Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

(Regius, Berigardus, &c.) the Platonists, the Peripatetics, the Hermetics, Lullius, Patricius, Telesius, Campanella, White, Digby, Glisson, and other novelists; and hath read the most learned improvers of the more current sort of philosophy, (Scheggius, Wendeline, Sennertus, Hoffman, Honorat. Faber, Got, &c.) how much of his life will be thus spent! And perhaps he will be as far to seek, in all points saving those common evident certainties, which he might have learned more cheaply in a shorter time, than he was before he read them. And will wish that Antonine, Epictetus, or Plutarch had served instead of the greater part of them. And will perceive that physics are much fuller of uncertainties, and more empty of satisfying usefulness than morality, and true theology.

XXXVI. By such false methods and notions men are often led to utter scepticism, and when they have found out their own errors, they are apt to suspect all the substance of sciences to be error. And he speeds well that cometh but with Sanchez to a nihil scitur,' and he better that cometh but with Cornelius Agrippa, to write vanity and vexation upon all the sciences: for many come to infidelity itself, and some to atheism; and, as Dr. Thomas Jackson noteth, by such distrust of men and human things, are tempted into a distrust or unbelief of Christ; or perhaps with Hobbes grow to cry down all learning besides their own, which is worse than the worst that they decry.

XXXVII. And by all this, Princes and States are tempted to hate learning itself, and banish it as a pernicious thing: as the case of the Turkish, Muscovian, and some other empires testify.

All this I have said, not to dishonour true learning, which I would promote with all my power; but to shew the corruption and vanity of that philosophy and human false learning, which Paul and the ancient writers did decry; and why the Council of Carthage forbad the reading of the Gentiles' books, and reproached Apollinarius, and other heretics for their Gentile learning.

Of the great uncertainty of our physics and metaphysics, almost all the chief authors themselves make free confessions. See Suarez, Metaph. disp. 35, pp. 219. 221. 237; Fromondus de Anim. p. 63; Gassendus often; and who not.

Pious Bonaventure hath written a tract "de Reductione

Artium ad Theologiam ;" and another "de non frequentandis quæstionibus;" "Cornel. Agrippa de Vanitate Scientiarum," is well worth the reading beforehand to prevent men's loss of time.

CHAP. IV.

III. What are the Certainties that must be known and held fast, and why.

It is none of the apostle's meaning that men should be mere sceptics: nor am I seconding Sanchez's nihil scitur,' unless you take science for adequate science, or in a transcendent notion, as it signifieth that which is proper to another world, and therefore may be denied of this. He can neither play the part of a Christian or of a man, who doubts of all things, and is assuredly confident of nothing.

That our discourse of this may be orderly and edifying, it is of great use that I first help you rightly to understand what certainty is. The word is ambiguous, and sometimes is applied to the object, and sometimes to the act and agent. The former is called objective certainty; the latter subjective certainty.

The Objective is either certainty of the thing, or certainty of evidence, by which the thing is discernible or perceptible to us; and this either sensible evidence, or rational; and the latter is either self-evidence of principles, or derived evidence of consequences.

Subjective certainty is also either considered in the nature of it, or in the degree; and as to the nature it is either the senses' certainty, or the intellects'; and this is either of incomplex objects, or complex: the first is either of sensible objects, or purely spiritual: the second of principles, or of conclusions. Of all these there are certainty.

The degrees are these: It being first supposed that ng human apprehension here is absolutely perfect; and therefore all our certainties subjective are imperfect; the word therefore signifieth not only a perfect apprehension, but it signifieth 'non falli,' not to be deceived, and such an apprehension of the evidence as giveth us a just resolving and

[blocks in formation]

quieting confidence. And so, 1. The due objects of sense, and, 2. The immediate acts of the soul itself, are certain in the first and highest degree. I know certainly what I see clearly, so far as I see it: and I know certainly that I think, and know, and will. The next degree of certainty is of rational principles, and the next of consequents.

It is likely in a scheme you will more easily understand it.

CERTAINTY being an ambiguous word, is either,

I. Objective: which is,

I. Of Being of the Thing; which is nothing but Physical Verity.
II. Of Evidence; which makes Things Perceptible; and it is Evidence,
1. Sensible; S1. To the External Senses.

viz.

2. To the Internal Senses.

[blocks in formation]

II. Subjective Certainty; by which I am certain of the Object; Considerable,

51. Of the Outward Senses, when they are not de

ceived.

2. Of the Inward Sense and Imagination.

1. Of Sense,

I. In its Nature; viz. Certainty.

1. Of Beings,

2. Of the In-
tellect;
which is,

1. Sensed and

imagined.

2. Of the Acts
of the Soul.

1. Quod sint.

2. Quid sint. 3. Qualia sint.

2. Of the Com-f1. Of self-evident Principles. plex Verities, 2. Of Conclusions.

N. Qu. Whether there be not a third sort of Certainty both Objective and Subjective; viz. Goodness not sensible, Certainty apprehended by the Intellectual Soul, not only sub ratione Veri, sed et Boni? And whether the Will by its Natural Gust have not a Complacential Perception of it as well as the Intellect? (Vid. Pemble Vindic. Grot.)

II. In the Degrees of Certainty; which are the Order following:

1. Sense perceiving the Object and itself, is the first perceiver; and hereof

the surest.

2. Imagination receiving from Sense, hath more requisites to its Certainty.
3. Intellectual about Things sensible, hath yet more requisites to its Cer-
tainty; viz. 1. That the Object be true; 2. The Evidence sensible;
3. That the Sense be sound, and the Medium and other Conditions of
Sense be just; 4. That the Imagination be not corrupt; 5. That the In-
tellect itself be sound.

4. But Intellection about itself and Volition hath the highest Certainty.
5. We are surer of the Quod, than the Quid and Quale; as that we Think,
than What and How.

6. We are more certain of self-evident Principles than the Consequences.
7. Consequences have various degrees of Evidence and Certainty.

A few propositions may further help your understandings.

I. All things in the world have their certainty physical of being; that is, it is a certainty, or a truth that this thing is.

II. The thing which is most commonly called objective certainty, is such a degree of perceptibility or evidence as may aptly satisfy the doubting intellect.

III. Evidence is called infallible; 1. When he that receiveth it is never deceived; and so all truth is infallible truth; for he is not deceived who believeth it: 2. Or when a man cannot err about it, And there is no such evidence in the world, unless you suppose all things else agreeable.

IV. The perception is called infallible, 1. Either quia non falsa,' because it is not deceived: and so every man is infallible in every thing which he truly perceiveth: 2. Or because it cannot or will not err. And so absolute infallibility is proper to God; but 'secundum quid' in certain cases, upon certain objects, with certain conditions, all sound men's senses and intellects are infallible.

V. Certainty of evidence consisteth in such a position of the thing evident, as maketh it an object perceptible to the faculty perceiving; to which many conditions are required. As, 1. That the thing itself have such intrinsic qualifications, as make it fit to be an object. 2. That it have the due intrinsic conditions concomitant.

1. To the nature of an object of perception it is necessary, 1. That it be a thing which in its nature is within the reach of the perceiving faculty; and not (as spirits are to sense) so above us, or alien to us, as to be out of the orb of our perception. 2. That they have a perceptible quantity, magnitude or degree. 3. That, if it be an incomplex term and object, and not an universal of the highest notion, it be 'hoc aliquid,' and have its proper individuation. 4. That it have some special distinct conformity to the distinct perceiving faculty. In sum, that it be Ens, unum, verum, bonum, vel hisce contraria reductive et per accidens cognita.'

2. To the extrinsic conditions, it is necessary, 1. That the object have a due site or position. 2. And a due distance; neither too near nor too far off. 3. And that it have a due medium, fitted to it and the faculty. 4. And that it have a due abode or stay, and be not like a bullet out of a gun, imperceptible through the celerity of its motion.

VI. That the perception of sense be certain, it is neces

sary, 1. That the organ be sound, in such a measure as that no prevalent distemper undispose it. 2. That it be not oppressed by any disturbing adjunct. 3. That the sensitive soul do operate on and by these organs; for else its alienation will leave the organ useless: as some intense meditations make us not hear the clock. 4. That it be the due sense and organ which meeteth with the object; as sounds with the ear, light with the eye, &c., besides the aforesaid necessaries.

VII. Common notitia or principles are not so called, because men are born with the actual knowledge of them; but because they are truths, which man's mind is naturally so disposed to receive as that upon the first exercises of sense and reason, some of them are understood, without any other human teacher.

VIII. Even self-evident principles are not equal, but some of them are more, and some less evident; and therefore some are sooner, and some later known. And some of them are more commonly known than others.

IX. The self-evidence of these principles ariseth from the very nature of the intellect which inclineth to truth, and the nature of the will which essentially inclineth to good, and the nature and posture of the objects, which are Truth and Goodness in the most evident position, compared together, or conjunct; some call it instinct.

X. It is not necessary to the certainty of a principle, that it be commonly known of all or most. For intellects have great variety of capacities, excitation, helps, improvements, and even principles have various degrees of evidence, and appearances to men.

XI. Man's mind is so conscious of its own darkness and imperfections, that it is distrustful of its own inferences, unless they be very near and clear. When by a long series of ergos any thing is far fetched, the mind is afraid there may be some unperceived error.

XII. He therefore that holdeth a true principle as such, and at once a false inference which contradicteth it, is to be supposed to hold the principle first and fastest, and that if he saw the contradiction he would let go the consequent, and not the principle.

XIII. He that denieth the certainty of sense, imagination, and intellective perception of things sensed as such,

« ZurückWeiter »