merly were fatal, and by improvements in methods of treatment they learned to cure diseases which were regarded as incurable before and they are still improving and progressing. But this is not all. They have become diligent in the invention and discovery of methods which go to make good health and prevent disease. They seem to have no apprehension that by advancing the general health of the community they are injuring their own business. They are charitable and generous to the poor and unfortunate. They refuse no one necessary medical or surgical treatment, no matter what his or her financial circumstances may be. They aid in the maintenance of hospitals where poor persons are given the most skillful medical and surgical treatment free of charge.

In all this they have made no mistake so far as their own personal interests are concerned. They are now looked upon as among the best friends of humanity. They have prospered financially. They find work to do which had never been done before. They have found their patients better able to pay their bills when they are kept in good health than they would be if they were continually weakened by disease. Some bad men, it is true, are to be found among them, but nevertheless the vast majority of the profession are rightly esteemed as benefactors of mankind.

What have the lawyers of Illinois done within the ninety years which have elapsed since the organization of the state government for the improvement of the administration of justice? What have they done to advance the interests of litigants, to secure justice to poor persons, to expedite the transactions of business, to simplify methods of procedure, or to aid in the proper and prompt enforcement of the criminal laws? Practically nothing. Instead of aiding progress and improvement they bitterly oppose them. That some improvements in the practice of the law have been introduced is true. But it is equally true that more changes have been introduced which have been detrimental to the prompt determination of causes according to right and justice. Do we not furnish a most pitiable spectacle when

we are compared with the farmer, the mechanic, the builder, the machinist, the printer, the merchant, the manufacturer, the engineer, the surgeon, the chemist, the artist or the man of any other calling?

It is apparent that something ought to be done and must be done to improve the administration of justice and make the practice of the law a respectable and useful calling. It is not intended in this paper, however, to outline or discuss any measure which might be thought calculated to accomplish the desired end, but a few suggestions, nevertheless, will be offered respecting certain propositions which have been advanced in a printed circular letter addressed to the members of the General Assembly during its last session.

One proposition is that a law which would occupy not over thirty pages of the size of those contained in the Revised Statutes, being equivalent to about seventy pages of the size of those contained in a legislative bill, would do the work. The present Revised Statutes contain about two hundred and fifty pages, being the equivalent of about six hundred pages of a legislative bill, of provisions pertaining to the courts. About two-thirds of these provisions are unobjectionable. They have been construed by the courts and are understood by the bench and bar and should be re-enacted as a part of any act designed to cover the entire field of court legislation. Apart from this, thirty pages would not be sufficient to contain provisions necessary to provide a suitable scheme for the keeping of the files and records of our courts, to say nothing of numerous other necessary provisions, none of which is contained in the Revised Statutes. These facts alone would seem to dispose of the proposition that a proper court act can be framed within the limits thus suggested.

Another proposition is that the law should not prescribe detailed rules of practice but that room should be left "for the exercise of reasonable intelligence on the part of the bench and bar." When it is considered that not only our rules of procedure but also our substantive law are, for the most part, the products of judicial legislation and have been made law by the

courts largely at the instigation of the bar, and that the bench. and bar are responsible for the existence of most of the evils which render the administration of justice so unsatisfactory, the suggestion that the General Assembly should pass a short court act containing only general provisions and leave the rest to the "reasonable intelligence" of the bench and bar is not likely to appeal very strongly to those who are dissatisfied with the existing order of things and who wish existing evils remedied. Past experience shows that both the bench and the bar have not only been hostile to the enactment of legislation changing modes of procedure, but that their hostility to new modes of procedure when prescribed has continued and has greatly impeded their beneficial operation. It is all well enough, and indeed, it is necessary, that a reasonable discretion should be left to our judges in the matter of rules of procedure, but to leave to them too much discretion would be likely to result in the adoption of many rules more suited to their own convenience than to the convenience of litigants and members of the bar and to the prompt and proper transaction of business. Moreover, the enactment of a new code of procedure, general in its terms, which would require judicial construction and numerous rules of court for its proper operation, would plunge us into a state of confusion and uncertainty which it would require many years to remove. We would be worse off with such a code than we are now. Finally, it is perfectly plain that if our judges had both the disposition and the ability to enact good rules of procedure they would have no time to do the work. They have all they can do as it is.

The proposal, then, that we enact a short code couched in general terms and leave the rest to the judges and lawyers must be rejected as impracticable and as not suited to the conditions which surround us. The better course, it is respectfully submitted, is to enact, not many laws, but only one law containing, so far as may be practicable, all necessary provisions pertaining to the courts, re-enacting therein those provisions of existing law which are unobjectionable, which have been construed and which are well understood, with only such slight changes as may be

necessary to make them harmonize with the other provisions of the law; to provide an abundance of forms of papers, decrees, judgments and record entries used in proceedings in court; to prescribe methods of procedure which will tend to bring about economy of time and money, expedite business, and secure the determination of every case according to right and justice; to provide all details which may be necessary or useful for making it easy for judges and lawyers to understand and follow the new modes of procedure and thus avoid, as much as possible, the confusion which changes in matters of practice usually bring about, and then give the supreme court of the state large discretionary powers to enlarge upon the rules thus prescribed, or even to vary from or modify them when, in their actual operation, they may seem to produce inconvenience or injustice. While the changes we make in existing methods of procedure should be radical in effect they should be simple in form. They should consist not so much in new provisions as in the elimination of superfluous verbiage, useless or worse than useless forms and everything which experience has taught us is calculated to cause unnecessary delay, unnecessary expense and to defeat justice. Above all let us have a law which will cure both lawyers and judges of pettifogging and quibbling and compel the determination of causes in accordance with right and justice.

If a law of this kind be properly framed, provided with a carefully prepared index and an introduction or notes explanatory of the changes made in existing law, and put in operation, the benefits resulting from it will be immediately apparent and, if the law be supplemented by a proper book on practice prepared and published under the supervision of the supreme court, within less than three years the business of our courts will be in such condition that we will be able, in any ordinary case, to secure a final determination of the suit, both in the court of original jurisdiction and in the court of appellate jurisdiction, within four months after its commencement, and questions of practice will almost cease to exist.