opportunity of getting rid of the invasion by making now such sacrifices as will in the end have to be made. We fully appreciate the anxieties of those who look forward with something like dismay to the prospect of France being weakened and losing her prestige as one of the great Powers, although we cannot help suspecting that this sympathy is by no means disinterested; for its expression is very frequently intermingled with sentimentalities about the disasters that have befallen England's best and truest ally. Let us join issue on this point. We are quite ready to admit that the Emperor Napoleon proved himself on several occasions attached to an English alliance; but can any competent authority venture to assert that if he had been successful in this present war he would not have been equally ready to attack us, if the same party machinations that drove him into an unequal contest with Germany for the military hegemony of Europe had made the completion of it, by the humiliation of perfide Albion,' the condition of the continuance of his rule and dynasty? 'L'appetit vient en mangeant,' and the overthrow of one of the victors of Waterloo would have proved a strong inducement to undertake the chastisement of the other. The British Ministry seems to have contemplated such a contingency, for Lord Elcho, in one of his recent letters to the Times, seems to say that the result of the battle of Wörth put a stop to preparations that had been made for arming our new fortifications with ship guns; and our Foreign Office was probably quite as well informed on these matters as those who talked so loudly of the Emperor's friendship and deplored his fall bitterly. The simple truth is that the instability of French insti SO tutions renders a French alliance a very precarious one, and the passionate longing of the French nation for supremacy deteriorates seriously from the value of its friendship; it cannot easily brook a rival by sea or by land. If England has lost something by the fact of France being weakened, her wisest course will be to establish the balance by adding to her own strength what is wanting, and while there is yet time to do so. France has lost her prestige whether she cede the two eastern provinces or not; her institutions have broken down most thoroughly; her whole social system is disorganised, which is the greatest loss a country can sustain. To return to the military operations. On January 7, General Chanzy once more commenced a great movement for the relief of Paris, advancing through the forest of Vendôme with, as far as we can ascertain, three corps d'armée (the 15th, 16th, and 17th) whose numerical strength was, as usual, much exaggerated by the French Government before operations commenced; we shall probably soon hear a very different story. As to the quality of this force, there can be no doubt: the great majority of the men were perfectly untrained recruits unfit for field service, mixed up with the débris of the regular army; even the disciplinary companies from Algeria contributed their quota; as to the officers in command, they were equally unfit, or at least inadequate, for the work. Prince Frederick Charles brought his whole army (three corps d'armée, III, IX., X.) up to the line of the Loir (not Loire) to oppose this movement, whilst the Duke of Mecklenburg with the XIII. corps (a temporary formation) advanced from Chartres towards the north of Le Mans. The German movement was concentric; the French attempted to act in several divergent directions, that is to say, excentrically. We have here a pendant to the battle of Solferino, with this difference, that that was decided in one day, whereas it took several to effect Chanzy's defeat a defeat, however, more complete and more disastrous for the French cause than was even Solferino for the Austrians. A series of actions on January 8 and following days culminated on the 10th in Chanzy's army being driven back on his fortified positions at Le Mans by the Red Prince, whilst the Duke of Mecklenburg advancing to the north-west of the town, a general attack ensued and 18,000 unwounded prisoners were taken, several guns and mitrailleuses being captured, together with large stores and railway rolling stock in Le Mans, which was occupied by the Germans on the 12th. The question will at once occur, How came Prince Frederick Charles to be able to employ his whole army against Chanzy? Because Bourbaki with the 18th and 20th corps had been sent off to the east to join Cremer and Garibaldi in an attempt to raise the siege of Belfort, an attempt which, after several days' hard fighting, has also proved entirely unsuccessful. The Prince had therefore nothing to fear from the south-east and could turn his whole attention to the west. The German commanders occupy an internal circle, which enables them to concentrate their forces rapidly whenever an attack is threatened, and they are always kept perfectly informed of what the enemy is about through their intelligent and admirably led cavalry. In the whole of this difficult operation of Chanzy's we have additional evidence of what we have already stated respecting the memorable chain of events by which France has been reduced to her present lamentable condition. The [February capture, which cannot be long delayed, of Belfort by the Ger mans will secure undisputed possession of Alsace to them the just as Metz secures that of Lorraine. We have had too much experience of the system of selfdeception practised by the French to attach any great consequence to their plans of interrupting the communications with Germany by means of General Bourbaki's operations in the valley of the Doubs or the Garibaldian expedition in the Côte d'Or. It must be remembered that, since the fall of Mézières, and with Laon, La Fère, Ham, Peronne, and Amiens in their hands, the Germans in any case have a perfectly independent line of railway communication in the north, and quite beyond the reach of the Garibaldians, who, whatever they may be able to effect in the Côte d'Or or on the Plateau of Langres, are quite unfit to cope with the Gerother reason, from want of cavalry mans in the flat country, if for no and artillery. Taking a careful retrospect of the whole state of affairs we can come to no other conclusion than this: France cannot hope to retrieve all her defeats and her immense losses. She never has been allowed the time to make effectual preparations. The getting together masses of untrained soldiers under the command of inefficient officers, and hurling them at an army like that of Germany, is a simple waste of the most valuable material a country possesses-the lives of its adult males; and this becomes criminal when it is done against the will of the victims who are thus sacrificed. That it is so done is abundantly evidenced by the immense numbers of unwounded prisoners taken in every engagement. The surrender of unwounded prieuphuistic form of expression for soners in such numbers is merely a 'desertion en masse.' When 8,000 unwounded prisoners were made by the French at Magenta in 1859 it was well understood that the Italian, and part at least of the Hungarian infantry, could no longer be depended on by the Austrians, and the retreat behind the Mincio was, in the first instance, attributable to this very circumstance. Again, in 1866 the Prussians took vast numbers of unwounded prisoners, nearly all Hungarians, and this led the Austrian Government not only to listen to the first overtures for peace but eventually to grant nearly everything that Hungary demanded. This is the reason why the Prussian accounts always lay such stress on the numbers of unwounded prisoners taken. The political signification of such events is fully understood at Prussian headquarters. Can any sane person doubt that if a regularly constituted government existed in France peace would be made at once? It would, in that case, have been made two months ago, on better terms than at present. It might be made on infinitely better terms now than will be possible in February or March 1871. The contest is now being carried on, as we have already said, to establish forcibly a form of government in France to which it is more than doubtful that the majority of the French people are inclined. The violent but unsuccessful sorties of the garrison of Paris on the night of the 13th-14th January, were followed up the next day by a partial bombardment of the city. The forts of Issy, Vanvres, and Montrouge ceased their fire on the latter named day. Another great sortie was made on the 19th by a large force from the entrenched camp under the walls of Mont Valerien, an event we had already anticipated. This was directed against Malmaison, Montretout, which was surprised, and St. Cloud, but ultimately failed. A renewal of the effort was expected by the Prussians on the 20th, but did not take place, although the French force had not retired into the city but still remained on the plateau of Valerien on that day. Should another attempt to break through the iron circle be made, we do not anticipate its being successful, for Prussian batteries have been now constructed within 800 paces of Fort Issy, and on the heights facing Valerien only 4,000 to 5,000 paces from that fortress, and the bombardment of St. Denis and the north side of Paris has been commenced with the siege artillery that bombarded Mézières. Faidherbe, too, has suffered another decisive repulse from Goeben at St. Quentin on the 20th; there is a great probability of his being ultimately driven up into the corner of French Flanders, and the Belgian troops are once more on the frontier. The chances of relief are now fewer and more remote than ever, and what between famine and this new bombardment the power of internal resistance is daily waning away. On the other hand, Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire have established between them something more than a mere modus vivendi; in fact, something which, so far as the outer world can see, resembles much more the commencement of a permanent understanding; and this was to be expected, for Austrian interests, especially on the Danube, are to a great extent German interests. It is, therefore, a fact of no small importance, if true, that the Court of Vienna is taking preparatory steps with a view to mediation between France and Germany,' and we can scarcely imagine that this step will be taken solely in the interests of MM. Gambetta and Garibaldi. The first step in mediation. which would be of real advantage to France at this conjuncture would be such a one as would procure the French people an opportunity of deciding its own destinies, through the agency of some regularly constituted representative body, such as might have been constructed out of the Councils of the Departments which the delegate Government at Bordeaux has thought fit to suppress. If such an assembly should decide on continuing the war à outrance, and at the same time on establishing a republic, outsiders like ourselves would, however they might dissent from the wisdom of such a decision, be compelled to accept it, and the situation would at least become much simpler. At the moment we write, on the evening of the 26th of January, the air is full of rumours. M. Jules Favre has been at Versailles and has discussed terms of capitulation, some say terms of peace. He was expected in London, but is said to have returned to Paris. It is certain that Paris must yield, and it will be well if her submission be not preceded by a blind and useless volcanic outburst of mob frenzy. It is also as certain as anything future can be, that France must yield, and the longer she defers it the greater will be her exhaustion. Since wars began there never was a contest more hopeless than hers now is. The hints of a possible restoration of the 'Imperial' dynasty are evidence of the chaotic state of her affairs. Restored it might be, as a temporary puppet, but nothing could retain it in power. Let France call a truce, collect her best advisers, make peace and set about establishing a national Government. These are the necessary first steps towards her recovery. FRASER'S MAGAZINE. MARCH 1871. IT THE LAST INSTALMENT OF IRISH POLICY. T has been often pointed out that the peculiar defect of British policy applied to Ireland has been its want of reserve force. Many projects for the union of these island realms have been formed from time to time; most of those of which we speak characterised by largeness of view and vigour of conception. An energetic lorddeputy or an able Irish secretary was supported for a year or two years, and all went well; then came a break. English politicians became involved in Continental intrigues or distracted by home conflicts, or Parliament grudged the supplies for Irish government, or the Crown appropriated them to other objects, and the half-developed scheme was allowed to decay away, leaving not a trace except the anger of the people enkindled at each new attempt to give them a government. There is too much reason to fear that this evil destiny of British statesmanship applied to Ireland may overtake also those efforts which the English people have made within the last few years to come to a good understanding with their Irish fellow-subjects. It is acknowledged on all hands that further legislation is required as to the systems of education at present existing in Ireland, and Irish education was the work specially appointed for the coming session. Is there any hope that the English people will be able or willing to VOL. III.-NO. XV. NEW SERIES. pursue this work as they did that of the last two years, grasping all its details, and discussing laboriously all the solutions offered ? A combination of circumstances, partly arising from the condition of Ireland, partly from that of one of our great political parties, still more from the ripened condition of English thought upon the relations between the two islands, made Irish policy the question of the last election. Irrespective of ministers or parties, the great fact of the struggle of 1868 was the resolution of the great majority of our people to try a new policy for Ireland, and to spare no efforts to carry it out; and the novelty of this policy consisted not so much in the particular measures proposed as in the resolute effort to ascertain the Irish point of view, not necessarily in order to adopt that point of view, but in order to be able to determine from it what were the real wants of Ireland in contradistinction to her demands. Henceforth Parliament was not to farm out Irish government to a local faction or a local class; it was to meet its own responsibilities without any 'makeshift, and by its comprehension of the questions at issue, and its resolute vigour in dealing with them, to bring itself and the people of England more directly into connection with Ireland. Had Irish education come up for settlement whilst this spirit U21 |