune or accident, yet there is left a kind of expostulation against the divine powers.

Atque Deos atque Astra vocat crudelia Mater:'

But, where the evil is derived from a man's own fault, there all strikes deadly inwards and suffocateth.

The reprehension of this colour is:

First in respect of hope: for reformation of our fault is in nostra potestate, but amendment of our fortune simply is not: therefore Demosthenes in many of his orations saith thus to the people of Athens; that which having regard to the time past, is the worst point and circumstance of all the rest; that as to the time to come, is the best. What is that? Even this, that by your sloth, irresolution, and misgovernment, your affairs are grown to this declination and decay: for, had you used and ordered your means and forces to the best, and done your parts every way to the full; and notwithstanding your matters should have gone backward in this manner as they do; there had been no hope left of recovery or reparation. But since it hath been only by your own errors, &c. So Epictetus in his Degrees saith, The worst state of man is to accuse extern things, better than that to accuse a man's self, and best of all to accuse neither.

Another reprehension of this colour is in respect of the well bearing of evils, wherewith a man can charge nobody but himself, which maketh them the less.

Leve fit, quod bene fertur onus:3

And therefore many natures, that are either extremely proud, and will take no fault to themselves; or else very true, and cleaving to themselves, (when they see the blame of anything that falls out ill, must light upon themselves) have no other shift, but to bear it out well, and to make

Virg. Ecl. v. 23.

2 Demosth. Philip. A. 40.

3 Ovid. Am. i.ii. 10.

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the least of it. For, as we see, when sometimes a fault is committed, and before it be known who is to blame, much ado is made of it; but after, if it appear to be done by a son, or by a wife, or by a near friend, then it is light made of: so much more, when a man must take it upon himself. And therefore it is commonly seen, that women which marry husbands of their own choosing against their friends' consents, if they be never so ill-used, yet you shall seldom see them complain, but to set a good face on it.

9. Quod opera et virtute nostra partum est, majus_bonum: quod ab alieno beneficio, vel ab indulgentia Fortunæ, delatum est, minus bonum.

That which is gotten by our own pains and industry, is a greater good that which comes by another man's courtesy, or the indulgence of Fortune, is a lesser good. HE reasons are,

THE

First, the future hope: because in the favour of others, or the good winds of fortune, we have no state or certainty; in our endeavours or abilities we have. So as when they have purchased us one good fortune, we have them as ready, and better edged and environed to procure

another.

The forms be: You have won this by play. You have not only the water, but you have the receipt: you can make it again, if it be lost, &c.

Next, because these properties which we enjoy by the benefit of others, carry with them an obligation, which seemeth a kind of burthen: whereas the other, which derive from ourselves are like the freest patents, absque aliquo inde reddendo. And if they proceed from fortune or providence, yet they seem to touch us secretly with the reverence of the divine powers, whose favours we taste, and therefore work a kind of religious fear and restraint: whereas in the other kind, that comes to pass, which the prophet speaketh, Lætantur, exaltant, immolant plagis suis et sacrificant reti suo.

Thirdly, because that, which cometh unto us without our own virtue, yieldeth not that commendation and reputation, for actions of great felicity may draw wonder, but praise less; as Cicero said to Cæsar, Quæ miremur, habemus; quæ laudemus, expectamus.*

1 Cic. p. Marcell. 9.

Fourthly, because the purchases of our own industry are joined commonly with labour and strife; which gives an edge and appetite, and makes the fruition of our desires more pleasant. Suavis cibus à venatu.

On the other side, there be four counter-colours to this colour, rather than reprehensions; because they be as large as the colour itself.

First, because felicity seemeth to be a character of the favour and love of the Divine Powers; and accordingly works both of confidence in our selves, and respect and authority from others. And this felicity extendeth to many casual things, whereunto the care and virtue of man cannot extend, and therefore seemeth to be at large good. As when Cæsar said to the sailer; Cæsarem portas, et fortunam ejus; if he had said, et virtutem ejus, and his valour; it had been small comfort against a tempest; otherwise than if it might seem upon merit to induce fortune.

Next, whatsoever is done by virtue and industry, seems to be done by a kind of habit and art; and therefore open to be imitated and followed, whereas felicity is inimitable. So we generally see, that things of nature seem more excellent than things of art, because they be inimitable; for, Quod imitabile est, potentia quadam vulgatum est.

Thirdly, felicity commendeth those things which cometh without our own labour: for they seem gifts, and the others seem pennyworths. Whereupon Plutarch saith elegantly of the acts of Timoleon, who was so fortunate, compared with the acts of Agesilaus and Epaminondas, that they were like Homer's verses; they ran so easily, and so well. And therefore it is the word we give unto Poesie, terming it a happy vein; because facility seemeth ever to come from happiness.

Fourthly, this same præter spem, vel expectatum, doth increase the price and pleasure of many things; and this cannot be incident to those things that proceed from our own care, and compass.

5 Plut. Cæs. 38.

6 Plut. Timol. 36.

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10. Gradus privationis major videtur quam gradus diminutionis: et rursus, gradus inceptionis major videtur quam gradus incrementi :

The degree of privation seems greater than the degree of diminution and again, the degree of inception (or beginning) seems greater than the degree of increase.

IT is a position in the mathematics, that there is no pro

portion between somewhat and nothing: therefore the

degree of nullity and quiddity, or act, seemeth larger than the degrees of increase and decrease. As to a monoculus, it is more to lose one eye, than to a man that hath two eyes. So, if one have lost divers children, it is more grief to him to lose the last, than all the rest: because he is spes gregis. And therefore Sibylla, when she brought her three books, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other;7 because the burning of that had been gradus privationis, and not diminutionis.

This colour is reprehended,-first, in those things, the use and service whereof resteth in sufficiency, competency, or determinate quantity: as if a man be to pay one hundred pounds upon a penalty, it is more to him to want twelve pence, than after that twelve pence supposed to be wanting, to want ten shillings more. So the decay of a man's estate seems to be most touched in the degree when he first grows behind, more than afterwards when he proves nothing worth. And hereof the common forms are: Sera in fundo parsimonia: and, as good never a whit as never the better, &c.

It is reprehended also in respect of that notion, Corruptio unius, generatio alterius. So that Gradus privationis, is many times less matter, because it gives the cause and motive to some new course. As when Demosthenes reprehended the people for hearkening to the conditions offered by King Philip, being not honourable nor equal, he saith, They were but elements of their sloth and weakness; which if they were taken away, necessity

7 Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. i. 19. 8 Hesiod. ἔργ. κ. ήμ. 367. 9 Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. i. 3.