of complaint; he requested an explicit statement of every point calculated to promote peace. The mode adopted, in communicating with Russia, ought to have been followed with regard to France. "If (said the orator) the diplomatic paper transmitted to Petersburg had been sent to Paris; if you had unequivocally told the French what were the causes of your displeasure, what you expected from them, and what you should think it necessary to do for your own security, in case of their refusing to give you the satisfaction required, you would have acted with fairness and propriety; and they could not have been justified in fixing upon you the charge of aggression. But no notice was given to France; no opportunities of negotiation were afforded; and M. Chauvelin was dismissed in a way which constituted an absolute declaration of war."-When he thus vindicated the French from the ministerial charge, he did not pretend to justify their general proceedings, either internal or external. Their conduct, he said, was as bad and as execrable as the human heart could conceive. It was not to be expected that the revolutionary rulers of a nation which had been so long under the sway of the Bourbon race could avoid imbibing the restless ambition, the perfidy, the falsehood, of the old cabinet. It was said, that they had daringly invaded the rights, and seised the possessions, of other communities. Did not Louis the Fourteenth pursue that unjustifiable course? Yet the powers of Europe did not refuse to treat with that despot, or insist on his restitution of the whole of his unjust acquisitions. The modern French had seised Savoy on Bourbon principles-on account of the convenances morales et physiques: but this was no reason for declining a negotiation. If the acts of the revolutionists merited severe censure, so did the iniquities of the oppressors of Poland: yet we had

formed alliances with these powers, in a war which was blasphemously called a war of religion. To treat with such a man as Bonapartè, said the friends of the war, would be a disgrace and a profanation: yet the same individuals exulted in the aid of Russian and Turkish barbarians, and panegyrised the pious zeal of Souvoroff, the deliberate perpetrator of the most flagitious inhumanities. Were such confederates and assistants the proper instruments for the restoration of social order? The idea was an insult to the common sense of man. kind.

In speaking of the negotiation of 1797, he satirised the servility of the house. If ministers, instead of rejecting the late proposal of peace, had agreed to treat, as in that year, would not the majority (he asked) have applauded such an acquiescence in the wishes of the people? Yet now, when the answer was hostile, the same members were ready to support it. Such was the influence of the crown! such was the blind confidence Teposed in the cabinet! "I then (said he) mentioned the general wish for peace; but it was affirmed that I did not speak the sense of the people. It is now acknowledged that I did, and I speak it now when I say that you ought equally to treat at this time.-The minister, it seems, then consented to negotiate, not because he was desirous of peace, but because he wished to convince the people of the expediency of a more vigorous system of finance, which could only prosper by their unanimity. As he then gained his point, he no longer thinks it necessary to pretend to negotiate.”

The premier, he thought, did not show his consistency by inveighing against military despotism, at a time when, by his advice, martial law was established in Ireland, and when the terrors with which government had thus armed itself were employed in recommending an incor

porative union to the free unbiassed sense of the nation. No advocate of freedom could approve such a mode of administration: but a cabinet that suffered it to take place ought not to be so violently indignant at the similar conduct of another government.-It had also been urged, that the military tenure on which Bonaparte's power rested, would render the return of peace adverse to the continuance of his sway, and, therefore, that it was not his interest to observe any treaty which he might conclude. But it ought to be recollected, that a despotism supported by an army had subsisted in the Roman empire, in peace as well as in war; and that it even remained for a long period in the same hands. To him it appeared to be the interest of the first consul to make peace. He must be aware of the risque of defeat, which would tarnish the splendor of his former achievements. He might apprehend that the incapacity or misconduct of his generals, as he would be less at leisure to act personally in the field, might endanger his power; and he might be induced to think, that, by procuring for France the respite which she desired, he might ob tain more real and durable glory than he could derive from the proudest triumphs consequent on martial exploits.

As Mr. Dundas had expressed a wish that no example might be permitted to exist of a republic established as that of France had been, he might perhaps, said Mr. Fox, be hostile to the continuance of the American state: but the colonial revolution ought not to be stig matised as a bad example. The Americans, he added, did not desire to rush into hostilities with France, or refuse to negotiate. They would not make war for absurd theories; and such forbearance evinced their wisdom. They would only take arms if they should be forced into a war by continued provocations.

It was admitted that peace might be made with the republic: yet it was evident that the ministry prolonged the war in the hope of restoring the Bourbon line. This was a mad scheme, which did not promise or deserve to be successful. Elevated with some recent instances of good fortune, the court seemed to think that the French would speedily be subdued, without considering how soon a calamitous reverse might take place. In referring to the miseries of war, he could not avoid reprobating the atrocities committed on the rescue of Naples from the French yoke. The friends of social order had violated their engagements with those whom they sneeringly called the patriots, and had disgraced their cause by horrible barbarities. When were these enormities, the offspring of the most degrading passions, to cease? Not before the Bourbons should be restored-or, if the prospect of that event should be very distant, not before we should ascertain the character of an individual, or adjust the probable stability of his power!

The address was approved by a plurality of 201 suffrages; and the court had also an ample majority when the ministry proposed, in each house, that the king should be empowered to carry into effect the subsidiary engagements which he was concerting with the elector of Bavaria and other princes. For two months, a hundred and twenty thousand seamen were voted, and ninety thousand soldiers, exclusive of subsidiaries; but for the rest of the year, ten thousand were taken off from each number. The supplies nearly amounted to forty-seven millions and a half.

While the commons thus manifested their liberality, and bore testimony to the opulence of the nation, the poor suffered severely from the difficulty of procuring bread, as an unproductive harvest had greatly advanced the price of corn. The higher and middling classes

were advised to be œconomical in the use of bread, and to introduce various substitutes for it; but the evil still continued. The ministerialists would not allow that the price of corn was enhanced by the war; but it was obvious that the farmers, feeling the weight of the tax upon income, confessedly a war-tax, could not afford to sell the article at a low rate. Mr. Pitt did not think that the farmers had sufficient reason to complain; for, in endeavouring to obtain a greater revenue than the tax had already produced, he compelled that class of men, by a new act, to contribute more largely.

A motion against continuing the war for the restoration of monarchy in France-one for the dismissal of the ministers and two for an inquiry into the causes of the failure of the expedition to Holland, and into the general state of the nation,-served to exercise the talents of both parties, and to prove the inefficacy of argument, compared with the force of number.

Among other parliamentary topics, the affairs of the India company were repeatedly discussed. Mr. Dundas, having investigated the state of its finances, detailed the subject to the commons. He calculated the revenues of the three presidencies, for the year ending at Lady-Day, 1798, at eight millions, and the charges at less than seven millions and a half. Allowing for the interest of debts, he stated the deficiency of territorial revenue at 194,000 pounds; and, deducting this sum from the receipts in India on the sale of imported goods, he mentioned 388,000 pounds as the whole sum ascertained to be applicable to commercial purposes, although the advances for the latter object nearly amounted to two millions and a half. In the succeeding year, the financial view was rather more favorable. In those two years, he said, the debts had increased so as to approach nine millions; and the assets in India had decreased,