that it is not the real intention of the Court to make war on us, but merely to intimidate the National Convention; let therefore the head of Louis fall; and George the Third, with his minister, Pitt, will feel if their heads rest firm on their shoulders. Then will the Parliament of England no longer hesitate to demand an alliance with the French Republic. The same fate will attend the other despots and shortly will every nation say, the head of our tyrant is not more divine than that of Louis; let us strike it off therefore; let us abolish royaltylet us imitate the French in every thing; and cries of Vive la liberté! Vive l'egalité! Vive la république! shall resound in every quarter of Europe." By speeches like these, and still more by actions which corresponded to them, the republicans of France, republicans who, as Louvet said, were worthy of the name, "aspired at the lasting renown, at the immortal honor of abolishing royalty itself, of abolishing it for ever, first in France, and then throughout the world."

In the next chapter, Mr. Marsh states, with great clearness, the events of the last fourteen days before the declaration of war. His account of the last mission of M. Maret to this country is, that the 24th of January was the day appointed for Maret's departure from Paris: but that Le Brun, willing, as Dumouriez himself observes in his Memoirs, to counteract the negociation without appearing so to do, would not permit Maret to leave Paris till the 26th of that month. He landed at Dover, and thence wrote for farther instructions: he then went to London; and, on his arrival, he sent a short note to Lord Grenville, signifying to him that he had come over to take charge of the diplomatic papers in the house of the late French Envoy. He never requested an interview, nor solicited a correspondence; waiting, as he said, for instructions. These instructions never came; on the 4th of February, the French declaration of war was first known in London; and M. Maret then sent a letter to Lord Grenville to take leave on his return to Paris. Thus began and thus ended M. Maret's celebrated mission.

The 16th and last chapter of this work contains an account of the state of parties in France, at the beginning of the year 1793. The author's account of them is, nearly in his own words, as follows: The two great parties were the Jacobins, or Anarchists, headed by Robespierre; and the Girondists, headed by Brissot: the latter were men of talents and education; the Jacobins, though many of them were not devoid of natural abilities, were for the most part unlettered enthusiasts. The one had been educated in the school of French philosophy and the tenets of the Encyclopedists; the others had learned no maxims besides those which were suggested by anarchy and brutal violence. In regard to morality, the Jacobins set all honor and religion at open defiance; the Gi

rondists

rondists possessed little of either, but had the habit of concealing their sentiments. In the struggle between two unprincipled parties, that which goes the greatest length usually has most the appearance of consistency, has fewer weak parts open to attack, has most power and energy, and will therefore generally succeed. Both the parties were unanimous for the war with Great Britain: but, as soon as the war grew somewhat unpopular in consequence of Dumouriez's defeat at Neerwenden, each reproached the other as being the authors of it."Who provoked the war?" says Brissot, in his letter to his constituents, "the Anarchists alone." In return, when the Anarchists had brought Brissot to the bar, one of the principal charges against him was "that he had involved France in a war with England."-" No," he exclaimed, "it was not I, it was the Assembly of the Nation who decreed the war!" This, Mr. Marsh observes, is an acknowlegement from both parties, that not to the British, but to the French Government, its origin must be assigned. He then proceeds to a confutation of the eighteen pretexts alleged by the French in justification of the war, and to a general recapitulation of the leading points endeavoured to be established in his work.-An appendix is annexed, containing a narrative of the attempts made by the British Government to restore peace written with a view to prove, that the continuance of the war can no more be ascribed to the British Government than the commencement of it.

Here the work concludes;-and we have thus endeavoured to give a full outline of its contents. Its importance, its celebrity on the Continent, and the high degree of consideration which the author of it enjoys in the literary world, haye induced us to allot to it a larger space than political writings of the same size generally fill in our Review. The reader must see that it is the performance of a person who is completely master of his subject, accustomed to laborious and accurate investigation, to arrange his compositions in the best order, and to express himself with clearness and ease.-We shall conclude by an extract from the preface; in which the author shortly mentions some circumstances that gave rise to the work, and some which have been the consequences of its publication:

The history now presented to the British public, I wrote originally in German, a language which a long residence in the university of Leipzig has rendered as familiar to me as my own. A desire of rescuing my native country from the calumnies of some German journalists, had induced me at the beginning of the year 1798, when the attention of all Europe was engaged with the threatened invasion of Great Britain, to draw up a short essay, in the form of an epistle

to

to a literary friend at Weimar, in which I endeavoured to shew, that whatever might be the issue of the important, and then doubtful conflict, the blame of its origin attached only to the rulers of France. This essay was printed in the German Mercury for March 1798: and, as the period of the publication was very unfavorable to the author, the expectations of those who were attached to the French cause being at that time very high, it was not to be expected that those journalists, who had asserted, that the coalition against France in 1791, was formed by the intrigues of the British Cabinet, that the French rulers were solicitous for peace, but that the ministers of Great Britain, through mere hatred of the new republic, had resolved at all events to commence hostilities, and had so confidently repeated these assertions during several years, till at length they were received in almost every part of Germany, and in the adjacent countries, as indisputable truths; it was not to be expected, that such men, under such circumstances, would silently permit the oracular authority which they had so long enjoyed, to be questioned by a writer who had given no proofs of experience in political history. The opposition which was made, especially by one of them, determined me, therefore, to bring the question at once to an issue, by laying before the public all the facts. and documents arranged in historical order, which concerned the relative politics of Great Britain and France, from the time of the coalition in 1791, to the declaration of war against Great Britain in February 1793. The decision was soon made for my work had not long appeared, when the first literary reviews in Germany, though the contrary opinion had till that time very generally prevailed, pronounced that the British Government was completely rescued from the charges which had been laid to it, and that the origin as well as the continuance of the war, must be wholly and solely ascribed to the mad ambition of the French rulers. Even the journalist, who had so virulently attacked the essay inserted in the German Mercury, has since thought proper to assume a very different tone: he has not ventured any longer to direct his invectives against the British Government, but has turned them against the French Directory.'

Whether these volumes will have the same effect in silencing the British minister's adversaries in this country, respecting the charge of having engaged us in an unjust and unnecessary war, which they bring against him, we do not undertake to foretel: but, if Mr. Marsh has satisfactorily proved that the French were the aggressors in the contest, he has deserved well both of the government and his countrymen. The merit and ability of the performance are unquestionable; and we apprehend that the enemies and the friends of the minister will equally acknowlege, that it is the ablest work on the subject which has yet appeared in his favor.

P. S. We had just finished the foregoing analysis, when the author's Postscript to it came to hand. It relates to the overture of peace lately made to this country by Bonaparte. Mr.

Marsh

Marsh says that Bonaparte foresaw that the bare consent of the British Ministry, to enter into a negociation with the Consul of France, would have induced the Emperor of Russia instantly to withdraw his troops, and the Austrian Cabinet would have immediately made proposals for a separate peace, as in the year 1797; thus we should have been once more exposed to the necessity either of carrying on the war alone, or of submitting to the disadvantageous and dishonorable terms of peace which an haughty and inexorable enemy would impose and thus, by our merely listening to his overtures, Bonaparte would have won the deep game which he is playing, and we should have paid the stakes.

ART. X. Speech of the Right Hon. Lord Castlereagh, in the Irish House of Commons, February 5, 1800, on offering to the House certain Resolutions, proposing and recommending a complete and entire Union between Great Britain and Ireland. 8vo. 15. 6d. Wright. 1800.

AFTER so much ingenuity of discussion, the question of

union can now receive little new light, except from experiment, that grand touch-stone of human opinions. It is not, however, to be pretended that "no argument is like matter of fact;" especially since the endeavour of the argument on one side has been to prove the impropriety of making the experiment.

The propositions, to which Lord Castlereagh's speech was introductory, render it an object of more than common interest. The opening, however, appears to us to be in a style not sufficiently conciliating to suit the occasion and the subject. To promote union of sentiment should more particularly be the endeavour of the friends of the proposed political union; because union of sentiment ought to be the foundation of a measure in which the future harmony of the two countries is so much involved.

In recommending the first three articles of the resolutions, Lord C. remarked on the inadequacy of the act of annexation, or of any other method short of a legislative union, to ensure a permanent connection, consistently with the rights of the Irish Parliament. The great object of a legislative union, he observed, was the establishing the identity of the Executive:

The act of annexation (he said) went in principle to hand over to another country, in which we are not represented, one of the most important legislative powers, that of regulating the succession to the Crown; a power which never could be exercised by Great Britain, without jealousy and distraction on the part of this country; nor was the practice less defective than the principle. In the case of the regency,

it was found so for the Prince of Wales was constituted Regent by an address of the Irish Parliament, before any Regent was appointed for Great Britain; so that the unity of the Executive, the only bond of our present connection, depended on the British Parliament acquiescing in the choice of the Irish House of Commons: and for the dangers of this connection, (his Lordship said) he had the authotity of a Right Hon. and Learned Member, who opposed the measure of union. That Right Hon. Member had introduced a bill avowedly to move on this argument in favour of union, grounded upon the act of annexation; but when it was pressed upon him to say whether he would surrender the right of the Irish Parliament to Great Britain, he was so startled at this idea, that he abandoned his own bill: thus confirming the weakness of the bond by which the unity of the Executive was secured.'- After the abdication of King James II. he withdrew into this country, and setting himself up with the Irish Parliament in opposition to England, gave a strong practical proof of the tendency of distinct legislatures to ultimate separation.'

On all the great imperial questions of war, peace, and treaties, what was the situation of Ireland? To avoid separation, she was bound, without deliberation, to adopt the conduct of Great Britain; if she dissented from that conduct, her dissent tended to that separation which it was so much the true interest of Ireland to avoid; and as the country advanced in wealth and prosperity, it was more likely that such questions would more frequently occur, and be more anxiously discussed.'

In answer to its being objected that the proposed union would reduce Ireland to the state of a colony, Lord C. ob served: If I were called upon to describe a colony, I would describe it as something very like the present state of this country, enjoying indeed a local legislature, but without any power entrusted to that legislature, with respect to regulating the succession of the Crown. I would describe it as having an Executive administered by the orders of the minister of another country, not in any way responsible to the colony for his acts or his advice.'

The principles, on which it is proposed to establish the proportions of contribution to the general expences of the empire, appear rather in an indigested state. The best cri

terion of ability,' said Lord Castlereagh, as embracing all kinds of possession and expence, was an income-tax; this was not a criterion to be found in Ireland, nor was it likely that for some time our local circumstances could permit its operation; so that some other must be sought.'-We cannot avoid remarking that the amount of the income-tax, as established in Great Britain, is not perfectly adapted to be taken as a criterion of ability. The more a country is in debt, the less is her real ability to furnish taxes: but the debt of Great Britain considerably increases the produce of her income

tax.

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