Epistemology and EmotionsRoutledge, 29.04.2016 - 220 Seiten Undoubtedly, emotions sometimes thwart our epistemic endeavours. But do they also contribute to epistemic success? The thesis that emotions 'skew the epistemic landscape', as Peter Goldie puts it in this volume, has long been discussed in epistemology. Recently, however, philosophers have called for a systematic reassessment of the epistemic relevance of emotions. The resulting debate at the interface between epistemology, theory of emotions and cognitive science examines emotions in a wide range of functions. These include motivating inquiry, establishing relevance, as well as providing access to facts, beliefs and non-propositional aspects of knowledge. This volume is the first collection focusing on the claim that we cannot but account for emotions if we are to understand the processes and evaluations related to empirical knowledge. All essays are specifically written for this collection by leading researchers in this relatively new and developing field, bringing together work from backgrounds such as pragmatism and scepticism, cognitive theories of emotions and cognitive science, Cartesian epistemology and virtue epistemology. |
Inhalt
| 1 | |
1 Emotion and Understanding | 33 |
On a Role for
Affective States in Epistemic Evaluation | 51 |
3 Virtues Emotions and Fallibilism | 67 |
4 Conflict Without Contradiction | 83 |
5 Epistemic Immediacy and Reflection | 105 |
6 Critical Reflections on Affective Epistemology | 125 |
7 Misleading Emotions | 149 |
Beliefs Desires and Feelings as Neural Activity | 167 |
9 Epistemic Feelings | 185 |
| 205 | |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
accept Affective Epistemology affective valuations amygdala appropriate argued argument assessment belief formation bounded rationality brain character traits claim clairvoyant cognitive coherence concepts conflict without contradiction conscious dangerous deliberative thinking depends Descartes discussion dispositions Döring doubt Elgin emotional deliverances emotional responses epistemic access epistemic activities epistemic agent epistemic evaluation epistemic feelings epistemic immediacy Epistemic Virtue evidence example explain externalist fact fallibilism fear frame problem function Gigerenzer Goldie heuristics Hookway Hookway’s Hume immediate inference inferential inquiry intellectual virtues involved justification kind mental moral motivate Müller-Lyer illusion neural activity neurons normative object one’s Oxford University Press oxytocin Paul person perspective Philosophy position possible Prinz problem processes propositional attitudes propositional knowledge psychology question rational reason relevant reliable representational content response-dependent properties salience scepticism sense perceptions situation Sousa standards Thagard theories of emotions things truth understanding University of Zürich virtue epistemology virtue ethics Zagzebski