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day (if the prefent plan of Union is given up) attract imperial notice, for the Head that is diminutive is placed between the fhoulders and governs unwieldy Limbs, and the Heart that is ftill fmaller, by its central fituation gives life and heat and fire to the loosely connected fyftem of the human frame. But, notwithstanding what I have been here faying in favour of Mann as the natural feat of Empire, I fhall not longer trefpafs on the public attention by recommending it further, as it is more than probable if I faid ten times as much, and ten times better than I am capable of faying it on fo unexpected a propofition, my patriotic ingenuity and industry might turn out to be only labour in vain. I fhall therefore give up the hopes and the claims of my native Ifland, and confulting only the good of the Empire, treat the subject of an Union between Great-Britain and Ireland with that fairness which as I faid before, I fear a native of either Ifland from the very cir cumftance of fuch nativity, is difqualified from difcuffing,

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And now, having fo far premifed, and taken fuch pains to make it appear that I can have nothing in view but the general good, I fhall proceed to fhew to the people of Ireland only by plain unfophifticated Argument what are the Solid advantages that Ireland is certain of receiving by its Union with Great Britain, fhould the Parliament of the former Kingdom wifely adopt fo falutary a meafure: for, as to the concur rence of the English Nation to what must so manifeftly benefit the Sifter Ifland, the wonted difintereftedness of that People leaves me no

doubt.'

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doubt. But here a difficulty arifes in the very
outfet, and this difficulty is no other than that
which the enemies of Union have proudly in-
fifted on as an ESTOPPEL,-to wit. The incompe
tence of the Parliament of your Kingdom itself legally
to effect fuch a measure without the concurrence of the
Freeholders and Freemen convened in their primary
Affemblies. I am certain this objection to the
competence of Parliament must have been started
by fome young Lawyer whofe head (if I am in-
dulged in the expreffion) has been Democratised
by his recent ftudy of the Irish Conftitution.
But this young Perfon, (for young he certainly
must have been) who originally fuggefted this
difficulty, feems not to kave formed a proper
notion of the potency of Parliament, and the in-
dependence of the Commons Houfe on the com-
monalty to whom it is indebted for its existence,
for should it be directed by the will of the People
after the People had willed it their faculty of
thinking it would recognife in its conftituents:
the poffeffion of an intellect which they had moft
folemnly refigned: 'tis true indeed this delega-
tion of power is limited to a certain number of
Years. But it is alfo as true that during the
continuance of this fpecific time the House of
Commons is omnipotent and if omnipotent, concurring
with the other members of the conftitution, con-
trollable only by its own vote in general Parlia-
ment. The Commons of England prolonged
its deputation from three to feven Years without
thinking of confulting its Electors, and the fame
reasons might have continued it for the lives
of the then Reprefentatives. 'Tis true indeed there
is an implied compact between the Electors and
the Elected, but if this compact can be broken in

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upon in the article of time I fee no difficulty inf a fimilar infringement in the matter of place?· for if a man pledge himself to pay me a certain fum in a certain time at a certain place, and I fuffer him to enlarge the time to more than double its ftipulated duration withont complaint; he will naturally think he may difcharge a debt which he fees me indifferent about, where he will. In fact there is no Law maxim more true than this, that Liberty depends upon vigilance and when the People are guilty of laches in calling their Representatives to an account for their Parliamentary conduct at the conclufion of their public fervice, they cannot justly complain of being ferved not altogether to their wishes. If therefore the Commons of Great-Britain could legally enlarge its ancient du ration without confulting its Electors from three. to feven years; the Commons of Ireland cantranf fer its place of fitting from the proper dominion of Ireland to any other place it may think proper to prefer even to new Holland, and of courfe may treat and refolve on the subject of an Union with the Parliament of England independent of any Electorial confent. Having thus I hope. flatly levelled the great impediment to the defira bie measure of an Union, I fhall go on to ftate the advantages that may arise to Ireland from the incorporation of its Parliament with the legislative Affembly of the Empire, and first.

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A Parliament, I mean that part of it which reprefents the People is a member of the Conftitution, which though of the highest Importance in every Nation that has enjoyed freedom, yet has certain drawbacks

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on the freedom it fecures which the lovers of Liberty are feldom fully aware of. An election, particularly a general election is attended with certain ills that heretofore have baffled all remedy. It encourages idlenefs, forces the common people into exceifes frequently of long continuance, too often strikes at the root of morality by inducing perjury, and never fails to interrupt private friendships and generate public difcords, not only among the mean but the most refpectable families. Now, the measure of an Union, I may fafely fay will in a great degree prevent those democratic evils, for not more than one fifth of the prefent reprefentatives will be returned to ferve in the imperial Parliament, which in the first inftance will put an end to four fifths of the diforders attendant on elections, and if we add to this, the upright indifference that in all probability will direct the fuffrages of the people in the new order of things, we may fecurely pronounce the inconveniencies of a general Election to be reduced to at least an hundredth part. I will indeed confefs that the eagernefs of Candidates, and the interest which the people take in fupporting former favourites who have brought forward or fupported measures of national. good, may be productive of no small public advantage; but what public advantage can compenfate for general discord and general diffipation? then fo far as public quiet and harmony are fuperior to confufion and intoxication, an Union will be preferable to an independant Parlia

ment.

Again, it has been loudly lamented that the Parliament of Ireland has long ftood in need B

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of Reformation: but how is it poffible for a Parliament fo defective as to need Reformation to be able to reform itfelf?-it is out of the nature of things. What remedy then must be applied? why, to treat this high affembly like a fingle man in a fimilar fituation. The fingle man is advised to keep better company than himself that the example of others may amend him. Now the Parliament of England has always been allowed to be the wifest affemblage of Sages in the world; and if that wisdom, which is in itfelf moral perfection; can bring about that reform of our reprefentatives in Parliament which has been fo long devoutly wished, I think the incorporation of the two Parliaments will undoubtedly effect it. And as nothing can tend to give a man fo juft a knowledge of what is the bufinefs of Legislation fo much as the obfervation exercifed in travel, fo, no legiflative affembly will be able to boast of equal knowledge with that which ventures over feas in fearch of it-I have been obliged to make this remark on the near approach of Parliamentary reform to fatisfy fome malcontents who have long been in despair of it.

As I have ventured in the above with all humility, to compare the Body Politic with an individual Body, I am induced to continue the fimilitude with a view to prove the advantages which your Legislature itself may receive by the adoption of an Union. Nothing is better known among phyficians than the inadequacy of the head attached to a difeafed body, to preferibe for that body; and therefore no perfons more frequently afk advice than those who acquire their livelihood

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