lift our Indian Government from such a slough." He goes on to declare that Sir Charles sought not any active command beyond the Indus, and he assigns reasons for this indifference, which, unless there be some solid and substantial ground for them, an officer of his rank and reputation cannot suggest without a risk of character:-"He was disgusted," the major-general says, "with the shameless system foully pervading all branches of the public service, a system which he, having then no experience of Lord Ellenborough's great qualities, could not hope to see overborne, supported as it was by factious persons of influence in England, and by the Directory."

In August, 1842, he was selected to command the troops in Scinde and Beloochistan, and he seems to have been inspired with better hopes by the explicit instructions received from the Governor-General, and by having entire control given to him over all the political agents and civil officers. The incidents of his entrance into Scinde are related in detail from Sir Charles's own letters, as well as the position in which he found himself in that country, whilst General Nott was isolated at Candahar, Cabul and Ghuzni were in the hands of the Affghans, General England, repulsed, was retreating by the Bolan passes, and the Belooches of Scinde, princes, chiefs, and followers, were alike hostilely inclined. "This critical state of affairs demanded the instant exercise of the general's sagacity and energy, -and he was ready."

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The interview between the Ameers and Sir Charles Napier is described in a picturesque manner. The gorgeous display made by the former contrasted strongly with the simple appearance of the "General Sahib," who had been an object of so much interest : a small, dark-visaged old man, but with a falcon's glance, must have disappointed their expectations, for they knew not then the heroic force of mind which was so soon to invalidate their wild strength and furious courage on the dreadful field of Meeanee.” Aware of their deceitful character, he was proof against the flattering attentions of the Ameers, and "while the flow of their politeness seemed to invite friendship, he frankly and honourably gave them an austere, but timely and useful warning." The warning, however, was fruitless; the Ameers, reduced to the alternative of an honest policy or a terrible war, "chose dishonesty and battle; they tried deceit, and were baffled by a superior intellect." The major-general then proceeds to shew that, "in despite of his relation's earnest wish and indefatigable exertions to preserve peace, the Asiat.Journ.N.S. VOL.IV.No.21.

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war was of the Ameers' own seeking," and that this was no isolated event, but the "tail of the Affghan storm."

A sketch of the relations between British India and Scinde shews the conduct of our Government towards the Ameers in no favourable light. The treaty of April, 1838, obtained "under pretence of a friendly interest in the affairs of Scinde," the major-general characterizes as "the first open encroachment on the independence of the Ameers. It is impossible," he adds, "to mistake or to deny the injustice." And again; And again; "this treaty, by which Lord Auckland placed a loaded shell in the palace of the Ameers, to explode at his pleasure for their destruction, was, abstractedly, an unjust, oppressive action."

The supposed "designs of Russia," which were the incentive to the harsh policy pursued towards Scinde, the major-general treats as a bugbear; the invasion of Hindustan by a Russian army as a chimera. But, on the supposition that the projects of the autocrat were directed against British India, and that its invasion was practicable, he censures the whole policy of Lord Auckland and his advisers, especially the setting up of Shah Shooja, and provoking a collision with Russia in the steppes of Tartary, instead of encountering her on the sea, in Europe. "This conception of the AngloIndian Government," he observes, "applauded and urged on by the Whig Government at home, so nearly allied to madness, was executed with consistent absurdity:" and the author offers a variety of arguments, of the soundness of which military critics must judge, in support of this averment. "For a time, success seemed to attend the unjust aggression,-the brilliant, ill-requited Dennie sustained it by his talents; but when he and the intrepid Sale marched to Jellalabad, error succeeded error, not unaccompanied by crime, with fearful rapidity, until an entire destruction of the invaders closed 'the tragic harliquinade. The system of making smart young men, who could speak Persian, political agents, and supposing them generals and statesmen, failed. England lost an army by the experiment."

The Ameers were meanwhile called upon, under the tripartite treaty, to which they were no parties, to pay a large sum of money, in consideration of the relinquishment by Shah Shooja of his claims to their country, which they did not admit. Other causes of dissatisfaction increased the alienation or hostility of these princes. They were charged with violating commercial treaties, which they were required to respect, whilst we cast them aside. Military measures of coercion were employed; and another treaty, of a sterner cha

racter, was imposed upon the Ameers, under which a subsidiary force entered Scinde, "and the political obligations of its rulers became totally changed."

The original injustice remained in all its deformity, yet, being admitted by treaty, without public protest or stroke in battle, became patent as the rule of policy, and new combinations, involving great national interests, were thus imposed on Lord Auckland's successor, demanding a different measure of right from that which should have governed the Anglo-Indian Government's intercourse previous to these treaties; for, amongst the many evils attendant on national injustice, not the least is the necessity of sustaining the wrong-doer's policy, thus implicating honest men in transactions, the origin of which they cannot approve. Some abstract moralists hold, indeed, that governments stand in the same relation to each other that private persons do in a community; that, as leaders and guides of nations, they should be governed by the same rules of morality as the leaders and guides of families. It would be well for the world were this practicable; but when private persons wrong each other, they have a tribunal to control them and to enforce reparation, or they may voluntarily amend the wrong. Apply this to nations. Their tribunal is war. Every conquest, every treaty, places them on a new basis of intercourse. The first injustice remains a stigma on the government perpetrating it; but for the nation, for succeeding governments, new combinations are presented, which may, and generally do, make it absolute for self-preservation, and therefore justifiable, not only to uphold, but to extend, what was at first to be condemned.

This is a doctrine to which our assent would not be given without clear demonstration of its soundness. We doubt whether it is so generally admitted as the major-general evidently believes from the manner in which he lays it down. If it be sound, the process of shewing that our treatment of the Ameers of Scinde was just would be very much simplified.

There is a distinction between the cases of Scinde and Affghanistan pointed out by the author, which, supposing both countries to have experienced injustice at our hands, very much mitigates the evil in respect to the former: in Scinde, although the Ameers might complain, the people gained by the change of rulers; whereas the invasion of Affghanistan was undertaken to force a tyrant upon a people who detested him.

Following up the history of our transactions with Scinde, where we had gained three military stations, Sukkur, Bukkur, and Shikarpore, besides the sea-port of Kurachee, whereby, in conjunction with the last grinding treaty, and the subsidiary force, the Ameers were in our grasp, Major-General Napier arrives at the year

1842, when Lord Auckland quitted India, "leaving it in all the confusion, terror, and danger, necessarily flowing from the political immorality and astounding incapacity which had marked his mischievous career." Lord Ellenborough, on his arrival, found the public mind confused with terror, the finances embarrassed, the military depressed in spirit. With respect to Scinde, he from the first held a firm tone towards the Ameers, promising to confide in their fidelity and in their friendship until he had proof of their faithlessness and hostility; in which case he announced to them that "their sovereignty would pass from them." Major-General Wm. Napier reminds his readers of the different position in which Lord Ellenborough stood in relation to Scinde compared with his predecessor,-namely, the latter had no international right of meddling with the Ameers, whereas the former stood on treaties acknowledged and acted on for three years; treaties, however, which the major-general admits were unjustly extorted from the Ameers. Major Outram informed the Governor-General that "he had it in his power to expose the hostile intrigues of the Ameers to such an extent as might be deemed sufficient to authorize the dictation of any terms to those chiefs, or any measure necessary to place British power on a secure footing.”

Lord Ellenborough was, at this time, occupied with the movement in Cabul, and with "choking off the civil and political leeches who were sucking the public." Meanwhile, Major Outram was employed in collecting proofs of the hostile disposition of the Ameers, and grounded on them (disposed under ten heads) a proposal for a new treaty. This proposal Lord Ellenborough rejected; but fresh offences on the part of the Ameers led his lordship to consign Scinde and its troubled affairs to Sir Charles Napier, with the following instructions, in fulfilment of the warning he had given to the Ameers four months before :

Should any Ameer or chief, with whom we have a treaty of alliance and friendship, have evinced hostile designs against us, during the late events, which may have induced them to doubt the continuance of our power, it is the present intention of the Governor-General to inflict upon the treachery of such ally and friend so signal a punishment as shall effectually deter others from similar conduct; but the GovernorGeneral would not proceed in this course without the most complete and convincing evidence of guilt in the person accused.

Relying upon the honour and humanity of Sir Charles, and giving him a wide discretion, Lord Ellenborough, as the major-general acknowledges, "threw the moral responsibility of any action to

which he might be provoked by the report of the general, upon the latter." Sir Charles, twelve days after his arrival at Sukkur, had prepared a catalogue of offences committed by the Ameers, which proved a settled design for war on their part. Although Lord Ellenborough knew the "odious process" by which the previous treaties had been obtained, the general did not; "he could only look at the treaties as contracts, voluntarily made, and which he was in Scinde to uphold, both as a political agent and as a military officer." According to the hypothesis of the author, however, this made no essential difference. Under these circumstances, Sir Charles Napier made his report to the Governor-General, on the 17th October, 1842 (which is found amongst the Parliamentary Papers on Scinde), in which he argues, from public engagements violated, from designs notoriously cherished, and from policy towards the people of Scinde, the general interests of the world, as well as of the British Government, that the Ameers should be coerced. He was authorized to offer a new treaty for their acceptance. It was tendered and refused. A sudden recourse was had to arms, and, if they had had to deal with a general less firm and less prepared, the impetuous bravery of the Belooches might have been successful.

It must not be understood that we subscribe ex animo to all the opinions expressed by Major-General Napier, still less that we adopt his severe strictures upon public men, which amount in some cases to vituperation, and will materially mar the effect of his book. A temperate history of the transactions connected with the occupation of Scinde, accompanied by an uncompromising criticism of the couduct of those who were engaged in them, would, at this moment, have been highly acceptable; but there will be many who share the sentiments of the major-general in regard to the injustice which his relative, as well as Lord Ellenborough, has experienced, who will revolt at the harsh and offensive expressions employed by him in speaking of the civil service of India, of the "politicals," of Major Outram, of the press of India, of the Court of Directors, and of Lord Auckland.