Epistemology and Emotions
This volume focuses on the claim that we cannot but account for emotions if we are to understand the processes and evaluations related to empirical knowledge. The collected essays bring together work from backgrounds such as pragmatism and scepticism, cognitive theories of emotions and congnitive science, and virtue epistemology.
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Emotion and Understanding
On a Role
Virtues Emotions and Fallibilism
Conﬂict Without Contradiction
Epistemic Immediacy and Reﬂection
Critical Reﬂections on Affective Epistemology
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able accept According action activity affective agent answer appropriate argued argument aspects assessment attention attitude behaviour belief better Cambridge character claim cognitive concepts concern conﬂict conscious consider contradiction dangerous decision deliverances depends Descartes desires develop discussion distinction doubt Elgin emotions epistemic epistemology evaluations evidence example experience explain fact fallibilism fear feeling ﬁrst function give given holds Hookway human idea immediate important inference inquiry intellectual involved judgement justiﬁcation kind knowledge means mental mind moral motivate natural neural normative object one’s Oxford patterns Paul perception person Philosophy play position possible practice present problem processes properties propositional question rational reason reﬂective regarding relevant reliable represent representational requires responses role salience seems sense situation sometimes Sousa speciﬁc standards theory things thinking traits true truth understanding University Press virtue