the agricultural class, took a deep interest in the Land question. Forty years ago, Ulster was distracted by Tommy Downshire,' who was the 'Captain Rock' of his day, and carried his flag of orange and green over the counties of Down, Antrim, and Armagh, demanding for Protestants and Catholics alike-half rent and no tithe.' The Orange magistrates, who were then mostly landlords or agents, were very anxious to use the yeomanry against them; but they could not trust them to act against Tommy,' for they were Orangemen to a man, on account of their common sympathies as tillers of the soil. But in 1835, when an attempt was made to obtain for the Ulster tenant- farmers compensation for their unexhausted improvements, the Orangemen held aloof from the agitation; and again, within the last two years, when the Duke of Abercorn had the assurance to tell the Orangemen of Belfast that the demand for security of tenure was dictated by an Ultramontane spirit,' the leaders of the Society actually succeeded in keeping their followers apart from the agitation, saying to them in effect Better sacrifice your Ulster custom than restore it to its ancient force, if you are compelled to extend its benefits to those who have assisted to deprive you of the privilege of insulting them with impunity. But the absence of a patriotic spiritthough a great evil in itself-might be compensated, in some measure, by a loyal and peaceful behaviour in all civil relationships. It was a rule of the Orange Society in 1814: 'We will not persecute, injure, or upbraid any person on account of his religions opinions, provided the same be not hostile to the State; but this provisional clause kept the way clear for every contrivance in the way of songs, party-tunes, processions, and emblems, to insult and irritate their Catholic neighbours, and it wrote its own history

in endless outrages, murders, burnings, and riots. An Ulster magistrate declared, in 1835, before the Committee of the House of Commons, that there had scarcely been a 12th of July, to the best of his recollection, in any year, from the commencement of Orangeism till the present period, when a breach of the peace had not occurred; and frequently lives had been lost as a consequence of these processions.' The Earl of Caledon testified, at the same time, that so far from assisting to execute the laws, the Orangemen in County Tyrone were the very people who were the most active in infringing the laws.' Recent events tell the same story. Unhappily, too, the system tends greatly to the injury of morality. Lord Gosford testified, in 1835, that the Orange Lodges led to idleness and dissipation, as they usually met in public-houses; and it is very well known that during the last thirty years they have largely demoralised the humbler classes of the Protestant population. The evil effects of the system on the administration of justice have almost-though not altogether

passed away, through the vigor ous determination of successive Governments to weed out Orangemen from the magisterial bench. The conduct of the Whig Government, in 1849, in superseding Lord Roden and the brothers Beers in the Commission of the Peace, and in multiplying the number of stipendiary magistrates, has had the best moral effect upon the country at large; for, in former times, the Orange system paralysed the action of the law, not only by the open resistance of its partisans, but by the tone of feeling it encouraged, that Orangemen were never to be punished. No confidence can ever be placed in the tribunals of a country where fairness and impartiality are not displayed in the selection of its judges and magis

trates; for the partisan system vitiates and contaminates everything, but above all the judicial character. We have already alluded to the existence of a Democratic party in the bosom of the Orange Society, which first made its power felt at the last election for Belfast, when Mr. William Johnston, the great Orange hero, was returned for that flourishing town, in the teeth of the old Orange faction. The change that has thus taken place in the tone and policy of the working classes is a significant proof that new relations may be formed in the future that will deeply influence the peace and prosperity of the country. The Orange Brotherhood has hitherto been a strong and daring bodyguard of the landlords and clergy, specially serviceable at election times in repressing all popular and liberal tendencies, and never hesitating to do the meanest offices in the service of political despotism and landlord tyranny. But the last election saw the Orangeman and the Catholic marching arm in arm to the poll to vote for each other's candidates; and though the Grand Orange Lodge, true to its old instincts and traditions, was not afraid to banish from its ranks Mr. Marriott Dalway, M.P. for Carrickfergus, for proposing Sir Shafto Adair, a Liberal and Episcopalian, for the representation of County Antrim, it was afraid to touch the Orange working men of Belfast, who had voted for the Liberal candidate there, because the fact had become apparent that Mr. Johnston himself must be involved in the proceeding, to the possible overthrow of the whole Orange Institution. This new party believes in the doctrine of equal political rights, and took a noble and independent stand on the Land question, to the great indignation and disgust of the landlords. Undoubtedly the independent Orangemen may fairly regard themselves as representing the enlightened policy of William III.;

and we are happy to know that, believing as they do that the day of invidious distinctions is really gone, they are disposed to trust to their own natural weight and influence for a fair share of public honour and patronage, and will steadfastly ally themselves with all true friends of liberty against Ultramontanism and every other tendency of opinion that threatens to obstruct the progress and prosperity of the nation.

In drawing these observations to a close, we cannot but remark that the higher classes of Ireland are mainly responsible for the continuance of the Orange Institution. It was the gentry who revived it in 1828, when it had been dead for three years. It was Lord Roden and his class who revived it in 1845, after it had been extinct for about ten years; and it is always the gentry who hound on the lower classes for their own political purposes, though usually they are very careful to keep themselves in the background. And, instead of using their powerful influence to quell the spirit they have evoked, with its long train of evil consequences, they usually call upon the Government to pass more repressive laws, and to lay restrictions upon party demonstrations which they have themselves sedulously fostered or wantonly provoked. It was the present Lord Londonderry, a son-in-law of Lord Roden, and a Tory, who urged the Government of the day to pass that Party Processions Act under which the Orangemen are chafing at the present hour. It was during the viceroyalty of the Duke of Abercorn that Mr. William Johnston, M.P. for Belfast, was prosecuted for a breach of the same Act, and imprisoned for two months in Downpatrick gaol; yet the same noble lord is not above making political capital out of the distractions of his country a year after, when he harangued the Orangemen of Belfast, denouncing the present Government for the social disorders of the

country, but not uttering a word in denunciation of Fenianism, or expressing a word of rebuke against the aggressive bigotry of Orangemen. It would have been a far more patriotic course to strive to dissolve religious animosities, which threaten -at least at present-to burn hotter than ever, and to bring together men of all sects to labour with a common understanding for the good of a divided land. We should like to know what good the 'No Popery' cry has ever done from the days of Lord George Gordon downwards, and especially what triumphs have been made under its banner to the interests of true religion.

These Orange demonstrations, regarded from another point of view, are not an altogether unmixed evil. They warn all Governments alike of the danger of attempting to play into the hands of the Ultramontane hierarchy; for there is a deep and formidable Protestant feeling behind them which our statesmen would do well not to provoke. The object of the Roman Catholic bishops is at present to obtain such a modification of the system of Irish education, both primary and collegiate, as will hand over the whole Catholic population to an exclusively clerical or denominational training; or, to use the language of Mr. James Lowry Whittle, who protests warmly against any tendency to make Ultramontanism the principle of State dealing with education-To take the Catholic body, and ere it has half shaken off the misery, the ignorance, the prejudices, the suspicions of bygone ages, to hand it over bodily to the emissaries of Italian fanaticism, would be wilfully to defer the resurrection of the country, and, as regards the empire

at large, to strengthen a system pregnant with disorder and mischief to our social organisation.' The danger hinted at is immensely increased by the attitude taken by the Episcopalian members of the Royal Commission on Primary Education, for they are completely in accord with the Catholic members in recommending such a modification of the existing system as the Ultramontanes desire. If Mr. Gladstone is indisposed to tamper with the broad principle of religious equality and justice which he avows, he will shrink as much from Catholic as from Protestant ascendency. He will decline to retrace his steps by the proposal of any plan of disguised concurrent endowment. He knows Ireland well enough to understand, that the policy of equal justice, without bribery or favouritism, will in the end disarm disaffection and extinguish religious bitterness; but to seek still to govern Ireland through the clergy of either denomination will bring down upon the Government a Protestant agitation of which the Orange demonstrations are but a feeble precursor. We trust that the time will soon come when Orangemen will see the wisdom of withdrawing from organisations so anti-social and sectarian; for they are in conflict with the claims of good citizenship and good fellowship, and are capable, by their secresy, of being perverted to the worst political ends; and that they will soon learn that the charity that ought to govern all human relations is no respecter of persons, and is not limited or circumscribed by obedience to the rules or conformity to the views of any political sect.

AN ULSTER PROTESTANT.

IN

our last article (November 1870) we accompanied the German 3rd and 4th Armies to the walls of Paris, leaving the 1st and 2nd still engaged in the blockade of Metz. After the catastrophe of Sedan the French possessed no organised field force whatever, with the exception of the two corps d'armée under Generals Vinoy and Ducrot which were shut up in Paris, and therefore the German force investing the capital had little to fear from without, being protected by a cordon of four strong cavalry divisions from any sudden attack that might be attempted against its

rear.

There has been much speculation as to the causes which delayed the active prosecution of the siege from September 19 or 20, when the capital was invested, till December 27 when the first great gun was fired against it; and many very erroneous conclusions have been drawn from this apparent hesitation on the part of the German leaders, which has been frequently interpreted into a consciousness of weakness. Now, however, that accomplished facts enable us to form a more correct judgment, we can scarcely withhold our admiration of the great skill, wonderful patience, and remarkable foresight with which the most difficult and complicated military-political problem that has perhaps ever abruptly presented itself has been dealt with. Up to the end of August 1870, no German statesman or military chief could have seriously contemplated the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine as a probable consequence of the campaign then just commenced, nor up to September 2 that three days' fighting in the neighbourhood of Sedan would leave France without government sufficiently strong to negotiate for peace, or able to do

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anything else than proclaim a war à outrance. The whole course of subsequent events was, however, in reality governed by these two wholly unexpected complications; and whilst Count Bismark acquired the conviction that the unification of Germany would eventually depend on the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, the members of the Government of National Defence and the leaders of all political parties in France saw in the guerre à outrance the best and only chance of retaining or conquering an ascendency for themselves, and they therefore all joined hands to carry it out.

These two political programmes when handed over to the respective military authorities on both sides imposed on them most difficult and arduous tasks: on the French Minister that of organising, out of very imperfect materials, new armies; on the Chief of the German staff, first, that of counteracting by the immediate investment of the French capital the measures of the French Ministry; and, secondly, of securing such a footing in Alsace and Lorraine as would, come what might, ultimately leave these provinces in German hands. It was therefore a question of time on both sides, and if, as we are told, it is our duty to learn lessons from the events of this war, here we have one to begin with; namely, that it takes more time to organise armies and get them ready for field work, even in an essentially military country like France, than to carry out the most difficult operations with an army that is really well constituted led.

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The reader will, however, find n the facts stated above a satisfactory explanation of the subsequen events, and also, as we believe, a tolerably safe guide towards esti

mating the probabilities of what is likely eventually to take place. Of course it will be understood that the possession of some of the fortresses was highly desirable, if not absolutely necessary, for the maintenance of the communications and the bringing up supplies of all kinds from Germany; but if the retention of the provinces so often named had not been determined on very early, many of the fortresses which have been bombarded and taken would have been simply blockaded.

In the Times of January 5 there is a very interesting and important letter from a correspondent, dated Paris, December 30, in which it is said, that if the Prussian army had proceeded at once to the attack of the city after the engagement at Chatillon of September 19 they would have found it unarmed and unable to offer any resistance; and the writer goes on to show how this might have been done. It will be remembered, however, that precisely the same thing has been asserted with regard to Sebastopol, although this has never been more than a matter of opinion; and nothing is more natural than that a person who comes to compare the state of a fortress after months of active preparation with what it had been before these had commenced, should arrive at a similar conclusion, especially if he altogether ignores the political motives of the enemy and their influence on his military plans. The question presents itself therefore-Was it, under the circumstances, desirable for the Germans to take immediate possession of Paris, supposing that to have been possible, and that they were aware of this? Now it will be remembered that, just at that time, conferences took place at Ferrères between M. Jules Favre and Count Bismark, the results of which must have proved very clearly to the latter, that neither the existing

French Government nor any other likely to succeed it for months to come would, or perhaps could, entertain for a moment the idea of ceding Alsace and Lorraine. Supposing, as we have said, that Count Bismark had determined, for political motives, and Count Moltke, for military reasons, that the two provinces must be annexed; and taking the whole political situation of the moment into account, it seems highly probable, or at least possible, that it was better military policy to invest Paris than to run the risks of failure in attacking and trouble in keeping it in order when taken. The balance between the number of troops required to garrison this unruly capital and that actually disposable for the investment might have been absorbed in a premature attack, whether successful or not. If, as we suppose, the securing possession of Alsace and Lorraine appeared to be the primary, and that of Paris only a secondary operation, then it is easy to understand why the Germans might have preferred to remain outside the walls rather than encumber themselves with garrison work, for, be it remembered, Metz was still holding out, and Bazaine had an efficient army under his command within its walls.

It seems reasonable to enquire into the motives which probably led the Chancellor of the North German Confederation and the chief of the staff of the federal armies, to concur in the necessity of making the operations in the east of France primary, and those in the west secondary, at least pro tem. We cannot imagine either the one or the other of these two personages to have been blind to the facts that a forced cession of these provinces would naturally terminate in a perpetual feud between France and Germany, and a renewal of hostilities as soon as the former