CHAPTER XLII.

GEORGE III. (Continued.)

A. D. 1812.

WHILE the British court cherished the hope of success in the Spanish contest, and encouraged the harassed patriots with liberal succours, it was yet uncertain whether the friends or the enemies of the nation would ultimately triumph. Probability, however, favored the cause of justice, and light seemed gradually to disperse the gloom which at first hung over the face of the country.

The British general, with a view of facilitating his future operations, resolved to make strenuous efforts for the reduction of the two principal fortresses in the west of Spain. He expected that Marmont would be intent upon the preservation of Ciudad-Rodrigo, and he knew that it was extremely hazardous to commence a siege within the view of a superior army; but he trusted to the celerity of his movements, and to the enterprising audacity of his men. Passing the Agueda amidst the rigours of winter, major-general Crauford invested the place; and, on the fifth day from the completion of the batteries, two breaches tempted the besiegers to an assault. While that officer was advancing to force his way through the smaller opening, he received a wound which he did not long survive: but his division, not discouraged by a loss which every one lamented, moved forward with the utmost alacrity. The breaches were defended not only by the foremost parties of the enemy, but by the occupants of a second enclosure, too high for scalade. By the terrific use of

the bayonet, however, the allied divisions were enabled to gain ground: the breaches were forced; great havock was made; both flanks were fiercely assailed; and the garrison, retreating into the town in consternation, could not escape captivity. Valuable military stores of all descriptions fell into the hands of the besiegers, who even had time to repair the fortifications of the captured post, before the French general approached to witness the disgraceful loss.

As the siege of Badajoz required more considerable preparation, the French had opportunities of taking those precautions which might have precluded its success: but they did not seem aware of the danger to which the place was exposed. The works had been materially improved since the short siege which it had sustained and it was concluded that relief might be easily afforded, before the garrison could be reduced to extremity. Fort-Picurina excited the early attention of the besieging force. It was invested in very unfavorable weather; but, when the heavy rains had subsided, the batteries were opened upon it with ef fect; and, while some parties menaced the rear, it was forced in the front by scalade. This preliminary attempt enfeebled the hopes of the garrison; and a sudden firing from all the fortifications of the town testified the great alarm which the loss of this important outwork had produced. Continued approaches, amidst the severity of occasional loss, indicated the firm determination of the confederates to attain their object. Three breaches were at length discovered; and (on the 6th of April) an assault was boldly risqued. On one side of the place, a castle-wall built on a steep hill, formed the only intermission of regular works; and, while one division attempted to scale that wall, two other select bodies marched toward the breaches. In

descending into the ditch of the counterscarp, these parties suffered the regularity of their arrangement to be broken: their efforts to mount the breaches were consequently unconnected, however fervid might be their courage; and the fury of the enemy, advantageously posted for annoyance, and provided (says colonel Jones) "with every kind of burning composition and destructive missile," compelled them to retreat in confusion. The fire from the elevated wall, in the mean time, destroyed many of the assailants; but the perseverance of the rest ensured success at that point. A fourth division stormed the ramparts at the other end of the town, and, surprising the defenders of the breaches, put them to flight. The governor retired to Fort-Christoval, without daring to maintain it. A great number of the garrison had fallen; but almost 4000 men remained for captivity.

In the two enterprises, above 6100 of the besiegers were killed or wounded: but, while the general lamented this extraordinary havock, which pacific men would have deemed too great a price even for more splendid success, he was not deterred from a renewal of risque. He advanced to meet Marmont, who, during the siege of Badajoz, had made some attempts to recover Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida, and had ravaged the eastern frontier of Portugal. The French commander was apparently sensible of his inattention to the interest of his employer, and of his want of activity and of vigilance; and, as he probably dreaded the indignation of the tyrant, he resolved to seek an opportunity of atoning for his negligence: but his irruption into Portugal was neither productive of honor nor of benefit. He ingloriously retired into Spain on the approach of the allied army, which then found an interval of rest.

When lord Wellington resumed the bold attitude of offensive warfare, his principal army did not far exceed 42,000 men, and the whole force which he could call into exertion did not amount to 75,000; while the number of the French, in various provinces, bordered upon 170,000. The guerilla bands, at the same time, became less effective, not from the diminution of physical strength, but because the increase of number rendered them less manageable, and encouraged them to assault whole brigades, in a mode of action for which they were not regularly qualified; and, while they thus lost their peculiar character, they excited odium by their rapacity: yet an officer speaks too strongly on the subject, when he says, that the perpetual demands for their maintenance "were fast generating a total separation of feeling and interest between those warriors and their countrymen." As they still fought in the cause of their country, and still aimed at the expulsion of a hated enemy, the mere practice of extortion, in a critical emergency, could not be expected to produce that impolitic and dangerous disunion to which the writer alludes.

In advancing against the French, the general directed his chief attention to marshal Marmont, who continued to over-awe the Spaniards in the province of Leon; while, with a view to the defence of the eastern parts of Spain, he made arrangements for the organisation of an army, which was intended to consist of 10,000 British soldiers expected from Sicily, and 6000 Spaniards levied in Majorca. As a prelude to his own operations, he gave orders for an attack upon the fortifications at Almaraz, which formed the most convenient spot for the communication of the northern with the southern French army. When this service had been promptly and effectually performed, the allies

marched to the northward, and approached Salamanca, which was principally defended by three forts, constructed with such skill as to require a regular attack. A siege was quickly formed; and, when the marshal had in vain endeavoured to draw off the garrison, the progress of the besiegers flattered them with the hopes of success. Not discouraged by their abortive attempt to scale the walls of one of the forts, they continued to point their artillery with vigor, so as to make a breach in another fort, and produce flames in the third. A decisive advantage was taken of these promising appearances; and the works were stormed with little difficulty. The French then retreated to the Douro; but their rear-guard did not pass it with sufficient celerity to escape loss.

Marmont hoped to retrieve his credit by a bold defence of the Douro. On the right bank, he possessed some advantageous stations; and he had increased his force to 47,000 men: but, as he had not a full convenience of supply, and was therefore obliged to employ strong detachments in scouring the country, so as to expose himself, under unfavorable circumstances, to the danger of an attack, he suddenly relinquished the defence of the river, and hastened to received support from the army of the centre. In his march, he seemed to be favored with an opportunity of overwhelming two divisions, which had anxiously watched his movements; but, by the seasonable aid of the cavalry, they escaped with less injury than might have been expected. The opposite armies then approached the Tormes, after marching for some time in parallel lines within mutual view. Some bold heights, called the Arapiles, to the southward of Salamanca, drew the attention of both parties; and the French seised the more advan