the occasion were thus expressed :-"It is impossible to say what may be the effect of his coming into this neighbourhood, but I apprehend very serious consequences, for both the town of Cabool and the country are ripe for revolt. I cannot ascertain how many men he has with him,-some accounts say 10,000, others 200; the last is, I dare say, near the mark; but what I dread is the effect of his incessant intrigues, while he is so near us, upon the minds of the population. Our force is too weak to expel him from the position he has now taken up; and we have desired Brigadier Dennie to return to Cabool with the 35th and Garbett's troop of Horse Artillery, as soon as possible, for the capital is in a very weak and defenceless state. I shall write daily during the present

This force, however, was found sufficient. A company of the Shah's Kohistanees was sent to Ghorbund, and created such a panic as to compel Dost Mahomed to leave the valley on the 13th, with a few followers. He was pursued by another detachment, till he reached Nijrow, which had for a twelvemonth been the hotbed of sedition. Having reunited his forces to the extent of about 4,000 foot and 400 horse, he broke up from Nijrow on the 27th, and on the 28th encamped at Doornama. On the 29th, our troops, commanded by Sir Robert Sale, marched to meet him. He had been joined by two of the eastern chiefs. His approach to Cabool of course quickened the progress of intrigue, and Sir William Macnaghten began to forebode the worst consequences. "If he could only succeed in getting up an insurrection in the city (says he in a letter to Lord Auckland, written only four days before the Dost surrendered), I have little doubt that his two sons, who are at large in Zoormut, will be able to effect a rising in that and the adjacent districts; and that we shall have to submit to the disgrace of being shut up in Cabool for a time." But on this occasion, there was no want of vigour to meet the emergency. Dr. Atkinson says, "Every possible precaution had been taken to provide for the safety of the state at this perilous crisis. The guards over the citadel gates and magazines were farther increased; guns were mounted on the Bala Hissar, so as to command the principal avenues and streets of the town." "If the town does rise (writes Sir William) we shall be compelled to make a terrible example of it. We have placed guns in position so as to command it." And, in a moment of irritation, he added, "No mercy should be shewn to the man who is the author of all the evils that are now distracting the country; but should we be so fortunate as to secure the person of Dost Mahomed, I shall request his majesty not to execute him till I can ascertain your lordship's sentiments." A little after, he adds: "His majesty, in a conversation I had with him yesterday, after dwelling on the mistaken lenity he had, according to my advice, shewn towards the adherents of Dost Mahomed, observed, 'I suppose, if I were to catch the dog now, you would prevent me from hanging him.' I replied, it would be time enough to talk about that after catching him."

Dost Mahomed moved on gradually towards the capital at the foot of the hills, and had arrived at Purwan-derra. On the 2nd November, 1840, our troops marched thirteen miles to that post, and reached it at noon. They came upon the Dost and his army, and found the hills covered with the armed populace of Nijrow. As they advanced, the Dost endeavoured to move off, and two squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry were ordered to intercept him. On approaching the enemy, and being ordered to charge, they turned round, and leaving their officers to their fate, galloped back, under the impulse of fear or treachery. Three officers were killed on the spot, among whom were Dr. Lord and Lieut.

Broadfoot, of the Engineers, two of the very ablest of our Affghanistan functionaries. Two other officers were wounded while performing prodigies of valour. In the confusion occasioned by this infamous conduct of the Cavalry, Dost Mahomed disappeared. This appeared to be the hour of our extremity. There was no other prospect before our officers but that of being reduced to a struggle for existence in the city of Cabool. It was expected that the Dost would fall back on Nijrow, and be enabled to make such use of our disaster at Purwan, as to bring down the whole force of the Kohistan upon the city. The mind of Sir Alexander Burnes presaged the direst calamities. He wrote from the field of our disgrace to Sir William, to beg that all the troops might be recalled, and concentrated at Cabool for its defence. This letter, calculated to confirm the gloomy anticipations of the Envoy, was delivered to him on the 3rd of November, as he was taking his evening ride. After reading it, he was returning home in the greatest depression of mind, when Dost Mahomed suddenly presented himself, and, on ascertaining that the Envoy was before him, dismounted and claimed his protection. The effect of this sudden apparition on the mind of the Envoy may be more easily conceived than described. Feelings of the deepest anxiety were exchanged, as if by the power of enchantment, for those of the highest delight and exultation. Such an incident would appear extravagant even in romance: but how frequently, during our brief career in Affghanistan, did not the events of real life exceed in their romantic, and too often tragic, interest, the boldest fictions of the imagination. All idea of retribution or revenge vanished from the mind of the Envoy, as he took the Dost's arm and walked up through his garden; and as the Dost, on entering the house, delivered up his sword, with the remark, that he had now no farther use for it, the animosity which had been excited by his opposition was forgotten in admiration of the confidence which he had manifested in our clemency, and the perfect self-possession which he exhibited in this moment of bewildering excitement. Seated in the palace where, fifteen months before, his command had been law, his first inquiry was about his family. Immediately afterwards, he requested the aid of a moonshee, and with the utmost calmness and distinctness, dictated a letter to his son, Afzul Khan, then in Nijrow, and to his two sons, Azeem Khan and Sheer Ali Khan, who had made their escape from Ghuzni on the 23rd September, and were in arms in Zoormut, to announce his own surrender and safety, and the honourable reception he had met with.

The conduct of Sir W. Macnaghten to the Dost was marked by the kindest sympathy and attention. Two days after his arrival, the Envoy writes, "This morning I have passed a pleasant hour with the Dost; I went to see his tents, where he is very comfortable. He gave me the whole account of his wanderings from the time of his flight at Arghunda. Whatever else he may be, he is certainly a shrewd clever fellow, and it is difficult to refrain from compassionating his fallen state." Soon after, he adds, "We are doing every thing we can to soothe the ex-chief's feelings, and up to the evening of the 7th, our efforts appear to have been attended with success. On the evening of that day he had an interview with his mother, and when she left him, he appeared in a state of considerable affliction and excitement. It appears that some one had told him-(and I have no doubt his mother, instigated by some mischievous people in the town, was his informant)—that it was our intention to send him to London." The Envoy begged him to set his mind at ease, for that he would not be sent farther than Loodhiana, without his consent, and at Dost Mahomed's request gave him a writing to that effect. This promise seemed to give

him satisfaction. Soon after he was sent to India, and his farther connection with the subject of this memoir ceased; except that Sir William, when the question of his allowances came under discussion, urged the most generous arrangement. "I trust," says he, "that the Dost will be treated with libera. lity. His case has been compared to that of Shah Soojah; and I have seen it argued that he should not be treated more handsomely than his majesty was; but surely the cases are not parallel. The Shah had no claim on us. We had no hand in depriving him of his kingdom; whereas we ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the victim."

It must be apparent that the dangers which threatened our position in Affghanistan in the beginning of November, 1810, when Dost Mahomed was in full march on the capital, were far greater than those which issued in our expulsion at the close of the following year. At the former period, the city of Cabool was in the highest state of excitement. The Kohistanees, though hating Dost Mahomed much, yet hating us more, had organized the most systematic opposition to our rule, and were ready, on the first gleam of success, to pour ten or fifteen thousand warriors into Cabool, The Seikh cabinet was deep in intrigues against our authority in Affghanistan, and had not only given the most unequi vocal support to the insurgents, but had actually sent supplies of money to Dost Mahomed. Two of his sons were abroad in the heart of the country, endeavouring to enlist the inhabitants in the cause of their father. Khelat had fallen away from us; Beloochistan was in arms, and our position in the south was perilous. Yar Mahomed Khan, whom Pottinger had justly described as the greatest scoundrel in Central Asia, in spite of all the benefits which we had conferred for two years on the government of Herat, was preparing to take advantage of Dost Mahomed's approach, to march an army to Candahar. In every direction, the horizon appeared dark and portentous. On the east, west, north, and south, our position in Affghanistan was menaced. And had the Dost, instead of surrendering himself to the Envoy, appeared in force before the city, and succeeded in creating an insurrection, the energies of the country would have been instantly concentrated for our destruction, and the disgrace of being shut up in the Bala Hissar, which the Envoy had begun to dread, would have been consummated. There was nothing in our favour but the indomitable courage of the Envoy and his military associates, which steadily rose with the tide of difficulty, and the energetic measures which were so promptly taken to meet the emergency. A twelvemonth after, when a crisis of infinitely less difficulty surprised us, bad the energy of Sir William been seconded with the same manliness and zeal by the military authorities, our army would have been saved from annihilation, The surrender of Dost Mahomed gave us a year's respite. "It made the country," as Sir Alexander Burnes expressed it, "as quiet as Vesuvius after an eruption,-how long this will last it is impossible to say."

Sir William Macnaghten had now, at the end of fifteen months, a little breathing time from political anxieties, and was enabled to turn his attention to the reform of the internal administration. "We have hitherto," says he, “been struggling for existence, without any leisure to turn to the improvement of the administration......We have now, thank God, a little time to turn our attention to the affairs of the country, and his majesty is well disposed to do his utmost to cleanse the Augean stable." While Dost Mahomed was rousing the tribes on the Oxus, Sir Alexander Burnes had sent the Envoy a long and important letter, with his views on the state of the country, which he described to

be in a very deplorable condition. The picture was, perhaps, overwrought, for Sir Alexander was subject to great alternations of feeling; but there was, unhappily, too much truth in his representations of the wretchedness which the double government had inflicted on the country. This system of administration corresponded with that which we have introduced into Oude, Hydrabad, and other states in India, and which, while we are writing these lines, has roused the people of Kholapore into an insurrection, which one-fifth of the army of the Bombay presidency has been required to repress. It places the powers of the administration in one hand, and the power of the sword-a sword wielded with irresistible might-in another. The native officials are relieved from that salutary dread of reaction which is the only check on official rapacity throughout the East, and are enabled to pursue their extortions with perfect impunity. When they have roused the people to rebellion, our troops are sent to quench it with their blood. Thus the presence of a British army in Affghanistan, which was of itself a sufficient cause of humiliation and irritation, was rendered still more intolerable by being associated in the minds of the people with the exactions of the Shah's officers. Instead of appearing in our proper character, as the messengers of humanity, we were exhihited only as the ministers of vengeance on an insulted and plundered people. There was no remedy for this state of things except in making the province a British possession at once; but this was forbidden both by our views of policy and our promises.

The pressure of this system was, perhaps, felt the more severely, from the practice, once so common in India, of paying the Shah's troops by assign. ments on the revenues of particular districts. The soldiers were thus the collectors; they proceeded to the districts assigned for their support, and lived at free quarters till the peasant paid the assignment. Sir A. Burnes well observed, that "such a system must clearly alienate all the people of this country from Shah Soojah and from us, for the force we give him ensures what, if left to himself, he could not otherwise command.” Oosman Khan, whom the Shah was induced to appoint his vizier, seems to have acquired the confidence of the Envoy. "He purposes," says he, "to manage the revenue department so as to abolish the burat, or assignment system; but I cannot as yet form any opinion as to the feasibility of the system." Within three weeks after, writing to a friend, he says, "you are a little too sanguine, I think, in the hope of a speedy and universal reform of this country. For thirty years, the inhabitants of most of the districts have never paid a fraction of revenue, until they were coerced into payment by the presence of troops. The habit has grown into second nature with them, and we cannot expect them to subside at once into cheerful tax-payers."-"The universal venality of the public officers, and the authorized exactions of the former governments, are hardly credible, and it is wonderful that any portion of the inhabitants could have remained to endure them; as it is, half the country is depopulated; but, with a little management I feel certain that the revenues of the country might be doubled in a few years." During the year 1841, the attention of the Envoy was closely directed to the correction of abuses, as far as it lay in his power to influence the Shah's proceedings; but the basis of the administration was unsound; and to build any useful or secure superstructure upon it was impossible.

We are much tempted to enter upon the political movements at Herat, because they serve to illustrate Sir W. Macnaghten's views of the politics of Central Asia; but the great length to which this article has extended, and the

necessity of husbanding the little remaining patience of the reader for the closing scene, which possesses so deep an interest, obliges us to pass over this episode in the Affghan tragedy with the remark, that the villanies of Yar Mahomed were consummated in March, 1841, by the expulsion of our repre sentative, Major Todd, just at the time when our differences with Persia had been finally adjusted by the cession of Ghorian; that this disappointment was so keenly felt by Lord Auckland as to induce him, in a moment of irritation, to remand the Major to his regiment-one of the very few harsh or hasty acts of that administration-and that the Envoy proposed to march an army to Herat, but was overruled from head-quarters by the advice, "that we should first learn to quiet and to control the positions we occupied before we plunged onwards."

We now come to the last scene in this tragic drama. In July, 1841, the Envoy, in communication with General Elphinstone, proposed to Government that six corps, including H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, should be relieved by six other regiments, because the country was unquiet in several directions, and particularly in Kohistan and Nijrow. Lord Auckland proposed to send one European and three native regiments, and to hold two others in readiness to proceed. To this the Envoy and General rejoined, at a subsequent date, that the European regiments were particularly desirable, but that all the native regiments would not be required, under existing circumstances, as tranquillity had been restored-so the officers reported-in Zoormut, and the Western Ghilzies were peaceably disposed; the Khyberees were innoxious from internal feuds, and the insurrection at Candahar had been suppressed. They stated, that though fewer troops would be required, a strong force for a time would be advisable, "to confirm the fickle people in the habit of obedience, which they were now, for the first time, beginning to manifest after half a century of anarchy." At the same time, Sir A. Burnes wrote to his correspondents at this presidency, that the country was so tranquil, that troops might safely be withdrawn.

In September, 1840, Sir Wm. Macnaghten had been nominated provisional member of the Council of India; and in September, 1841, he received farther token of the approbation with which his conduct had been viewed in the highest quarters at home, by his appointment to the office of Governor of Bombay. He had thus attained the highest honours within the reach of any civil or military servant on the Indian establishment. If he had ambition for high place, it was amply satisfied. He now prepared to quit Affghanistan, and bad fixed the early part of November for the period of his departure. Sir Alexander Burnes also expected to be relieved from that subordinate situation in which his mind had been chafed, and his feelings inflamed, and to succeed to the office about to be vacated. His largest wishes were on the eve of being gratified. On the 1st of October, he wrote, "Supreme at last...... I fear, however, that I shall be con. firmed as resident, and not as Envoy, which is a bore; but as long as I have power, and drive the coach, I do not much care. I hope I have prepared myself for the charge by hard study, and a knowledge of the country." Alas, for the blindness of human foresight and the vanity of human wishes! Thirty-two days after this burst of exultation, he became the first victim of an emeute which ended in severing our connection with Affghanistan. And the very week in which Sir William Macnaghten was making preparations for his departure, he was arrested by an insurrection, which terminated in his own assassination, and the destruction of the entire army.