an universal notion; nor whether it be truly to be called any thing at all. We doubt not but ORDER should be a most observable predicament, in the series of human notions or 'nominanda ;' but yet I doubt not much but that Gassendus, who would make 'tempus' and 'spatium' two of his predicaments, doth describe to them that entity which they have not.

XIX. And though undoubtedly action is a noble predicament, and whatever the Cartesians say, requireth more causation than non agere' doth, yea, is itself the causation of the mutations in the world; yet men scarcely know what to call it. Some say it is 'res;' others, it is but 'accidens rei;' and others, 'modus rei:' some say, it is 'in passo;' some say it is 'in agente;' some say it is neither, but is 'agentis :' some say immanent acts are qualities, as Scotus, &c.

XX. And which is yet worse, the very name, accident, mode and quality, aré but general, unapt notions not well understood by any that use them, nor suited meetly to the severals contained under them. And when we call a thing, or nothing, a quality, accident or mode, we are little the wiser, and know not well what we have said. Sure I am that they are exceedingly heterogenea' which Aristotle compriseth in the very predicament of quality. And Gassendus thought all accidents may be as well called qualities or modes.

XXI. And which is yet worse, all human language is so wofully ambiguous, that there is scarcely a word in the world that hath not many senses; and the learned world never came to agreement about the meaning of their common words, so that ambiguity drowneth all in uncertainty and confusion.

XXII. And which is yet worse, the certain apprehension of sense and reason, is commonly by men called learned, reduced to, and tried by, these dreaming ambiguous names and universal notions; and men are drawn to deny their certain knowledge, because they know not by what universal term to call it, e. g. I know as far as is useful to me, by seeing what light is; but whether it be 'substantia, accidens, modus,' &c., or what to call it universally, few know! And no wonder, for their universal notions are their own works or 'Entia rationis,' fabricated by the imperfect comparing of things with things, by ignorant understandings; but the

sensibility of objects and the sensitive faculty and the intellect are the works of God. I know much better what light is by seeing it, than I know what an accident or a quality is.

So I know by feeling what heat is, I know what motion or action is, I know what pain and pleasure is, I know what love and hatred is, I know partly what it is to think, to know, to will, choose and refuse; but what is the right universal notion of these, what true definition to give of any one of them, the most learned man doth not well know; insomuch, as I dare boldly say, that the vulgar ordinarily know all these better without definition, than the most learned man living can know them by definitions alone.

And here I will presume to step aside, to say as in the ears of our over-doing Separatists, who can take none into Christian communion, that cannot tell you how they were converted, or at least give them a fair account or their understanding all the Articles of the Faith, in words that are adapted to the matter: I tell you, 1. That the knowledge of words, and second notions and definitions, is one thing, and the knowledge of matters and things is another. 2. And it is the knowledge of the things, and not of the words, that is primarily and absolutely necessary to salvation. 3. And that many an illiterate, ill-bred person understand things long before they can utter their understandings in any intelligible words. 4. And therefore if any man do but these two things: 1. By yea or nay, do signify to me, that he understandeth the truth, when I put the matter of nothing but the baptismal covenant into my questions; 2. and do manifest serious willingness accordingly, by avoiding evil, and using God's means; I dare not, I will not refuse that person from the communion of the church; though I would do as much as the most rigid censurer to bring such up to greater knowledge.

XXIII. And on the other side, men are made to think that they know the things because they know the names and definitions; and so that they are learned and wise, when they know little the more by all their learning. For to be able to talk over all the critical books, and lexicons, and grammars, all the logical notions and definitions, is nothing but organical knowledge; like the shoemaker that hath a shop full of lasts (and that most of them unmeet for any man's foot), but never made a shoe by any of them. And false and

confused and idle names and notions, fill the learned world with false, confused and vain conceptions, which common country people escape, so that it costeth many a man twenty years' study to be made more erroneous than he would have been, by following an honest trade of life.

XXIV. Nay, our very articles of faith and practice which salvation lieth on, are commonly tried by these arbitrary organical notions; whole loads of school volumes are witnesses of this. Though the schoolmen, where our grammarians deride them as barbarians, have often done well in fitting words to things, and making the key meet for the lock yet old terms and notions and axioms too often go for current; and overrule disputes, when they are not understood, nor are proper or univocal. What work doth Aristotle make with Actus and Potentia, and the schoolmen after him! What abundance of darkness do these two words contain in all their writings! And for want of other words to supply our needs, what abundance of distinctions of Actus and Potentiæ are the Scotists and other schoolmen fain to use! What abundance of disputes are kept up by the ambiguity of the word cause, while it is applied to things so different, as efficience, constitution and finality! The like may be said of many more. And then when it cometh to a dispute of the Divine nature, of the soul, of the most weighty things; these confounding notions must overrule the case. We must not have an argument for the soul's immortality, but what these notions check or vitiate; no, nor scarcely for an attribute of God.

XXV. And it is so hard a thing to bring men to that self-denial and labour, as at age thoroughly and impartially to revise their juvenile conceptions, and for them that learned words before things, to proceed to learn things now as appearing in their proper evidence; and to come back and cancel all their old notions, which were not sound, and to build up a new frame, that not one of a multitude is ever master of so much virtue as to attempt it, and go through with it. Was it not labour enough to study so many years to know what others say; but they must now undo much of it, and begin a new and harder labour? who will do it?

XXVI. And indeed none but men of extraordinary acuteness and love of truth, and self-denial and patience, are fit to do it. For, 1. The common dullards will fall into the

ditch when they leave their crutches. And will multiply sects in philosophy and religion, while they are unable to see the truth in itself. And indeed this hath made the Protestant churches so liable to the derision and reproach of their adversaries. And how can it be avoided, while all must pretend to know and judge, what indeed they are unable to understand!

2. Yea, the half-witted men, that think themselves acute and wise, fall into the same calamity.

3. and the proud will not endure to be thought to err, when they plague the world with error.

4. And the impatient will not endure so long and difficult studies.

5. And when all is done, as Seneca saith, they must be content with a very few approvers, and must bear the scorn of the ignorant-learned crowd; who have no way to maintain the reputation of their own wisdom, orthodoxy and goodness, but by calling him proud, or self-conceited, or erroneous, that differeth from them by knowing more than they. And who but the truly self-denying can be at so much cost and labour for such reproach, when they foreknow that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow?

XXVII. by these means men's minds that should be taken up with God and his service, are abused and vilified, and filled with the dust and smoke of vain, and false, and confused notions. And man's life is spent (as David saith) in a vain show. And men dream waking with as great industry, as if they were about a serious work. Alas, how pitifully are many of the learned world employed.

XXVIII. By this means also men's precious time is lost: and he that had time little enough to learn and do things necessary, for the common good, and his own salvation, doth waste half of it on he knoweth not what. And Satan, that findeth him more ingenious than to play it away at cards or dice, or than to drink and revel it away, doth cast another bait before him, and get him learnedly to dream it away about unprofitable words and notions.

XXIX. And by this means the practice of goodness is hindered in the world; yea, and holy affections quenched. While these arbitrary notions and speculations, (being man's own) are his more pleasant game; and studies and pulpits must be thus employed, and heart and life thus stolen from God.

Yea, it is well if godliness grow not to be taken by such dreamers, for a low, dull, and unlearned thing; yea, if they be not tempted by it to infidelity, and to think (not only the zealous ministers and Christians, but even) Christ and his apostles to be unlearned men, below their estimation.

XXX. And by the same means the devilish sin of pride will be kept up, even among the learned; yea, and by the preachers of humility: for what is that in the world (almost) that men are prouder of, than that learning which consisteth in such notions and words as are afore-described? and the proudest man, I think, is the worst.

XXXI. And by this means the sacred chairs and pulpits will be possessed by such men, whose spirits are most contrary to a crucified Christ, and to that cross and doctrine which they must preach. And when Christ's greatest enemies are the Pastors of his Churches, all things will be ordered and managed accordingly; and the faithful hated and abused. Though I must add, that it is not this cause alone, but many more concurring, to constitute a worldly, wicked mind, which use to procure these effects.

XXXII. And by false and vain learning, contentions are bred and propagated in the churches. None are instruments so apt, and none have been so successful, as all Church History recordeth, and the voluminous contentions of many such learned parties testify.

XXXIII. And this is an increasing malady; for new books are yearly written, containing the said arbitrary notions of the several authors. And whereas real and organical learning should be orderly and conjunctly propagated, and things studied for themselves, and words for things, the systems of arts and sciences grow more and more corrupted, our logics are too full of unapt notions, our metaphysics are a mere confused mixture of pneumatology and logic; and what part hath totally escaped?

XXXIV. And the number of such books doth grow so great that they become a great impediment and snare; and how many years' precious time must be lost, to know what men say, and who saith amiss, or how they differ!

XXXV. And the great diversity of writers and sects increaseth the danger and trouble, especially in physics; by that time a man hath well studied the several sects, the Epicureans and Somatists, the Cartesians, with the by-parties,