religious morality, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" is only a derivative injunction. Only under Principle—that is, never forgetting the universal relationships of social justice-mayest thou love thy neighbour as thyself. The double commandment "Thou shalt love Goodness as thy God and thy neighbour as thyself" constitutes one perfect whole. On it hangs the entire sanity of politics and history. The second part, though derived, is in substance the same as the first. Love to one's neighbour refines by individualising the love of righteousness, and the love of righteousness steadies, dignifies and preserves neighbour-love.

An analysis of ethical experience and an independent interpretation of the Ten Commandments in the light of social and psychological principles, while preserving to us the distinction made by Christ between the first four and the last six of the Ten Commandments, yet expose to view a homogeneity of character throughout the whole of the Decalogue which was altogether obscured under the supernaturalistic interpretation. According to that, the first four commandments inculcate the worship of an intelligent Maker and Governor of the universe; then, beginning with the fifth commandment, the point of view is shifted to another plane. The commandments suddenly become purely social and humanistic, historical and moral. It is hard to see why, all at once, the intelligent and infinite Creator of the universe, after exacting homage to himself, should become equally concerned that children should honour their parents, and that no one should steal, murder, covet, and the like. But if it is nothing other than the ideal will of the community itself which is the "I" speaking and the "me" to whom homage is exacted in the first four commandments, nothing could be more perfectly of one

piece than the Ten Commandments are, despite the difference between the first four and the last six Words. The Decalogue is now seen to possess from beginning to end a psychological, a political and a religious—not to mention a literary—unity.

The harmony and proportion, the symmetry and consistency of meaning thus brought to view, are too nearly perfect to have originated in a fanciful and arbitrary interpretation. An interpretation must commend itself to us which discloses such interdependence and naturalness of meaning. It is impossible to escape the belief that the higher will of the community was not only the power actually guiding the judgment of the Jewish statesmen, but was also the reality which they worshipped as the Lord their God. No explanation, if it were not true, could reveal such mutual support of parts in any document. On this ground we are justified in maintaining that the being of whom the first four commandments enjoin the worship is none other than Wisdom and Goodness. But whether they were the God of the ancient Jews or not is of no primary significance; the question for us is: Shall we make Wisdom and Goodness our God? If we do, we as a nation are face to face with the same problem which confronted the writers of Deuteronomy. Shall we promulgate to the people of the land that they shall love wisdom and goodness with all their heart and with all their soul and with all their might? And shall we not, moreover, proceed to subdivide this general commandment as the exigencies of our day require ?

1. Shall the Ten Commandments of the future-if we are to retain such a summary of morality and religionbegin with the statement "I am the Lord thy God: thou shalt have none other gods before me"?

This statement is not self-illuminating as to the identity of the "I" who is represented as issuing the commandment. Although we waive for the moment who or what it is that speaks, the commandment still says something very definite. It says that the power speaking is the Lord God of the person spoken to. This can mean nothing else than that the power speaking is the source of the supreme blessings of life to each person addressed, and, on grounds of national expediency, should receive steadfast obedience and reverence. The sentence "I am the Lord thy God" might be paraphrased into "I am the being by obeying and reverencing whom thou shalt receive the highest benefits." As there probably would be no dispute as to this interpretation, we may turn to note that it would have been perfectly possible for the framers of the commandment to have introduced a clause in apposition with the first personal pronoun, which would for ever have put beyond all question who the person was that issued the command. If, for instance, the author of the Decalogue meant to represent the moral and intelligent Governor of the universe as speaking, it would have been no sacrifice of aphoristic brevity to have introduced words to that effect. The first clause might have stood, "I, the intelligent and moral Governor of the universe, am the Lord thy God," or "I, the infinite personal Creator of the universe, am the Lord thy God," or "I, the infinite supernatural agency who created the world out of nothing, am the Lord thy God." Unfortunately, or fortunately, no such specification to point unequivocally to the being designated by the word "God" appears in the Ten Commandments, or anywhere else throughout the Old or New Testament. We are left to our own resources to discover what factor in experience the word God indicates. The writers of the Bible somehow assumed

that readers would know what reality was meant. But such has been far from the case.

Scholars are more and more coming to the conclusion, however, that there is no adequate justification for the notion that the Jews meant by the word "God" an infinite Creator of the universe, or a moral and intelligent Governor of all things. More and more they are coming to recognise that the word points to the Ideal of Social Justice as the constructive principle of human society, and therefore as a living, creative reality within verifiable experience.

Those whose study of the Bible has led them to this conclusion-if to them the question were submitted as to what clause in apposition with the first personal pronoun should be introduced in this commandment— might urge that it should read, " I, the Principle of Social Justice, am the Lord thy God." Of course, the exact wording is not the point for which I am contending. The clause might read, "I, the Social Conscience,” or “I, the Moral Ideal," or "I, the Good in Man," or "I, the Cause of the Good in the world, am the Lord thy God."

It may be well also to observe that the form of commandment might still be retained although the being called God were not represented as speaking in the first person. God might be referred to or spoken about. Thus, instead of saying "I am the Lord thy God," it would have been possible to introduce the commandments by saying, "The personal Creator of the universe is the Lord thy God thou shalt have none other gods before him." The remaining nine commandments might have been cast in similar fashion. Indeed, it would be possible for any nation to-day formulating new commandments or re-casting old ones to give them this shape.

Those who did not believe that the world was created out of nothing by a supernatural personal agency would

naturally protest against the formula, "The personal Creator of the world is the Lord thy God." Those who believed as Matthew Arnold did would say something to this effect: "The Ideal of Social Justice as the formative principle of human society is the Lord thy God thou shalt have none other gods before it." And all the rest of the commandments could be so re-shaped that some such phrase as the Moral Ideal, or the Good in the world, or Duty, or the Moral Law, or the Vision of the Perfect City, could be introduced at various points in such a way as to put beyond all doubt what was meant by "the Lord thy God."

If, however, the being who is set up as a God is not to be represented as speaking in the first person, a difficulty arises which is not merely verbal. For who, then, is it that issues the commandment "Thou shalt have none other gods before the Ideal of Social Justice"? The power or person who issues the command must be the supreme and final authority, the sovereign whose sanction is the chief credential to the dignity and efficacy of the commandment. Who, then, is it who presumes to order me to worship the Moral Ideal as my God? If it be something else or somebody else than the Moral Ideal itself, there is a divided authority. The person issuing the commandment either sets himself above the God whose worship he commands, or else he speaks only in the name of the God. We may set aside as morally impossible that he should elevate himself as an authority superior to the God which he commands to be worshipped. There only remains, then, that the power issuing the commandment speaks on behalf of and in the name of the God who commands. If this be so, it is then after all the God who speaks, and the first person would be the only appropriate form of expression. The command