absence of the general, paved the way for the execution of the scheme. After his escape from Egypt, he was received in France with loud acclamations. Hastening to the capital, he prepared for an assumption of the whole power of the state. Influenced by his chief partisans, the council of elders declared him commander of the armed force of Paris. Profiting by this appointment, he dissolved one of the councils by military intimidation, but suffered the servile members to resume their functions, on condition of their agreeing with the other assembly in framing such a constitution as he desired. Three consuls were appointed for the executive power, and a legislative body was also constituted; but the chief power was delegated to the first consul.

The new government expressed a desire of accommodating all disputes with Great-Britain. Bonapartè, who was named first consul for ten years, was eager to announce his sovereignty to one of the chief enemies of the nation which he now ruled. He therefore sent a letter to the king, urging the ruler of a free nation, whose only object was to promote the happiness of his people, to attend to the cause of humanity, and concur with him in restoring peace to a harassed world. His majesty did not condescend to answer this epistle by a particular letter from himself; but lord Grenville, in a long A.D. note, accused the French of aggression, recapi1800. tulated the enormities of which they had been guilty, and declined treating of peace until the causes which had produced the war should cease to operate. He recommended a reinstatement of the Bourbon family, without so far insisting upon it as to trust to that event only for peace; for, whenever security could be obtained for Europe by any other settlement of the affairs of France, his majesty would accede to a treaty. Talleyrand, the confidential minister of the first consul,

answered this note by a vindication of the conduct of France, and proposed that negotiators should meet without delay. The secretary again signified the disinclination of his sovereign; and the rising hope of peace vanished.

Both houses being officially informed of this correspondence, debates arose on the propriety of rejecting the overtures. Lord Grenville proposed an address of a warlike rather than pacific complexion, and endeavoured to justify it by a review of the proceedings of the French, whose systematic iniquity, profligate violations of public faith, and persistence in the same spirit which had originally roused the hostility of the chief powers of Europe, still called, in his opinion, for determined opposition. A negotiation was earnestly recommended by the duke of Bedford and lord Holland, and faintly supported by the indecision of lord Romney: but the house, in the proportion of above fifteen to one (the numbers being 92 and 6), voted for the address.-Mr. Dundas, in the other senatorial assembly, moved for an address of the same complexion, and contended for the necessity of continuing the war. One argument, he thought, would be sufficient to prove that point. That decree which encouraged the excitation of insurrections in other states, for the subversion of the existing governments, had not ceased, from the time of its promulgation to the present day, to influence the conduct of the French. With such a people, no pacification could be secure. The pretended revocation of the decree had not been regarded; the nefarious spirit which dictated the order still prevailed.

Mr. Pitt, in a long speech, attempted to prove that Great-Britain, instead of provoking the war, had been forced into it. As Mr. Erskine had attributed the rupture with this nation to the refusal of acknowleging the

new powers of Chauvelin, and to his dismissal, which precluded all negotiation, the premier replied, that opportunities had been given for discussing every disputed point as fully as if a regular and accredited French minister had been resident in England; that the grounds of complaint which existed at the beginning, or arose in the course of this discussion, were such as would have justified, twenty times over, a declaration of war on the part of this country; that all the explanations given by the envoy were unsatisfactory and inadmissible; that the ultimatum breathed a spirit of defiance; that the offer of fraternity was an impudent attempt to propagate sedition and rebellion; that a subsequent decree (of the 15th of December, 1792) tended, more obviously, to a subversion of the constitutions of other countries, and amounted to a declaration of war against all thrones and all civilised governments; that a proposal of confining the former edict to the nations then at war with France, was rejected by a great majority of the convention; that the pretended concessions in the dispute respecting the Schelde were evasive and insulting; that the unprovoked seisure of Savoy argued an atrocious spirit of ambition and rapacity; and that the whole conduct of France rendered neutrality dangerous and war necessary. Instead of thinking that Great-Britain had too soon ceased to be neutral, he was now of opinion, that an earlier commencement of the war would have been both expedient and justifiable. The king (he said) had observed a strict neutrality until the battle of Jemappe. Instead of encouraging the courts of Vienna and Berlin to hostilities, his majesty had repeatedly testified a resolution of avoiding all interference in the affairs of France; and, when at length the progress of the republican arms in the Netherlands, and in other parts of Europe, had excited an alarm for the balance of

power, he merely proposed (in answer to an application from the empress of Russia) that the princes and states not then engaged in the war should adjust such terms of accommodation as might prevent the French from encroaching on the rights or disturbing the tranquillity of other governments and nations. It was only on the eventual failure of such an appeal to the domineering republic, that hostilities were stated to be expedient for the general security.

The minister then traced the history of revolutionary enormities, to demonstrate the folly of depending on the honor or the moderation of the enemy. "You cannot (he said) look at the map of Europe, and lay your hand upon that country against which France has not either declared an open and aggressive war, or violated some positive treaty, or broken some recognised principle of the law of nations." He began with the mention of the seisure of Avignon, and proceeded, through a series of acts of injustice, violence, and perfidy, to the æra of that revolution which placed Bonapartè at the head of the state. If a treaty had been concluded with the French during any part of that period, he was convinced that they would not have long observed it, and that, even while they did not openly violate the terms, they would have systematically deviated from its spirit, either by a dissemination of their pestilent doctrines, or by other modes of unjustifiable encroachment. It had been affirmed, that, as Bonapartè might wish to consolidate his power, and repair at leisure the mischiefs which the war had entailed on the French, we might depend on his adherence to a treaty. But Mr. Pitt contended, that, under all the circumstances of the personal character and newly-acquired power of the first consul, he had no other security than the sword for the continuance of that power; that he must be at once detested by the

admirers of a republic and by royalists, and an object of jealousy and alarm to furious Jacobins; that, to avoid the effects of such odium, he could only rely on his army; that, if his troops should be confined within France, and restrained from military enterprise, his laurels might wither, his influence over the soldiery might decline, and he might find it extremely difficult to maintain, at his devotion, a force sufficiently numerous to support his power. The new government being a stratocracy, and its chief being inspired with a restless ambition, and known to be faithless, inhuman, and impious, what prospect of security could a treaty with him afford?—or, even if he should be inclined to regard its stipulations for a time, what dependence could be placed on the stability of his usurpation? Military despotism did not usually remain long in the hands of the same individual; nor was it generally, in any hands, a permanent government.

For these and other reasons, Mr. Pitt, whose speech strongly excited the public attention, recommended a spirited prosecution of the war, until security should be obtained against the greatest danger that had ever yet threatened the world.

Mr. Fox harangued the house with equal spirit and a greater degree of wisdom, but with less influence and efficacy. On the question of aggression he ventured to differ from the minister. He did not accuse the king of having concurred with the Austrian and Prussian courts in those engagements (at Mantua and at Pilnitz) which threatened the French with an armed interference, and which were obviously unjust and aggressive: but he maintained, that the conduct of the ministry, in the year 1792, was very far from indicating a desire of peace. Chauvelin wished to treat: he endevoured to explain offensive circumstances, and remove all grounds